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Abstract
The Japanese economy differs from other OECD countries in a number of 
important respects. Though half the women in age group 15-64 have participated in 
the labour force since the 1950s, patterns of gender inequality at work have been 
very slow to change. In the period 1975-2000, women’s monthly earnings remained 
approximately half of men’s, and female labour force participation has stagnated at 
50 percent. Fertility rates, meanwhile, have declined very sharply since 1975, 
without being accompanied by any marked increase in married women’s paid 
employment. One particularly unusual feature of the Japanese economy is that well 
qualified married women are less likely than those with lower educational 
qualifications to remain in the labour force.
The conventional explanations within neoclassical theory do not 
adequately explain these phenomena. They are based on the assumptions that 
people make decisions by considering income related factors. They suggest that 
technological advances will be associated with an increased participation of 
married women of in paid employment, and a particularly high participation rate for 
those with high qualifications; and that as a result, fertility rates will decline. The 
Japanese case does not conform to these expectations.
In order to explain the Japanese case more sufficiently, this thesis develops 
an alternative analysis drawing on Nancy Folbre and Timur Kuran’s work. In this 
model, individuals act upon preferences formed within a framework of social 
norms, and not merely in response to income generating factors. The thesis explores 
the constraints imposed by social norms and income related factors help explain the 
Japanese case.
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Part I Gender Inequality in Japan
Introduction 
1 Japanese Puzzles
The gender division of work, at home and in the workplace, is widely believed to 
develop in synchrony with the wider economy. The gender division of work affects 
economic development and economic development often fosters a particular 
gender division of work. Different countries are in different stages of economic 
development and exhibit different patterns of gender division.
Part of the argument of this thesis is that mainstream Anglo-American 
economic theory has simplified this relationship, and has readily assumed that all 
societies will pass through the same development path. As economies advance, 
both gender inequality at work and fertility rates are expected to follow the same 
path as that of Western Europe and areas of European settlements. Industrial 
economies develop from agrarian ones by going through phases of light and heavy 
manufacturing, eventually culminating a service economy that demands highly 
educated workers. Despite the different timing and the pace of development, this 
path is indeed common in industrial economies. As white-collar jobs increase in 
significance and women gain higher educational qualifications, gender wage 
differentials are predicted to decrease through the more equal provision of highly 
paid jobs for women (Goldin 1995). The rapid expansion of the market economy in 
the Western Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries since World War II brought about dramatic if  uneven changes in gender
1
roles, reflected in increased female labour force participation and a gradual fertility 
decline. Due to technological advances, women’s participation in both higher 
education and the labour market has increased, as has their proportion in the 
percentage of the population with higher-level qualifications. Fertility rates have 
declined for married women as they have increasingly found paid employment. 
Having children is also more costly than before because of decreasing gender wage 
differentials and growing gender equality in paid employment. Some economists 
predict that the same processes will occur elsewhere as economic development 
proceeds.
Yet peculiarities of Japanese society indicate that, although Japan has 
broadly followed the path of economic development that took place in Western 
industrial economies, it has not followed the expected path in relation to gender 
inequality and fertility change. In the following respects, in particular, Japan does 
not conform to the pattern in Western OECD countries:
■ Married women with higher educational qualifications are less likely 
than those with lower educational qualifications to participate in the 
labour force.
■ While gender wage differentials decreased in Western OECD countries 
from 1975-2000, those in Japan are still large and resistant to change. 
Gender wage differentials of female part-time workers are markedly 
large and widened even further in the 1990s.
■ Though the decline in fertility rates has been rapid since the 1970s, it 
has not been accompanied by the increase in female labour force 
participation that took place in Western OECD countries.
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In this thesis, I call these peculiar characteristics, the Japanese ‘puzzles’.
Why does Japan exhibit these particular puzzles? Existing economic 
theory does not provide a satisfactory explanation of female labour force 
participation and fertility change even within Western OECD countries, for these 
differ from country to country in ways that do not necessarily fit with economic 
predictions. Japan, however, differs in a particularly marked way, and I argue that 
this is best understood by examining the societal and institutional factors that shape 
female labour force participation and fertility change. Existing economic 
explanations pay insufficient attention to societal/institutional factors. The 
Japanese experience, therefore, provides a useful illustration of the limitations of 
neoclassical economic theory in explaining gender inequality and fertility change.
The thesis draws on the work of Nancy Folbre (1994, 2001b) to examine 
of the impact on people’s choices of social/institutional constraints that are 
themselves shaped by gender-based collective action. Importantly, the definition of 
social constraints includes not only material assets and rules, but also social norms 
and preferences. The latter emphasises the importance of emotional factors in 
people’s decision making; people not only seek self-interest, but also self-identity 
when they act upon certain preferences.
Folbre’s theory provides important insights into the Japanese experience 
through its exploration of the interaction between self-interest and self-identity in 
the process of decision making. However, her theory is largely based on 
cultural/institutional factors specific to the Western experience. To account for 
cultural factors that are specific to the Japanese case, this thesis develops Timur 
Kuran’s account of preference formation. In doing so, it attempts to deepen
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Folbre’s analysis of the interaction between the individual and social/institutional 
factors, to develop a more rounded explanation of the Japanese case.
This thesis then demonstrates my explanation of Japanese puzzles by 
synthesising Nancy Folbre and Timur Kuran’s accounts of normative interaction.
My central hypothesis is that social values and norms embedded in 
Japanese social organisations are, in large part, the same as those that in 
predominated late nineteenth century Japan, and therefore differ significantly from 
those of most Western OECD countries. Values in relation to work are typically 
embedded in norms of masculinity and femininity, which are subject to change over 
time (Folbre and Weisskopf 1998). The process of change regarding the gender 
division of work at home is, however, slower in Japan than Western OECD 
countries. In Japan, the work values in social organisations were formed in direct 
descent from traditional feudal norms, as a result of Japan’s sudden process of 
industrialisation (Kensy 2000; De Bary 1996: 21-37); though this point itself is not 
novel (Williams 1997; Garon 1997) of its implications have not been sufficiently 
explored in relation to the gender division at work and at home (Brinton 1993).
In this analysis, large keiretsu play a key role as they help people shape 
their perceptions to towards the prevailing values. My central hypothesis draws on 
Bourdieu’s (1977) analysis of the cultural capital of elite who have an influence on 
how people perceive attributes such as certain types of language, attitudes and 
customs. I define ‘elite’ in Japan as the elite in large keiretsu firms who set the 
terms for cultural capital, and establish the attributes other’s will try to acquire in 
order to become a member of the elite. This thesis focuses on elite in keiretsu 
because keiretsu increased their importance in the Japanese economy and society
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after the 1970s. I demonstrate the main features related to the shift from family 
owned businesses to paid employment caused by the expansion of large keiretsu 
firms, and explain why my thesis focuses on large firms in Japan. The more popular 
the firm becomes as a place for paid employment, the more important employer’s 
decisions become. Before the 1970s, family business owners tended to work with 
family members and, as a result, business owners, wives and mothers participated 
in the labour force. This, however, changed sifter the 1970s when paid employment 
began to increase.
Those hired in large firms enjoy higher paid jobs and prestige from being a 
member of the corporation. The employers in these firms select employees 
according to specific attributes. As a result, those who want to be hired by large 
firms tend to gain the attributes which employers in large firms value. This occurs s 
in any industrial country, but is particularly so in the Japanese context (see details in 
Chapter Five). This trend became stronger in Japan after the 1970s.
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2 My Analysis of the Japanese Puzzles
2.1 Main Hypothesis
Drawing on Nancy Folbre’s and Timur Kuran’s accounts of normative interaction, 
this thesis explores the interaction between prevailing gender norms and individual 
preferences. I argue that values and norms in social organisations in Japan 
encourage the development of preferences that differ widely by gender and that 
gendered preferences then play a crucial role in sustaining the gender inequality of 
work and reducing fertility rates.
My argument depends partly Kuran terms the status quo: an aggregate 
form of prevailing values and norms regarding the ‘elite’. The status quo in Japan 
encourages women to choose either paid employment or having children. Working 
women are encouraged to follow the ‘good’ worker model by staying childless if 
they are in paid employment; mothers are encouraged to leave work. When women 
make the first choice -  to remain single and in paid employment -  fertility declines. 
In this scenario, higher educational qualifications do not reduce the pressure to 
conform to female care work patterns because married women with higher 
educational qualifications tend to have elite husbands, and are less likely to 
participate in the labour force than women with lower educational qualifications. 
As a result, gender wage differentials persist. This binds married women to carer 
roles in the family and recreates the situation of women facing an ultimatum; either 
paid employment or children. Until fundamental change in the status quo occurs, 
this pattern will continue. I set out this main hypothesis by the following
6
sub-hypotheses.
2.2 Hypotheses
As will be noted in Chapters Two and Three, a conventional economics approach 
falls short of explaining the Japanese case due to its misleading assumptions 
regarding self-interest. I make three key points. First, while the conventional 
approach in economics pays attention mainly to incomes and opportunity costs (i.e. 
self-interest), my approach uses self-interest in a broader sense and includes gains 
from good reputation, following Kuran (1995)’s account of self-interest.1
Second, I argue that people’s actions are driven not only by self-interest 
but also self-identity, based on gender, age, sexuality, race, class and nationality 
(Folbre 1994,2001b).
Third, I argue that people connect their utility via reputation and emotions. 
Together with Kuran’s account of reputational utility, people’s actions driven by 
self-identity helps explain why people do not necessarily pursue ‘self-interest’ as 
defined in a conventional economics approach. For example, when a person 
identifies herself with a certain gender role, such as mother, she often acts 
according to what she wants to, needs to, and has to do as mother. When she
1 Kuran uses the definition of ‘utility’ in explaining self-interest and divides utility into three 
components: intrinsic utility (utility achieved directly from his inner preference), expressive utility 
(additional utility which values most when a person expresses exactly intrinsic utility) and 
reputational utility (utility that values most when a persons shows a preference for agreeing with 
others and adhering to social norms).
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prioritises her interest and identity as a mother over that as an individual, she acts as 
a mother even though she may be financially worse off during the most demanding 
period of time for child rearing. She may do both because she expects to acquire 
good reputation as mother (Kuran 1995) and feel attached to her own children 
(Folbre 2001b).
This happens because people play social roles to pursue their self-interest 
on the basis of emotions largely depending on their own experience and the 
expected experience. In the first place, when a person’s identity is linked to certain 
gender, age, sexuality, race, class and nationality roles, and he/she acts according to 
these, emotions play a marked role (Folbre and Weisskpof 1998; Folbre 2001b). 
Once a person self-identifies with a group, she develops feelings of attachment to 
that group, and these feelings of attachment will shape her subsequent actions. 
People act on the basis of a mixture of various motivations such as altruism, 
intrinsic joy, sense of responsibility, expected return from care giving and fear of 
punishment or loss (Folbre and Weisskopf 1998). This agrees with the findings in 
cognitive psychology; the part of the brain related to emotions is indispensable 
when the person makes decisions and reacts to the situation (Damasio 1995).
In the second place, bodily experience strengthens the emotions associated 
with it (Moore 1994; Folbre 2001b: 38). Moore notes that through their bodily 
experience, mothers may change their subjective position; as a result, they may 
form a different preference in relation to child rearing or paid employment. Folbre 
argues that the longer mothers spend time with their own children, the more they 
feel attached to them. It is important to note that attachment is a kind of emotion 
based on which people make decisions (Damasio 1995). I argue that this can be
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extended to apply to the case of Japanese men who socialise mostly with male 
managers and colleagues.
In the third place, emotions do not solely reflect the inner desire of the 
person independently of external factors. External factors can influence how a 
person feels, in particular, feelings of fear or insecurity. As Folbre and Kuran’s 
accounts suggest, external factors can influence a person in the following cases: 
certain groups of people feel responsible because social norms dictate as much; 
some people act as though they expect to be rewarded financially and praised in 
reputation; some people act as if they fear that they will be punished or lose 
financially or damage their reputation, if  not. Because fear induces group action and 
people increase their experiences as members of a group, it also encourages them to 
have feelings for other members in a group.
These elements such as the gain via reputation, the feeling of 
responsibility that is strengthened through attachment and the fear of financial loss, 
encourage people to maintain a clear gender division of work when they may not 
have a clear financial gain from doing so. A society such as Japan provides limited 
financial opportunities to mothers to support their family as a main breadwinner. 
This combines with the good reputation attached to women who follow gender 
norms. In the status quo, women with good reputation have higher probability to 
find a marriage partner that they and their children can financially depend on. This 
is particularly so, as many women believe that they will be more financially secure 
with a marriage partner following social norms than without him and working as a 
main breadwinner of the family. As people expect financial difficulties to act 
against social norms in the status quo, this encourages women to follow social
9
norms to avoid financial loss in the future. Thus, many women will choose to leave 
paid employment to take care of their own children, partly because the initial 
experience of childcare makes them feel more responsible for it, partly because it 
makes them feel more financially or reputationally secure, and partly because they 
feel fearful of the financial consequences of the status quo.
This also applies to Japanese men in the work place. Society offers little in 
the way of financial independence to the unemployed, and men who follow the 
customs of the firm in the status quo will achieve a good reputation. As a result, 
most Japanese men choose to follow the standard work pattern based on a clear 
gender division of work at home, partly because they feel responsible to their 
fellow workers, partly because they feel more secure financially and reputationally, 
and partly because they fear losing a job.
In a keiretsu economy, the sense of responsibility and fear can be a 
significant motive when people act along with the status quo. Fear, in particular, 
can be a particularly strong motive in Japanese society because people follow group 
consensus, as they fear being excluded. As the keiretsu is the dominant firm and 
upward labour mobility from small/medium size firms to keiretsu is low, people are 
likely to follow the group consensus status quo that fits with the keiretsu, in order to 
secure their financial position. This fear of losing security is a strong motive for 
conforming to the status quo.
The role of the elite is particularly important in the status quo. The best 
route to security lies in membership of the elite, and people will follow the status 
quo because they expect the best possible financial and reputational benefits from 
this. This analysis of the ‘elite’ draws on Bourdieu’s (1977) notion of ‘cultural
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capital’, which be presents as one crucial mechanism through which class 
advantage is produced intergenerationally. He argues that certain skills, knowledge, 
tastes, and lifestyles are intergenerationally passed on within a class as ‘cultural 
capital’. Elites, in this case, men, make holding such capital a prerequisite of 
rewards, even when the capital does not contribute directly to production and profit. 
In this process, an elite group engages in a symbolic struggle to impose a definition 
of society most in conformity with its collective class interests. When we introduce 
gender here, we can see that the form of capital that men have is more valued than 
that of women because it places a premium on years of experience in the labour 
market.
The definition of ‘elite’ is culturally specific and in Japan it is represented 
in the elements below. First, in the Japanese context, elites need to be men educated 
in elite universities where they achieve Western knowledge. At the same time, the 
elite member selflessly devotes his time to his employer by socialising with male 
members in keiretsu, with support from his full-time housewife, and develops 
networking between keiretsu and the government through alumni (Richter 2000). 
Because decisions are made by group consensus, Japanese society puts weight on 
male connections developed through socialisation.
Second, men and women have a gendered self-identity that forms a 
dovetailed pair in prevailing values and norms; elite sons and supportive daughters, 
elite working men and supportive working women and men, and working fathers 
and supportive mothers (Table 2-1). Women are likely to identify with members of 
the family while men are likely to identify with members of the firm (Table 2-1). 
Men are expected to selflessly devote themselves to the employer at the expense of
11
their private time and follow the group consensus within which senior men have 
leverage. Women are expected to support their husbands by taking sole 
responsibilities of care work for the family members so that he can spend as much 
time as possible socialising with managers and colleagues.
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Table 2—1: Model on Preference Formation by Change of Gender Roles throughout Life Course
Related Chapter Chapter Six Chapter Seven Chapter Nine Chapter Eight Chapter One
Subject Educational Investment Gender Vertical Segregation Care Provision and Work Pattern Time-off work for childcare Social Values
Women teens-early 20s single adult children married childless persons Parents Elderly
Gender Role at home caring daughters 
future wife and mother
caring daughter but live alone 
future wife and mother
wife
future mother
wife
mother
(past) work in family businesses 
care provider to children 
(present)
self caring or cared-for by society
Gender Role at work study subjects favourable 
to become professional 
care providers
have a male job by following maleness cultur worker in female care jobs 
or have a female carer job care provider
care provider
worker without childcare duty
cared-for 
(past by family) 
(present bv society)
Men teens-early 20s single adult children married childless persons Parents Elderly
Gender Role at home 
Gender Role at work
sucessful son 
future breadwinner
study subjects favourable to 
become elite workers
breadwinner
follow male cultural capital for job
breadwinner 
husband 
future father
follow male cultural capital for job
breadwinner pension reciever (present) 
husband
father (earning money for the family) 
follow male cultural capital for job
Influencial Persons on Paid Work Fathers Male workers in social organisations 
such as managers and male peers
Managers and male peers at work 
parents in law in fertility decision
Managers and male peers at work 
parents in law in care provision
adult son
Influential Person on Care Work Mothers
Grandparents (before the 1970s)
Parents (weaker influence than in teen age) husband
parents in law (before 1970s)
children 
husband 
parents in law 
peer parents
adult son
Note: Chapter Five discusses the origin of social values in social organisation, which fosters a traditional gender division of work illustrated above.
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As the status quo encourages men and women to establish a clear gender 
division of work, people’s experiences are strongly gendered; men develop a tie to 
male members of the firm via male socialisation (Roberson 1998; Kensy 2000); and 
women develop a tie to family members, particularly to their own children (Ehara 
2000).
Third, reputations come to rest on men and women following their 
expected gender roles. In Japan, decisions are made not on the basis of individual 
opinion but on the basis of consensus of a group (Mirai-city 2003; Kensy 2000). 
The persons with bad reputations may be excluded when a group makes decisions 
and distributes benefits amongst members.
As argued by Kuran, the status quo sustains itself by authority and peer 
pressure (i.e. concern over reputation) for when people are concerned about 
reputation, they are reluctant to contest popular values and norms. In Kuran’s 
(1995) and Kuran and Sunstein’s (2000) analysis, people fear losing reputational 
utility if  they stand out against prevailing values and norms. The values and norms 
then encourage people to identify themselves with their group, encouraging men to 
identify themselves as employees in a large keiretsu firm. Outside the family, the 
reputation of men and women who do not conform is lowered. Due to the 
importance of informal networks in social organisations (Richter 2000; Kensey 
2000; Ogasawara 1998) reputation is perceived as a particularly important factor in 
securing connections in the workplace. In the home, reputation is also important for 
wives, as they need to act together with the wives of their husband’s managers, 
colleagues and their own neighbours (Hendry 1993).
Accordingly, the status quo in Japan has extra enforcement power to make
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men and women follow clear gender divisions of labour via reputation. As Kuran 
(1998) suggests, even without law or regulation, people carry on following the 
status quo because they fear the loss of reputation if they contest the status quo. 
Others are not necessarily the employers and other authority figures but also 
colleagues.
This suggests that many Japanese men, particularly the elite, have great 
difficulties in being absent from work for personal reasons because they know that 
their reputation drops as the employers and colleagues see them as selfish persons. 
They are seen as not selflessly devoting themselves to the employer by prioritising 
work time over their private time. If workers absent themselves from work, their 
fellow workers are pressurised to make up for their absence and this eventually 
risks their reputation amongst colleagues as well as putting their financial security 
at risk in the future.
Both men and women feel this peer pressure. However, working women 
feel this pressure differently; as people who believe in social norms praise women 
who leave their job for marriage and having children, working women are 
pressured to leave their job if they begin to absent themselves from work for family 
reasons.
This thesis explores how these elements of the status quo help create the 
Japanese puzzles. Given the strong influence of the status quo, mothers may play an 
unpaid child carer role not only because of altruism and the joy of doing so but also 
because of a sense of responsibility and fear that the status quo induces. The more 
strongly the status quo affects people’s perceptions, the larger the impact of the 
latter motives. The sense of responsibility and fear combine with altruism and the
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joy of childcare, and women may feel confused when they give up their jobs to 
specialise in looking after their own children. As specialists, these mothers directly 
face these complex feelings associated with unpaid childcare. I argue that this trend 
is stronger for university educated women in Japan. In order to avoid these complex 
feelings, women may remain single and in employment, and delay starting a family. 
Single working women face another problem; they feel pressure to conform to male 
members in the firm who firmly follow the status quo. While most men are 
rewarded by conforming to the group, women are less likely to be rewarded 
because of social norms. This is even worse for married working women. The result 
is, the ‘Japanese puzzles’.
3 How the Status Quo Works
3.1 Economic Dominance of Keiretsu
Keiretsu are the groups of successful export companies linked to banks in Japan 
(Table 3-1). In terms of industry formation, keiretsu turn to each other for a 
particular service where possible, a process that perpetually reinforces mutual 
interdependence. Links between firms are frequently informal, with relationships 
founded on the basis of their interlocking directorships (Hunter 1989: 135).
Keiretsu represent only a small proportion of firms and the labour force in 
Japan. The Ministry of economy, Trade and Industry (METI)2 (2001) in its report 
on small/medium size firms found that the proportion of large firms was only 0.8
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per cent while that of small/medium size firms was 99.2 per cent in 1999; the 
proportion of employees in large firms was 19.4 per cent while that in 
small/medium size firms was 80.6 per cent in the same year.
2 METI is the successor of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).
3 MITI defined small/medium firms as firms with less than or equal to 300 employees (for 
wholesale, less than or equal 100 employees; for retails, catering and services, less than or equal to 
50 employees).
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Table 3-1: Six Keiretsu Groups
Group Name Mitsui (Mitsukoshi) Mitsubishi (Nihon Yusen) Sumitomo (Sumitomo Mining) Fuyou Daiichi Kangin Sanwa
Main Bank Sakura
(Mitsui-Sumitomo Bank)
Mitsubishi
Tokyo-Mitsubishi
Sumitomo
(Mitsui-Sumitomo)
Fuji
(Mizuho)
Daiichi Kangin 
(Mizuho)
Sanwa 
(UFJ Bank)
Trust Bank Mitsui Trust Mitsubishi Trust Sumitomo Trust Yasuda Trust - -
Insurance Mitsui Life Insurance Meiji Life Insurance Sumitomo Life Insurance Yasu Life Insurance Asahi Life Insurance Nihon Life Insurance
Trade Company Mitsui Trade Mitsubishi Trade Sumitomo Trade Marubeni Itochu/Kanematsue Trade Nissho Iwai Trade
Automobile Toyota Mitsubishi Nissan Isuzu Daihatsu
Electronics Toshiba Mitsubishi Electronics NEC Hitachi/ Oki Electron! Fujitsu Sharp
Heavy Industry Mitsui Shipbuilding/IHI Mitsubishi Heavy Machinery Sumitomo Heavy Machinary Showa Electronics Kawasaki Heavy Machinary Hitachi Metal
Metal Mitsui Metal Mitsubishi Material Sumitomo Metal Nihon Steel Kawasaki Steel Kobe Steel
Real Estate Mitsui Real Estate Mitsubhishi Real Estate Sumitomo Real Estate Tokyo Building
Construction 
(General Construction)
Mitsui Construction Mitsubishi Construction Sumitomo Construction Taisei Construction Shimizu Construction Obayashi Group
Source: Hino Cable TV (2003)
Note: Group Name = Name in ( )  finace zaibatsu, the former body of keiretsu.
Main bank has complicated history of merge. For example, Mistui-Sumitomo bank 
Mitsui Bank + Taiyo Kobe Bank = Taiyo Kobe Mitsui Bank = Sakura 
At the same time, Sumitomo Bank + Heiwa Mutual Trust Bank = (Expanded) Sumitomo Bank 
Mitsui Sumitomo Bank is consists of Sakura Bank and (extended) Sumitomo Bank
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However, keiretsu have a particularly significant impact on the economy 
and people in Japan. Firstly, keiretsu dominate over smaller firms within the same 
industrial sector. The Keiretsu system does not extend to the medium/ small 
enterprise sector, without which big business could not operate nearly so effectively. 
But in contrast to the large US firms, many small Japanese firms that are not 
themselves directly under keiretsu serve keiretsu, and there is severe competition 
amongst these small/medium firms (Shimokawa 1994). The relationship between 
keiretsu firms and medium/small firms is called ‘Shitauke’ (master-subordinate). 
Keiretsu of automobiles or electronics appliances, for example, located at the top 
echelon of firms, have plenty of ‘Shitauke’ small or medium firms in the middle or at 
the bottom of the echelon (Mari Ohsawa, 1993).
Keiretsu pressurise small/medium firms to cut the price of the products they 
supply to keiretsu in recessions. As the economy started to produce products requiring 
complicated processes from the 1970s, the link between the firms in these auto or 
electronic pyramids have become more like master and subordinates (Takenaka, 
1989; Mari Ohsawa, 1993). Takenaka (1989: 247), Mito (1991: 263) and Mari 
Ohsawa (1993:96) argue that keiretsu apply the paternal relations between parent and 
child of the feudal era to relations with their subordinates.
Few firms stand outside the keiretsu system. Firms in services can also 
offer workers poorly paid jobs in small/medium firms in industry. In the 1990s, 
more than 30 per cent of Japanese firms were in the service sector. The dominance 
of very small units was particularly great in retail and services since these were 
family-operated and a popular form of business.
The second, and perhaps even more important point, is that precisely
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because the keiretsu employ a minority of workers, they can exert tremendous 
pressure on their employees to conform to their working styles. Because lifetime 
employment prevails within keiretsu, job mobility has declined since the 1980s 
(Higuchi 1991: 92-122); unemployment benefits are in addition very limited in 
Japan (Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare 2001a). On the one hand, then, the 
economy displays a type of exclusion between workers in keiretsu and 
small/medium firms because there is little upward mobility in employment between 
them. As lifetime employment in keiretsu creates few vacancies within keiretsu, 
external workers have little chance to be hired in keiretsu if not hired for their first 
job immediately after graduating from university. Only keiretsu workers in keiretsu 
enjoy lifetime employment security and progressive wages by age (see the details in 
Chapter Three). Higuchi (1991: 106-7) argues that employers in 1975, after the 
economy experienced the first oil crisis, increasingly transferred employees to the 
subsidiary small/medium firms, where they earned 70 per cent of the income paid 
in the keiretsu head firms. On average, the unemployed receive from 50 to 80 per 
cent of the monthly income that he or she earned in the lost job.
On the other hand, unemployment benefits are not sufficient for Japanese 
workers to easily leave a job. The length of payment is a maximum of 300 days for 
the unemployed person who had been in employment for more than 20 years 
(Ministry of Labour 2001). If a person decides to leave a job, they need to wait for 
three months to get paid unemployed insurance.
As keiretsu dominate the industry and financial security for the 
unemployed is low, people are encouraged to seek employment in keiretsu. As 
keiretsu are always positioned at the top of the industrial echelon, they can provide
20
their workers with lifetime jobs and progressive pay by age. Small/medium firms 
cannot afford to provide such good conditions because they are subject to pressures 
to reduce costs because of the oil crises in the 1970s. This was partly because only 
keiretsu could afford to provide progressive pay and partly because the service 
sector increased its share of the economy.
Keiretsu are, on the face of it, in the best position to develop good practices 
as regards gender, because they could offer lifetime employment and progressive 
pay to both men and women. However, as keiretsu offer financial security solely to 
men, they can influence not only the structure of the industry but also the gender 
structure by their employment practices.
Under these circumstances, despite keiretsu representing only 0.8 per cent 
of firms and 19.4 per cent of workers, people in Japan perceive the keiretsu as 
significantly shaping the economy and employment.
3.2 The Characteristics of the Status Quo
My central argument is as follows. As keiretsu dominate the economy, the gender 
norms incorporated into keiretsu have a particularly profound impact on people’s 
perceptions of appropriate relations in the home and in the workplace. People form 
their perceptions by taking prevailing values and norms (the status quo) as their 
reference point; they believe that if they satisfy the elements in the status quo, they 
will be successful. Others will come to see them as elites and as the prestigious 
wives of the elite. This perception, however, has its drawbacks.
According to Kuran, as long as the status quo fits the needs of society and
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most people benefit from it, following the status quo earns the best outcome. In this 
case, if people simply follow the status quo, society functions effectively. But in 
accordance with the status quo is effective only when men and women not only 
strengthen their attachment to members of the firm (men) and to the family 
(women) and are tied to gender roles but also when their interests are served by 
following it. However, if people continue following a status quo that no longer 
meets the needs of society and benefits most of the people, this causes society to 
malfunction; even if people are tied to gender roles, they no longer benefit. If this 
continues, people grow dissatisfied with the status quo and eventually give up 
believing in it. As a result, the status quo changes.
In the case of Japan, most people do not yet recognise that the status quo is 
subject to change. The status quo effectively functioned for the family before the 
1970s, when the economy post-oil crises changed the formation of the family. The 
status quo worked even less effectively after the 1990s as the economy started 
suffering a long recession and unemployment. I argue that the gap between people’s 
preference and real choice suggests the status quo in Japan may start 
malfunctioning. This is developed Chapters Six, Seven, Eight and Nine. Declining 
fertility is arguably one of the first signs of this. Despite economic changes 
transforming values and norms to some extent, the status quo maintains the 
importance of maleness because people rarely look at this part of the status quo 
with fresh eyes.
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3.3 Change in Values
Changes in values and norms suggest which part of the status quo was strengthened 
while other parts were weakened. As the economy changes, families and society 
also change, and, in particular, their values change. Japan experienced economic 
development accompanied by changes in the family and, as a result, family values 
changed in the 1970s.
The current form of the status quo in Japan draws on long established 
attributes that are increasingly at odds with the modem economy. These attributes 
are based on ideal relationships between lord and subordinates, between senior and 
junior men and women, and between the husband and wife in the nineteenth 
century and before. A majority of the archetypal ideals were formed in the 
Tokugawa feudal era (1600-1867), but the ideal relationship between husband and 
wife has its root in the Meiji era (1867-1912) during its ‘modernisation’ period.
Most parts of the status quo were carried over in the post-WW II era. After 
lifetime employment in keiretsu prevailed in the 1970s, the responsibilities of 
employees to employer strengthened while the responsibilities of employer to 
employees weakened and became less like that of Tokugawa era. Similarly, after a 
firmer gender division of work in keiretsu prevailed from the 1970s, the classic 
relationship of husband and wife prevailed among the majority of Japanese families, 
but with a modification in the responsibilities of the husband.
Change occurred most in the values associated with children and elderly 
people. When the economy underwent significant changes in the wake of the oil 
crisis in the 1970s, there was also a process of change in social values and norms:
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most notably, there was a changing pattern in (1) care service provision for the 
elderly and (2) single women’s paid employment from the 1970s (Retherford, 
Ogawa, and Matsukura 2001). The state pension reduced the responsibility of adult 
children to provide financial support to elderly parents after the 1960s. After the 
1970s, sons and daughters increasingly lived away from elderly parents in order to 
find paid employment (Mikami 1993). This induced a change in values; before the 
1970s, parents had children partly because they needed to rely on them in their old 
age, but this motivating force has since become weaker (Mikami 1993; Cabinet 
Office 2002). Following this change, social norms regarding financial support from 
adult children to elderly parents became weaker. Furthermore, due to an increase in 
paid employment after the 1970s, single daughters started engaging in paid 
employment. Social norms that discouraged single women from working outside 
the family were thus modified.
It is worth noticing that, following these value changes regarding the 
family, there has been a change in preferences regarding the gender division of 
work in the family among both men and women. A greater number of men and 
women in the 1990s indicate that they would prefer a more equal division of work 
within the family than in the 1970s. In 1973, 56 per cent of men and 51 per cent of 
women thought that men should assist in their wife’s domestic work. In 1998, by 
contrast, as many as 81 per cent of men and 87 per cent of women preferred an 
equal division of work in the family (Nihon Hoso Kyokai 1998). Regarding 
childcare, by 1999, 67 per cent of men said that fathers should take time off work 
for childcare (Prime Minister’s Office 2000). Anticipating a further slide in fertility 
rates, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2000) promoted a campaign
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geared to change the image of the ‘father’, in order to encourage fathers to 
participate in childcare and ease a mother’s responsibilities (Roberts 2002: 76-82).
In spite of these changes, a significantly large proportion of wives 
continue to perform the majority of care work for the family; The National Institute 
of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR)(2001) reported that mothers 
aged over 30 with children under one year old still carried out 80 per cent of the 
childcare in 1999.
The mismatch between preferences and actions suggests that both mothers 
and indeed fathers who would prefer a more equal division of childcare are being 
pressured into choosing a strict gender division of labour in the family; as Nikkei 
Hourly News (2003 1 March 01:00 AM) reported, that only 6.5 percent of fathers 
took time off work for childcare, while 30 per cent of them said they would wish to 
do so. Women who prefer paid employment to childcare and men who prefer 
childcare to paid employment have difficulty acting upon these preferences in the 
current social values and norms, particularly in keiretsu. Thus, even though over 80 
per cent of men and women report a preference for an equal division of labour in the 
family, this preference is not reflected in their choices.
3.4 The Japanese Puzzles in the Status Quo
I argue in this thesis that an understanding of the process sustaining the status quo 
provides a better understanding of the Japanese puzzles. When they consider the 
status quo the best situation possible, people are most likely to want to be either a 
member of the elite or wife of an elite member. Such people will adopt strict gender
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roles. As I argue in the thesis, this gender division starts from educational 
investment. Boys compete to obtain a degree from an elite university in order to get 
employment in a keiretsu, and parents support this. In contrast, even if girls have a 
degree from an elite university, keiretsu are reluctant to hire them because they 
expect women to stay at home in order to rear children and differently value 
women’s educational qualifications from men’s. If women have a degree from a 
female-only university, keiretsu may hire them for assistant jobs. Elites in keiretsu 
tend to marry university educated women, so some women are encouraged to have 
higher educational qualifications for the purposes of marriage. Due to this, women 
do not necessarily attain educational qualifications for employment as do men.4
Men, particularly young men, in keiretsu are pressured to follow the status 
quo. As managers assess the worker’s performance with little regard for firm-based 
trade unions (Mari Osawa 1993: 66-7; Tsumura and Kita 1994:189), and there are 
few available jobs after redundancy, men conform to gender divided work patterns 
supported by social norms, assuming -  rightly - that managers and senior male 
colleagues prefer this. Even if the employer does not directly pressure employees, 
workers are sensitive about maintaining their reputation, and fear they would be 
disobeying senior men if they did not follow social norms. This trend is 
strengthened after marriage. In contrast, married women in keiretsu are pressured to 
follow the wife’s role. If they do not match the expectations of senior men, they are 
regarded as ‘bad’ mothers and eventually ‘bad’ workers who do not value the status 
quo.
As senior men in keiretsu pressure parents to fit the prevailing social
4 Details in Chapter Six.
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norms, working fathers and mothers in keiretsu are unlikely to have access to time 
off for childcare even if they are legally entitled to it. Fathers rarely access childcare 
time-off as they are afraid of losing their job; and mothers tend to leave a job for 
childcare. Social norms after the 1970s are, however, less likely to restrict single 
men and women. Folbre (1994, 2001a) argues that changes in the economy 
modified social norms to reduce the restrictions on single women in the US. This 
also applies to Japan after the 1970s.
Where women are sensitive to value changes, it is rational for them to 
remain single and childless in order to continue working for pay. As maleness and 
marital status are crucial for elites in keiretsu, both single and married women are 
on the whole excluded. Nevertheless, there is less pressure on single women to 
follow gender norms than on working fathers and mothers.
Highly educated women in Japan are less likely to participate in the labour 
force partly because these women are likely to have elite husbands who need 
full-time housewives (Wakisaka 1990), and partly because even married women 
with a degree from an elite university cannot share care work for the family with an 
equally-highly qualified husband (Strober and Kaneko-Chan 1998). When the 
husband follows the ideal elite role in keiretsu, there is no option for his wife but to 
follow her assigned role. This is particularly so as the husband often lives away 
from the family for work. Also, as parents with higher educational qualifications 
tend to wish their children to have higher education (Brinton 1993), mothers 
specialise in teaching their children in the pre-school age in order to win 
competition for elite university places (Okada 1999).
Accordingly, as long as people in Japan stick to the current status quo,
27
mothers, particularly mothers with higher educational qualifications, are unlikely to 
participate in the labour force and fertility rates will continue to slide. As long as 
men and women think that they cannot challenge the league of senior men in 
keiretsu to break the mechanism of the status quo, delaying marriage and staying 
childless is the rational option for women. Therefore, fertility decline proceeds 
while mothers do not increase labour force participation.
Values and preferences can change as the economy and society changes. 
Adult sons and daughters have smaller financial responsibilities to their elder 
parents. This reduces the pressure of social norms and allows both adult children 
and elder parents to live independently. Nevertheless, as the status quo absorbed the 
impact of changes, working parents, particularly working mothers, increase their 
responsibilities as child carers. Though these adult sons and daughters are less 
burdened by care work for their elderly parents, they increase their workload as 
child carer because they cannot relay on support of their elderly parents in childcare. 
I argue that this has done so in Japan in ways that maintain the importance of 
maleness and seniority in the keiretsu elite.
4 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I provides details of the Japanese puzzles 
and a comparison with the experiences of the Western OECD countries; Part II -  
Chapters Two to Four - examines the application of neoclassical economic theory 
to the Japanese experience, and offers a critique based on the analyses of Folbre and
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Kuran. Part III -  Chapters Five to Nine - applies the subsequent theoretical 
framework to give an account of the Japanese puzzles.
Chapter One highlights the characteristics of the Japanese economy that 
appear as peculiarities from the perspective of neoclassical economic theory, and 
identifies these as the Japanese puzzles.
Chapter Two explains the dominant explanations of female employment 
and fertility change within neoclassical theory. Chapter Three considers the 
application of this theoretical framework to the Japanese experience.
Chapter Four explores an alternative explanation to neoclassical economic 
theory, that of Nancy Folbre. In contrast with neoclassical economic theory, Folbre 
insists that people act upon preferences that are formed on the basis of multiple 
self-identities and self-interest. She argues that emotional factors play a large role in 
the development of self-identity, often affecting gender roles, as well as roles based 
on age, sexual preferences, class, race and national context.
By means of a literature review, Chapter Five discusses the centred 
hypothesis on the development of cultural capital in social organisations and 
attempts to prove that social organisations today have inherited a large part of their 
values and norms from their predecessors in the pre-war era. This chapter focuses 
on large keiretsu (former zaibatsu) firms.
Chapters Six to Nine of the thesis provide a detailed empirical exploration 
of the sub-hypotheses, and draw on existing secondary literature to explore my 
central hypothesis.
Chapter Six shows that sons and daughters form their preferences by 
taking account of their father’s preferences, social norms and values. This draws on
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gender differentiated data from the major universities, available in paper form from 
Asahi Original (1995).
Chapter Seven demonstrates that employers select men and a few single 
women, who can conform to male culture at work, for highly paid positions and that 
this excludes most women from male high-paid jobs on the presumption that 
women prefer child rearing to paid employment. As noted in Chapter One, the 
gender gap in pay is associated with stricter vertical job segregation in Japanese 
firms. Here, I employ reports on industrial tribunals in the key firms on the Tokyo 
stock market, including Sumitomo keiretsu firms, to illustrate the way both 
employers and the courts affirm male cultural capital as a necessary basis for 
achieving a high-paid position. This indicates the role of male collective action in 
Japanese large- sized firms.
Chapter Eight illustrates how the status quo transforms the impact of value 
change in time off work for childcare, as peer workers believing in the status quo 
pressurise parents to follow social norms. Time off from work to care for children in 
Japan is actually available in many firms, but few parents in the private sector use 
their opportunity to take time off from work because of male peer pressure and a 
lack of support from others at work. This chapter further demonstrates the 
importance of male culture in social organisations, and draws on data regarding 
maternity and parental leave from Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha (1996a, 1996b, 1999).
Chapter Nine explores the way women make decisions regarding paid 
work and unpaid care service work in the family, and the particularly heavy 
constraints on women with higher educational qualifications who may wish to seek 
outside paid employment. I draw here on my own analysis by using the existing
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literature to illustrate that mothers may provide care services at home not only 
because of affection for their children, but for other reasons as well. Most 
importantly, some mothers may provide care work for children because they feel 
responsible but this is because society partially coerces women to feel like this 
through social norms (‘coercive’ being defined according to Folbre and 
Weisskiopf s (1998) use).
The central hypothesis is examined through the arguments presented in 
Chapter Five to Nine. As argued in these chapters, Japanese society tends to coerce 
mothers into providing care services for children. This is because current social 
values in Japan are based, in large part, on those of nineteenth century agrarian 
society. As the country’s economic elites encourage others to accept the present 
form of values as the best, Japanese social values on gender have been slow to 
change. People in Japan continue to perceive that “mothers” rather than “parents” 
or “other adults without children” should provide childcare because a ‘good 
mother’ provides childcare services at home. As people accept this external 
judgement of ‘good’ or ‘bad’ mothers, women in Japan are pressured into 
conforming to these strict standards. This is particularly strong in Japanese society, 
in which reputation (i.e. external judgement) plays a significant role in social life.
Working mothers are expected to act in accordance with male and female 
values that largely disagree in Japanese society. This, however, means that working 
mothers are likely to violate ideal gender roles either at work or at home; when 
working mothers act as workers, they will violate female carer roles at home; when 
they act as mothers, they will violate male worker roles at work. In both cases, 
working mothers are subject to the existing gender values.
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These values encourage women in Japan to choose either a male or a 
female gender role. Some women choose to have children and leave a job for this 
purpose, whilst some other women work outside the house without having children. 
There are, however, few gender-neutral roles that exist between these strict male 
and female roles. If Japanese women avoid conventional gender roles at home, they 
may have no children; this enables them to pursue their self-identity as a working 
person. If they avoid conventional male roles at work, they may stay at home to 
have children; this secures their reputation at the expense of their financial 
independence. Accordingly, there is a rationale for Japanese women to choose 
either children at the expense of paid employment or paid employment without 
children.
Chapter Nine shows that the rapid decline in fertility is related to this. If 
women prefer to avoid the pressure associated with female carer values, they are 
less likely to have children; this means that they stay single or have no children after 
marriage. In either case, these women dent their reputation less than working 
mothers who have the same work pattern as they do. It is assumed that childless 
women predict what may happen to them after having children through the 
experiences of mothers in the same generation and make choices based on this. 
Chapter Nine, then, examines why mothers provide childcare at home and whether 
or not they feel satisfied with it. If mothers, particularly mothers with higher 
educational qualifications, are less likely to be satisfied with caring exclusively for 
children at home, childless women are more likely to stay childless in the future.
Together, Chapters Five to Nine produce an alternative account to that 
found in the predominantly neoclassical literature on gender inequalities in Japan,
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and demonstrate the impact of persistent social and gender values in Japanese 
society. Because of this, gender inequalities at work have remained unusually rigid, 
and fertility rates have dropped sharply.
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Chapter One
Puzzles of the Japanese Economy 
1 Introduction
This chapter addresses the Japanese puzzles in detail; that is, the lower labour force 
participation rates of married women with higher educational qualifications 
compared to those with lower educational qualifications; the resistance of gender 
wage differentials to change; and a rapid fertility decline that has not been 
accompanied by an increase in married women’s labour force participation. I argue 
in this thesis that neoclassical economic theory - commonly used to explain 
Anglo-American experiences - provides an insufficient explanation of these 
puzzles.
The primary difference betweens the Anglo-American and Japanese 
experience are covered in Section 2 to Section 6, as follows. First, I consider the 
path of economic development followed by both the Western industrial countries 
and Japan. Section 2 examines the way that the economy has emerged and the 
expansion of services in Western industrial societies and Japanese society from the 
eighteenth century to the present. Second, I highlight the three key discrepancies 
that distinguish the Japanese experience from that of Anglo-American countries. 
Section 3 shows the pattern of female labour force participation, breaking this down 
to educational qualifications; Section 4 shows gender wage differentials; Section 5 
shows the change in fertility rates. Section 3 shows the similarities and differences 
between Japan and Western OECD countries’ female labour force in the period 
1975-2000; in particular, this highlights the differences regarding married women 
with higher educational qualifications. This section also examines the
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characteristics of part-time employment in Japan, such as the extraordinarily long 
working hours of some part-time workers. Section 4 demonstrates the fact that 
gender wage differentials in Japan are wider than in Western OECD countries, and 
that they were rigid over the period 1975-2000. This section includes a discussion 
of the part-time wages that married women with lower educational qualifications 
are most likely to be paid. Section 5 shows that Japan experienced a more rapid 
decline in fertility rates than Western industrial countries, excluding Spain and 
Italy, in the same period. This section shows that married women in Japan have not 
increased their labour force participation even when fertility rates have declined 
rapidly, in contrast with the experience in the West. Section 6 summarises the 
characteristics of the Japanese case.
2 Economic Development: towards a Post-Industrial Economy
According to some view, market activities developed in West European and North 
American economies over a similar time period and have a longer history than in 
Japan. The two centuries from 1450 to 1650 were marked in Europe first by 
exploration, exploitation, trade and settlement in the New World and West Indies, 
and second by a structural transformation, including of political-economic units 
(North 1981: 143). The short term consequences of this expansion were a widening 
of markets and an increase in opportunities for profit and, in turn, political pressure 
for structural changes to realise those opportunities. The period that preceded the 
initial industrial revolution is regarded as a prelude to rapid social and economic 
change, unleashed in Great Britain from the last half of the eighteenth century, with 
other Western European countries then following. The second industrial revolution
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took place in the early twentieth century when it created an elastic supply curve of 
new knowledge which built economic growth into the system (North 1981: 171).
North (1981) described the proliferation of technology and ‘science’ as the 
second economic revolution.1 The technological breakthrough that characterised 
the second economic revolution was the development of automated machinery to 
replace man’s hands and mind in production. The first of these developments was a 
continuation from the initial industrial revolution and was, in part, a simple result of 
the increasing specialisation and division of labour, which made the objective of 
devising a machine to replace a simple task easier for inventors. All the economies 
of the Western world underwent profound structural changes as a consequence of 
the second economic revolution. In the United States, Henry Ford’s assembly line 
for the manufacture of the Model T was a classic example. The type of industry 
created after the second industrial revolution was modem mass production, which 
was both capital and management-intensive (Chandler 1977). Mass production 
factories absorbed the male labour force and these workers formed trade unions to 
protect their jobs against the pressure of redundancy that cost-sensitive employers 
place on employees. As heavy industries require a large amount of capital, 
employers tended to control labour input to reduce costs, and it was important for 
mass production factories to have a balance between a number of managers and 
workers in order to function efficiently (Chandler 1977: 282-83).
1 The second economic revolution made the underlying assumption of neoclassical economics 
realisable, as discussed in Chapter Two. It should be noted that neoclassical economic theory is 
embedded in this notion o f ‘science’ as technology. North argues that the optimistic assumption was 
that new knowledge could be produced at a constant cost and that substitution at all levels made 
possible persistent and sustained growth. Such realisation was possible only with the wedding of 
science and technology.
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In my view, in contrast to Western Europe, Japan’s economic transition 
occurred later and over a shorter period of time (see Chapter Five). Before 1868, 
Japan was a feudal predominantly agricultural economy, but then, very rapidly 
shifted to an industrial one. With the collaboration of central government it caught 
up with the West’s level of heavy manufacturing before World War II. This 
transformation occurred at least one century after the initial industrial revolution of 
the West, and the contrast is even greater if  the centuries prior to the industrial 
revolution are considered as a preparatory period. Japan followed the traditional 
path of economic development, but within a period of just one hundred years 
compared with the Western experience of two or three hundred years.
Although Japan’s transition from a feudal to an industrial economy began 
far later, it shifted to being a service economy during roughly the same time period 
as the West. Western economies have become what are defined as service 
economies largely since World War II, with the speed of transformation increasing 
from the early 1980s (Esping-Andersen 1999: 103). The decline in industrial 
employment began in earnest in the 1980s. In the US in the early 1970s, less than 10 
per cent of employees worked in white-collar jobs; by the early 1990s, this figure 
had risen to 33 per cent (Employment and Earnings, US various years). The UK and 
Germany experienced similar trends. Between 1979 and 1993, the OECD countries 
lost an (unweighted) average of 22 per cent of their manufacturing jobs 
(Esping-Andersen 1999: 103). Over the same period the number of white-collar 
jobs expanded, most rapidly in Anglo-American societies, as seen in the annual 
growth of services (Table 1-2-1).
2 Service economy here means the economy that demands two types of workers - blue collar 
workers in retail, catering, and whole sale and white collar workers (both professional and clerical).
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Table 1-2-1: Service Growth and the Professional Technical Bias of Job Growth,
1980-1990
Annual Service Growth Ratio of professional to total growth
Australia 3.3 1.8
Canada 2.8 1.7
UK 2.1 2.8
USA 2.7 1.9
Denmark 0.8 2.0
Sweden 1.2 4.3
Austria 1.9 2.5
Belgium 1.4 3.8
France 1.6 7.3
Germany 1.8 3.1
Japan 1.2 3.8
Source: Esping-Andersen (1999), p. 108. International Labour Office, Yearbook o f Labour Statistics 
(1996, 2000)
Note: Years vary according to data availability
The number of white-collar jobs increased in Japan over the same period
as in Western OECD countries. In Japan, there were extra 1.4 million workers
newly engaged in the non-manufacturing sector from 1986 to 1996, but the
proportion of white-collar (both clerical and professional) workers among them
increased from 11 percent in 1986 to 33 per cent in 1996 (Management and
Coordination Agency 1997; Ministry of economy, Trade and Industry 2002).
The service sectors that expanded vary by country, as a wide range of
services is covered by the term; these include business (or producer) services,
distributive services, personal (or consumer services), and social services.
Business services include finance, insurance, real-estate and business-related
professional services (such as accounting, consulting, marketing, engineering and
design), most of which employ a high quotient of technical, professional and
managerial workers. In western industrialised countries, the employment share of
3 This follows Esping-Andersen’s (1999) categorisation.
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business services has at least doubled and in some cases even tripled since the 
1960s (Elfring 1988:108; Esping-Andersen 1999: 37-8).
Distributive services include wholesaling, retailing, transportation, 
communication. These emerged as companions to mass consumption and mass 
transportation, and boomed in the post-war decades. This was the catalyst for the 
first wave of female, white-collar employment. Although accounting for 
approximately 20 per cent of employment, distributive services are now stagnant 
and are more likely to contract than grow in the future (Esping-Andersen 1999: 
105) making them less likely to shape emerging post-industrial employment trends.
Personal (or consumer) services are the modem equivalent of butlers, 
maids, cooks, gardeners and other domestic help.4 They also reflect a growing 
quest for pleasure and purchased fun, and usually compete with tasks that 
households could in principle do themselves: cleaning and laundry, repairing, 
entertaining, serving food and drinks, and cutting hair. The labour-intensive nature 
and lower qualification requirements for employment in personal services is, to 
some extent, offset by technology and household capital goods such as washers, 
dryers and electric shoe-polisher.5 This makes household substitution easier, and 
depends on opportunity cost, meaning that unless they are affordable, personal 
services will stagnate. Partly because of different patterns of income distribution, 
Western OECD countries divide into low-cost service societies, such as the US and 
the UK, and high-cost service societies, such as Sweden and Germany
4 Personal services here mean the services exchanged mainly in the market; this excludes most 
publicly provided services such as education and health services.
5 Due to this character of personal services, personal service workers are paid less than workers in 
both other types of services and manufacturing. As women are more likely to engage in this type of 
service, this tends to lower women’s relative wage to men’s .
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(Esping-Andersen 1999: 105). In the UK and US, personal services account for 
10-12 per cent of the labour force; and in Germany and Sweden for 5-7 per cent 
(Elfring 1988: 109; Esping-Andersen 1993: 37-8).
Esping-Andersen (1993) defines social services6 as health, education and 
an array of care-giving activities, such as care provision for children and elderly. 
These services are largely dynamic because of the spread of mass education, ageing 
populations and intensified demands for health care. Households are their ultimate 
consumers, but apart from in a few countries, such as the US, most social services 
growth has taken place in the public sector. Nordic societies, as well as France and 
Belgium, have encouraged significant expansion of social services. This is the 
primary reason why Scandinavian welfare states account for approximately 30 per 
cent of all types of services (including, that is business services, distributive 
services, personal services and social services). This contrasts with other Western 
OECD countries where welfare services account for 15-20 per cent. Social services 
are skills-intensive due to their large share of medical doctors, nurses and teachers, 
but a notable feature is that the lower-skills bias increases as caring services grow.
Japanese service expansion is, to some extent, similar to that of the US. 
The types of services most widely available in Japan are business or manufacturing 
services, or consumer services such as restaurants, with other service sectors 
growing little (Ministry of Labour 1999b: reference 71, table 2-(l)-3). The main 
expansion of services in Japan has been in the manufacturing sector. This is similar 
to the US pattern from 1975-85 when the number of manufacturing jobs carried out 
by white-collar workers accounted for 90 per cent of the increase in manufacturing
6 Esping -Andersen defines social service as the types of services mainly financed by the 
government.
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White-collar jobs related to manufacturing expanded both in the US (1975-85) and 
Japan (1986-96) (Ministry of economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 2002).
Personal services such as restaurants and laundry services are just as 
widely available in Japan as in the US. However, apart from these, Japan has fewer 
marketed personal services than the US. Public sector service provision is less than 
in Sweden, and private social services less than in the US and the UK 
(Esping-Andersen 1999). Regarding other personal care services and social 
services, Japan is more similar to non Anglo-American Western OECD countries, 
such as Germany and Italy. Esping-Andersen (1999: 85) categorised Germany and 
Italy in the group of countries that have ‘conservative’ characteristics. In this group 
of countries, the family is the unit that provides personal care services and social 
services, the market place is in a marginal position, and the state subsidises these 
services (Table 1-2-2).
Table 1-2-2: A Summary Overview of Regime Characteristics
Liberal Social Democratic Conservative
Role of:
Family
Market
State
Marginal
Central
Marginal
Marginal
Marginal
Central
Central
Marginal
Subsidiary
Welfare state:
Dominant mode of 
solidarity
Dominant locus of 
solidarity
Individual
Market
Universal
State
Kinship
Cooporatism
Etatism
Family
Degree of 
decommodification
Minimal Maximum High
(for breadwinner)
Model Example USA Sweden Germany
Italy
Source: Esping-Andersen (1999), p.85.
Oddly, this suggests that Japan has followed a conservative European type
of family service provision similar to Germany and Italy. This contrasts markedly
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with the creation of service sectors in Japan, which has mainly followed the path of 
Anglo-American societies. Japan has thus copied the development path of the US, 
but not fully followed its market development. On the other hand, it has not 
followed the pattern of work and family relations that characterise Germany and 
Italy. Germany and Italy have a strongly regulated labour market, as do Austria, 
Belgium, Portugal and Spain. Japan, however, has a medium level of regulation as 
do in Ireland, the Netherlands, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Anglo-American 
societies meanwhile have weakly regulated markets: for example, the US, UK, 
Canada and Australia (Table 1-2-3: Esping-Andersen 1999:85).
Table 1-2-3: Typology of Regime by Labour Market Regulation, Welfare State and 
Family Type
Labour M arket Regulation
Little regulation Australia, Canada, Denmark, New Zealand, Switzerland, the UK and the 
United States
Medium regulation Japan, Ireland, the Netherlands, Finland, Norway and Sweden
Strong Regulation France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain
Welfare State
Residual Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States (and, to some extent, 
the UK)
Universalist Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands (and, to some extent, 
the UK)
Social insurance Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain
Families
Familialist Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain (and less 
so, Belgium and France)
Non-familialist Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the 
UK and the US
Source: Esping-Andersen (1999), p.85-86
Note: Esping-Andersen excludes Ireland in his catgorisation of both ‘Welfare State’ and ‘Families’.
Accordingly, workers in Japan are more likely to engage in manufacturing related
services or consumer services such as restaurants, but the market does not
sufficiently provide services that can substitute for the loss of family services as in
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Anglo-American societies. Due to the uneven development of the market, men and 
women in Japan are affected differently by the expanding service economy.
3 Characteristics of the Female Labour Force in Japan
Section 3.1 shows the general characteristics of the female labour force in Japan 
and contrasts them with various Western industrial countries. Section 3.2 illustrates 
the pattern of labour force participation by educational qualification and contrasts it 
with that in various Western industrial countries, in particular, the US. Section 3.3 
highlights three features. The first is that before the 1970s, a high proportion of 
women in Japan were working in family owned businesses including agriculture7. 
The second is the peculiar status of part-time workers in Japan, whose proportion in 
the total labour force increased after the 1970s while the proportion of workers in 
family owned businesses declined. The third feature is the negative impact of 
marriage on female labour force participation in the late 1990s, and the particular 
strength of this pattern in Japan.8
Section 3.3 is particularly important in addressing the Japanese puzzles. 
With industrialisation and the expansion of services, women moved from 
employment in family owned businesses to employment in firms, and it was after 
the mid-1970s that the pattern of female labour force participation I call the 
Japanese puzzle emerged. Despite what might be anticipated, this shift did not 
make it easier for married women to participate in paid work.
7 Family owned (small size) businesses are defined as family businesses in this thesis. Family 
businesses are businesses that are run by family members living in the same household.
8 South Korea has had the same trend as Japan.
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3.1 Patterns of Female Labour Force Participation
In Western OECD countries, female labour force participation increased from 1970 
to 1996. This was in line with the prediction that the more women there are with 
high qualifications and the more white-collar jobs expand, the more women will 
increase their participation in the labour market. In Japan, by contrast, female 
labour force participation has stagnated at approximately 50 per cent through the 
last half of the twentieth century. Before the 1970s when women, on average, had 
lower qualifications, there were fewer opportunities for white-collar employment. 
According to conventional expectations, women in Japan should have increased 
their labour force participation with the subsequent development of the service 
economy (Eaterlin 1980; Goldin 1988), but this did not occur. Japanese women 
have had a rather flat labour force participation for half a century.
The rate of female labour force participation was at a relatively high 50.6 
per cent in 1955, dropped to a low of 45.7 per cent in 1975, reached a high of 50.7 
per cent in 1991, and stood at 48.3 per cent in March 2002 (Ministry of Labour 
2000: Ministry of Labour 1999b: Japan Statistic Bureau Management and 
Coordination Agency 2002). As Table 1-3-1 indicates, female labour force 
participation was relatively high in the 1920s-1960s, but has hardly increased since 
then. Female labour force participation in Japan has fluctuated with the economic 
cycle, but has stagnated at 50 per cent since the 1960s (Takenaka 1989: 228).
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Table 1-3-1: Female Labour Force Participation in Japan, 1920-2002
Year Female Labour Force 
Participation
Year Female Labour Force 
Participation
1920 53.3 1991 50.7
1930 49.0 1992 50.7
1940 52.5 1993 50.3
1950 48.6 1994 50.2
1955 50.6 1995 50.0
1960 50.9 1996 50.0
1965 50.6 1997 50.4
1970 49.9 1998 50.1
1975 45.7 1999 49.6
1980 47.6 2000 49.3
1985 48.7 2001 49.2
1990 50.1 2002 (March) 48.3
Source: figures of 1920-65 are from Population Census. Figure of 1970 is from the Labour Force 
Survey, Ministry of Labour (1970). Figures of 1975-1998 are from Labour Force Survey 
in Ministry Labour (1999b), Figures of 1999-2002 are from Labour Force Survey in 
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (2003).
As Table 1-3-2 indicates, female labour force participation was relatively 
high in Japan in the 1960s and the early 1970s, as compared with the US and the 
UK, and West Germany. Thirty years on, the rate in Japan was virtually unchanged, 
while female labour force participation in the US and West Germany had 
significantly increased.
Table 1-3-2: Status of Female Labour Force in Industrial Countries from 1960-70 and
1999
Country Year Female Labour Force 
Participation
Year Female Labour Force 
Participation
Canada N/A. N/A. 1999 58.9
United States 1969 42.7 1999 59.3
West Germany 1961 41.1 1999 48.3
United Kingdom 1966 41.9 1999 43.7
Japan 1970 49.9 1999 49.6
Unit: percentage
Source: Labour Force Survey from Ministry of Labour (1970) and Ministry of Health, Labour and 
Welfare (2001b) for Japan. Yearbook o f Labour Statistics, International Labour Office (various 
years) for other countries
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3.2 Female Labour Force Participation by Educational Qualification
In the US, there is a strong correlation between women’s educational qualification 
and their participation in the labour market: women with more years in education 
are more likely to be in the labour force.
Figure 1-3-1: Female labour force participation by educational qualification in the 
US, in 1996
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70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0 
10.0
0.0
Percentage
§5
-Below 12 years in education 
-12 years in education 
13-15 years in education 
over 16 years in education
25-34 35-44 25-64
Source: OECD (1998).
In Japan, by contrast, this pattern only applies to women in their twenties 
and early thirties (Figure 1-3-2). Once women reach their mid thirties those with 
higher educational qualifications are less likely to participate in the labour force. In
Q
marked contrast to the US, this pattern has been maintained at least since 1980.
8 Higuchi (1991: 246) noted that in 1980 labour force participation in Japan was higher for women 
with lower qualifications after they reached their thirties. Higuchi points out that little research has 
been done regarding female labour in Japan while much research has been done regarding the male 
labour force because life-time employment has attracted attention.
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Figure 1-3-2: Female labour force participation by educational qualification in 
Japan, in 1999
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Source: Ministry o f  Labour (2000: www.jil.go.jp/kisya/josei/2000)
Figure 1-3-3 indicates that the US pattern is broadly replicated in other 
OECD countries, the main exception being South Korea where the pattern is closer 
to that in Japan.
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Figure 1-3-3: Female labour force participation by age group and educational qualification 
in the UK, Canada, Germany, France, Italy and South Korea, in 1996
(a) UK (1996) (b) Canada (1996)
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source Education at a Glance, OECD Indicators 1998 table F5 1
As all these tables indicate, the labour force participation of Japanese 
women has followed an unusual pattern. The higher educational educations that, in 
other countries, make it more likely that women will work outside the home (for 
obvious reasons, relating to the higher salaries they can command, and the 
possibility therefore of paying others to carry out childcare or domestic work) do 
not have this effect in Japan. Once women reach their mid-thirties, the better 
qualified are less likely to be in the labour force.
The other marked disparity is that while women’s labour force 
participation in Japan is very high for the 20-24 age group (comparable to the US,
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Canada and the UK, and considerably higher than Spain, Italy or France), it drops 
significantly for the 30-39 age group (Table 1-3-3).
Table 1-3-3: Labour Force Participation by Age Group and Country, 1996/1999
Age group Japan (1999) 
Women Men
US (1999) 
Women Men
Canada(1999) 
Women Men
UK(1999) 
Women Men
South Korea 
(1999)
Women Men
15-19 16.8 18.5 51.0 52.9 49.8 50.8 59.6 64.1 11.8 10.6
20-24 72.4 72.8 73.2 81.9 73.4 80.0 69.6 80.9 60.8 53.1
25-29 69.7 95.6 76.9 92.7 80.0 90 5 75.1 93.3 52.3 84.2
30-34 56.7 97.5 75.9 93.8 78.4 92.5 (age
25-34)
(age
25-34)
48.1 95.4
35-39 61.5 97.7 76.2 93.3 79.2 92.9 77.6 92.1 58.7 96.1
40-44 69.5 97.7 78.2 92.3 80.6 92.3 (age
35-49)
(age
35-49)
63.1 94.4
45-49 71.8 97.5 78.9 90.3 78.6 91.1 62.8 93.0
50-54 67.9 97.1 74.0 86.9 70.6 86.1 28.2 44.7 55.4 89.9
55-59 58.7 94.7 61.8 78.4 50.6 72.2 (age 
over 50)
(age 
over 50)
51.2 81.0
60-64 39.7 74.1 38.8 54.8 26.0 46.6 46.3 65.5
Total (over 
15) 
Total (over 
0)
49.6 76.9 59.3
(1996)
74.9
(1996)
58.9 72.5 43.7 56.3. 47.4 74.4
42.6 64.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a n.a. n.a. n.a.
(cont.)
Age group Spain (1999) 
Women Men
Italy (1998) 
Women Men
France (1996) 
Women Men
Germany (1999) 
Women Men
Sweden (1996) 
Women Men
15-19 21.6 28.3 15.5 23.8 5.3 9.4 27.8 34.4 27.4 24.2
20-24 56.1 63.3 48.6 64.2 48.6 58.0 68.1 77.3 60.1 66.1
25-29 76.1 88.2 60.9 81.0 81.4 92.2 75.1 85.4 79.1 85.7
30-34 68.5 95.3 62.2 94.1 80.9 96.6 76.2 94.7 83.0 90.3
35-39 63.9 95.1 60.4 96.2 81.9 97.1 77.0 95.8 86.7 90.6
40-44 60.0 94.8 59.2 96.2 81.1 97.2 79.8 95.6 88.6 92.0
45-49 50.5 93.0 50.9 93.5 80.9 95.0 78.3 94.5 89.9 92.0
50-54 38.8 88.4 38.7 80.1 71.5 92.6 70.5 90.4 87.6 92.0
55-59 27.6 74.9 22.7 54.1 51.7 70.4 55.3 73.9 78.4 89.6
60-64 15.4 39.8 8.1 31.7 15.2 16.2 12.7 28.7 49.8 83.3
Total 
(over 15)
32.4 52.1 29.6 52.6 n.a. n.a. 48.3 67.3 n.a. n.a.
Total 
(over 0)
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 40.1 50.8 41.3 56.4 75.6 80.0
Unit: percentage, Source: Yearbook o f Labour Statistics, ILO (1996, 2000; table 125).
Note: total (over 15) is the labour force participation o f those over 15 years old. Total (over 0) = 
those in labour force / total o f  all population including 0 year
Figure o f  age group 15-19 in the US, the UK, Spain and Sweden is figure o f  age group 16-19
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3.3 Two Features
3.3.1 The Difference in Work Patterns between Japan and the US: 
Paid Employment and Family Businesses
In contrast with the Anglo-American countries, particularly the US, paid 
employment outside the home is relatively new for women in Japan. Women in 
Japan have worked in family-based businesses as informal family workers since the 
early twentieth century, mainly in the agricultural sector after the 1920s, with a shift 
to commercial businesses after the 1950s. By 1970, 30.9 per cent of female workers 
in the total female labour force worked in a family business. A similar tendency can 
be seen in (West) Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Spain and South Korea. On the 
other hand, a low proportion of women work in family businesses in Anglo-American 
societies such as the US, the UK, Canada, Australia and Switzerland, where only 2.3 
to 4.7 per cent of women were engaged in family businesses in the 1960s (see Table 
1-3-4).
Table 1-3-4: Employment Status of Women Workers, 1960-70
Country Year Employee Self-Employed Family Worker
United States 1967 91.3 4.9 2.9
Canada 1969 90.5 4.3 4.7
United Kingdom 1966 91.5 4.0 1.5
Australia 1966 86.5 9.0 2.3
West Germany 1967 75.5 6.3 18.2
France 1962 67.5 12.3 18.7
As late as 1999, 11 per cent of women in Japan still worked in family 
businesses (Ministry of Labour 2001: table 3-3). This pattern has not been completely 
reversed in Japan, and Mari Osawa (1993) argues that female workers in family 
businesses made up 20 per cent of the female labour force during the 1980s. By 
contrast, only 1.7 per cent of men were working in family businesses in 1999. As 
family businesses concentrate on retailing, wholesaling and catering, and other 
services, women in these industries are more likely to work in small- sized businesses 
where their earnings are lower (Takenaka 1989; Mari Osawa 1993). This remains 
notable characteristic of the Japanese economy (Mari Osawa 1993:98; Higuchi 1991: 
171).
The expansion of paid employment after the 1970s effectively divided 
women into two groups: single women in paid employment and married women in 
other types of work environment such as family owned businesses. Table 1-3-5 
shows that 54.5 per cent of all women but only 37 per cent of married women in 
1997 were in paid employment outside the home. When the self-employed and 
workers in family owned businesses are included, married women increased their 
labour force participation to 51.3 per cent, and single women to 61.2 per cent.
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Table 1-3-5: Female Employment and Labour Force Participation in Japan, in 1997
Female Employment Female Labour Force Participation
Age group Single Women Married Women Single Women Married Women
Total 54.5 37.0 61.2 51.3
15-19 14.7 n.a. 16.3 n.a.
20-24 70.9 37.5 77.4 42.9
25-29 83.6 35.8 92.2 42.9
30-34 79.1 36.3 89.5 45.2
35-39 73.2 45.2 85.4 57.5
40-44 66.7 54.5 81.5 68.5
45-49 60.7 54.4 75.0 70.4
50-54 55.6 48.8 72.2 65.8
55-64 42.9 29.1 57.1 47.8
Over 65 11.1 6.3 18.5 21.3
Unit: percentage, Source: Ministry of Labour (1999a: appendix 33 table 17).
Note: ‘female labour force participation’ includes female workers in agriculture and employment in 
family owned businesses, while female employment includes female workers in paid 
employment outside home excluding agriculture.
One marked feature in Japan is that married and single women were 
equally engaged in the labour force before the 1980s. However, single women have 
since increased their paid employment while married women have not. In 1999, 
single women’s labour force participation was 62.2 per cent while that of married 
women was 50 per cent (Ministry of Labour 2000: 1).
This begs the question: Why has the market encouraged young single 
women but not married women into employment outside the home since the 1990s? 
Takenaka (1989:227-28) and Higuchi (1991:171) argue that paid employment has 
been less attractive for women in general than self-employment and working in 
family owned businesses, suggesting that paid employment in Japan provides 
particularly unfavourable conditions for women. As Table 1-3-4 indicates, women 
working in the US are overwhelmingly in paid employment, rather than
self-employment or family owned businesses.
52
Some other Western OECD countries experienced the same transition 
from self-employment and family owned businesses to paid employment from the 
1960s. Table 1-3-4 shows that a relatively large proportion of women in West 
Germany, France, Italy, Spain and South Korea worked in family owned businesses 
in the 1960s.
The Japanese case is not singled out from the OECD countries because 
France, Italy, Spain and South Korea share certain similarities and because 
Germany used to share these similarities. The change in women’s work patterns in 
Japan, however, was widely different from Anglo-American countries, particularly 
the US, in the 1960s. Although the degree of difference has changed since then, 
partial differences remain. Namely, the fact that in Japan, married women rather 
than single women tend to be self-employed or work in family businesses.
3.3.2 Part-time Employment
Married women’s paid work is closely linked to part-time employment. Despite the 
fact that the majority of both men and women are in paid employment in Japan, 
women occupy significantly different positions. The overwhelming majority of 
male employees in the 25-55 age group work as full-time employees with long-term 
contracts, known as lifetime employment; for example, in 1997, over 87 percent of 
them were in this position. By contrast, the proportion of women in full-time 
employment falls sharply after 35 years of age (Table 1-3-6).
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Table 1-3-6: Status of Employment by Gender and Age Groups, in 1997
Employer Full-time
Employee
Part-time Temporary
Contract
Worker
Agency
Worker
Other
Part-time
Others
Male 9.0 80.9 1.3 5.0 0.2 1.8 1.8
15-24 0.5 72.5 1.2 24.0 0.3 0.2 1.3
25-34 2.6 91.9 0.5 3.1 0.2 0.4 1.2
35-54 9.4 87.2 0.4 1.1 0.1 0.4 1.4
Over 55 21.0 57.8 4.6 4.4 0.2 7.9 4.1
Female 4.0 53.8 30.0 7.7 0.9 1.7 1.9
15-24 0.3 66.7 6.9 22.8 0.9 0.8 1.6
25-34 1.0 68.0 18.6 6.8 2.3 1.2 1.9
35-54 4.4 46.8 41.5 3.4 0.5 1.6 1.7
Over 55 11.2 39.4 36.8 4.3 0.2 3.3 2.8
Unit: Percentage
Source: Ministry of Labour (1999b), p.451.
Part-time jobs have become more prevalent since the 1970s when the 
number of self-employed and family business workers started to decline. The 
proportion of part-time workers in Japan has steadily increased since 1965. Part-time 
female workers increased their share of the female labour force, from 9.6 per cent in 
1965 to 37.5 per cent in 1999. Since 1975, the proportion of men working part-time 
has also increased (Ministry of Labour 2000). However, while 39.7 per cent of female 
employees were part-time workers in 1999, the equivalent figure for men was only 
13.4 per cent (Tanaka 2001: 121). Women comprised 67 per cent of all part-timers. 
The proportion of all part-time workers to total number of employees was 21.7 
percent in 1999 (Tanaka 2001:121). Temporary part-time jobs are largely filled by 
young male and female students and part-time jobs with long-term contracts by 
middle-aged men and women over 55 years old (Table 1-3-6). Part-time workers 
employed for long periods of time are mainly married women.
This tendency for women to work part-time is not, of course, unique to
Japan, and many Western OECD countries including Germany, Denmark, the
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Netherlands, Sweden and the UK share the same trend (Tanaka 2001). In 1994, 
part-time women workers as a proportion of overall female employees ranged from 
over 40 per cent in the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK, to around one-third in 
Denmark and Germany (Smith, Fagan and Rubery 1998: 36).
There is, however, one striking feature of Japanese part-time employment: 
that is, in Japan, some “part-time” workers work the equivalent of full-time hours, 
but are paid a part-time wage and provided with very little or no social security. 
Although the Labour Force Survey is commonly used for part-time worker analysis, 
it excludes some part-time workers who work hours as long as full-time workers, 
but are paid and treated as part-time workers (Shinozuka 1982; Mari Osawa 1993).
This is particularly related to the odd definition of ‘part-time’ workers 
commonly used in Japan. Approximately 20 per cent of “part-time” workers in 
Japan work as long as full-time workers, but are still classified as part-time workers 
and are paid a part-time wage (Mari Osawa 1993). As some surveys in Japan do not 
define part-time workers by their working hours per week, some part-timers work 
as long as full-time workers in Western industrial countries, but a shorter week than 
full-time workers in Japan (Mari Osawa 1993:81). Part-time contracts have been 
used, in other words, as a way of imposing lower hourly pay rates or denying 
workers holiday pay, without necessarily meaning these workers are employed for 
less than 35 hours per week (which is the International Labour Office (ILO) 
definition of part-time workers).9
9 While the ILO defines part-time workers as those who work less than 35 hours per week, the length 
of working hours alone does not differentiate between part-time and full-time workers in Japan, for 
surveys in Japan do not employ a uniform definition of part-time worker (Shinozuka 1992; Mari 
Osawa 1993; Tokuda 1993). The General Survey on Part-time Labour reported that in 1990,20 per 
cent of part-time workers worked longer than 35 hours, but were nonetheless paid and treated as
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In case where part-time workers work as long as full-time workers (40 
hours a week), it is marital status and age that creates the difference in pay and job 
security. Part-time workers rarely change their status to full-time workers in Japan. 
Once married, women with lower educational qualifications tend to be hired as 
part-time workers in retailing, wholesaling, catering and manufacturing (Mari Osawa 
1993: Tsumura and Kita 1994). Many married female part-time workers often do the 
same tasks as junior female full-time workers with the same educational 
qualifications, but married women are paid part-time wages
To sum up, the expansion of paid employment has largely passed married 
women by, for they still stand to be self-employed or working in family owned 
businesses. It has also created a Japanese type of “part-time” job, resulting in the 
crowding of those married women who are in paid employment into these part-time 
jobs. As will be discussed in Chapter Two, women may ‘prefer’ part-time jobs, but it 
is also, as Mari Osawa argues, employers who prevent married women from working 
full-time, because employers set age limitations on females applying for full-time 
jobs. This has substantially closed the door on middle-aged women who have finished 
rearing their children.
part-time, and that 16 per cent of female part-time workers fell into this category (Mari Osawa 1993; 
82). This, then, makes it difficult to picture both how long they work and how they are treated when 
we compare part-timers in Japan with their counterparts in the west.
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4 Gender Wage Differentials and Gender Job Segregation
4.1 Gender Wage Differentials
The other Japanese puzzle is that gender wage differentials in Japan have changed so 
slowly during the period 1975-2000. Gender wage differentials declined only 6 per 
cent over the two decades, and there has been relatively little change compared with 
the period before 1975. As Figure 1-4-1 indicates, women’s hourly wage relative to 
men’s has remained within the range 58.4 per cent to 63.9 per cent for two decades. In 
spite of a slight rise in relative wage, there is still a wide wage gap between men and 
women. However, after the early 1990s, women’s relative hourly wage rose.
Figure 1-4-1: Women’s hourly wage relative to men, 1962-2002
VWWn
0.7000
0.6000
0.5000
0.4000
0.3000
— m —  VW\Mn
0.2000
0.1000
n fWYi « J- *. 1 _» 1 A J . 1 J 1 1 L 1 . i 1 1 i i 1 1 1 i 1 i I 1 1 1 i l 1 i. | 1 1 I 1 ( l i
Source: Ministry o f  Labour (various years), Basic Survey on Wage Structure.
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hourly wages
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The main increase in women’s relative hourly wage was achieved during the 
early 1970s and after 1991 (Figure 1-4-2). Importantly, women’s relative wages 
hardly changed during 1975-1991, despite a slight increase in women’s employment 
relative to men’s after 1973. During 1975-1991, both women’s hourly wage and 
working hours relative to men’s changed to a narrower range than before 1975. Figure 
1-4-2 indicates that before 1973, there was an inverse relation between women’s 
hourly wage relative to men’s and their employment relative to men’s. For example, if 
women’s relative pay rose, then their relative employment decreased. However, this 
was not the case after 1973. Women’s relative hourly wage increased 1 or 2 per cent 
during 1973-1975 while their relative employment increased 30 per cent. During
1976-1990, women’s relative wages stagnated. After 1991, they increased a little, but 
the change was smaller than before 1975.Women’s hourly wages relative to men rose 
again, particularly in the late 1990s; they increased as large as by five cent, 0.62 in 
1996 to 0.67 in 2002. However, this was accompanied by the decrease in women’s 
employment relative to men. Although the relative employment increased a little from 
2001 to 2002, women’s relative employment in 2002 is far smaller than in the 1990s.
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Figure 1-4-2: Women's Relative Hourly Wage and Relative Employment to Men’s,
1962-2002
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The gender wage differential in Japan is considerably larger than in some 
Western industrial countries. Female full-time workers in Japan earned 63.8 per cent 
of the hourly wage of men in 1999. This figure is far smaller than in western OECD 
countries, and much below that in Denmark, France, Germany, the UK, the 
Netherlands and Australia where women were paid at approximately 75-80 per cent 
of male wage rates during the period 1982-96 (Figure 1-4-3). The US experience is 
perhaps closer to the Japanese one, for women’s hourly wage relative to men’s barely 
changed at all in the US from 1960 to 1980. Women were paid 60.7 per cent of the 
male wage rate in 1960,59.4 per cent in 1970,58.8 per cent in 1975, and 60.2 per cent 
in 1980. In contrast to Japan, however, women’s relative wage has increased steadily 
1982. rising to 61.7 ner cent in 1982 — 1 n ♦«« 1000
continued.
Figure 1-4-3: Relative Pay of Women, excluding Agriculture in IndustrialCountries,
1980-1996
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1982-97, with a fall of 6.7 per cent in fifteen years but they fell relatively slower than 
in 1977-82. Because the full expansion of service employment did not occur until the 
late 1980s, female part-time workers were likely to work in manufacturing in
1977-82. In 1979, the second oil shock took place, and manufacturing was badly 
damaged by this, in turn putting pressure on manufacturing firms to cut their labour 
costs to be more competitive in the international market. Large-sized firms could not 
cut wages for male full-time workers because employers and firm-unions agreed to 
provide lifetime employment and seniority wages to all male workers to avoid 
industrial action (details in Chapter Two).
Figure 1-4-4: Hourly wage of part-time female workers as a proportion of that of 
full-time female workers, 1977-97
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Data source: The Ministry o f Labour (1999a), p.31.
This trend has continued even since service sector expansion in the late 
1980s. This is because services expanded in retailing, wholesaling, and catering, all
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of which basically pay less, even for female full-time workers. Furthermore, since 
there are more part-time jobs available in retailing, wholesaling, and catering in 
urban than in rural areas, married women in urban areas tend to congregate in 
part-time jobs. Bergmann (1974) explores the Crowding Theory; she creates a 
model in which women and minorities are crowded into a restricted number of 
occupations to explain inequalities between individuals, as employers and male 
workers create and condition the labour market in their self-interest. Partly because 
of this, the hourly wage of part-time workers in retail, wholesaling and catering is 
lower than that of full-time employees (Houseman and Machiko Osawa 1998).
It is problematic that female part-time workers are unlikely to be financially 
independent of a male breadwinner because of their low wage. Calculating female 
part-timers’ hourly wage relative to male full-timers’, female part-time workers 
earn 43 per cent of their male counterparts in 1997; while the hourly wages of a 
part-timer are only 68 per cent of those of a full-time female worker (Figure 1-4-2 
and Figure 1-4-4).
Such a considerably lower wage for part-time jobs is a peculiar feature of 
Japan in comparison with Germany and France in the 1990s. In Germany, in the 1990s, 
male part-time workers earned 77 per cent of the hourly wage of male full-time 
workers, and female part-time workers earned 88 per cent of the hourly wage of 
female full-time workers. In France, in the 1990s, part-time workers earned 83 per 
cent of full-time workers’ earnings (International Section of Minister of Labour’s 
Bureau 1999: 297-314; Tanaka 2001). By contrast, in the US in the 1980s and 1990s, 
female part-time workers were paid 74 per cent of female full-time wages, and male 
part-time workers were paid 54 per cent of male-full-time wages (Hirsch 2000). Thus, 
the US reflects the same tendency as Japan regarding part-time wages, resulting in a
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problem for both countries in respect to part-time workers’ low pay.10
The significantly low pay for female part-time workers is the most striking 
feature of Japan because the gap between female full-time and part-time wages in 
Japan is wider than in Germany and France, and yet the proportion of female part-time 
workers is increasing as rapidly as in European OECD countries.
10 The UK is similar to the US in terms of wages for part-time workers. The hourly wage rate for 
part-time workers in the UK is 20 per cent lower than for full-time workers (DuRivage 1992; 
Warme, Lundy and Lundy 1992; Maier 1994; Delsen 1995). The UK is moving towards the 
normalisation of part-time work (Delsen 1998:69).
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5 Rapid Decline in Fertility Rates
Total fertility rate (TRF), which indicates the number of children that the average 
woman in the age group 15-64 has in her lifetime, has declined in Japan since the 
1970s. Similar pattern occurred in Western OECD countries up to 1985. Fertility 
then stably or increased in Western OECD countries while in Japan they continue to 
drop. As Table 1-5-1 indicates, it fell steadily from 2.13 in 1970 to 1.38 in 1998. It 
has since declined further to 1.34 in 2000.
Similar trends were evident in other OECD countries in the 1980s-1990s. 
In France, the TFR changes rose momentarily to 1.99 in 1980, then fell to 1.78 in 
1990, and further dropped to 1.72 in 1996. In Italy, the TFR had fallen to 1.61 in 
1980, fell further to 1.43 in 1984,1.36 in 1990, and declined further to 1.19 in 1995. 
In Spain, the change in the TFR is even more striking: the TFR was 2.53 was as late 
as 1978, but plummeted to 2.05 in 1981, dropped further to 1.54 in 1986 and 
continued falling to 1.15 in 1996.
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Table 1-5-1: Total Fertility Rate in industrial Countries, 1950-98
Year Japan US UK Netherlands Sweden
1950 3.65 3.02 2.19 3.10 2.32
1955 2.37 3.52 2.16 3.05 2.25
1960 2.00 3.64 2.57 3.11 2.17
1965 2.14 2.93 3.03 2.39
1970 2.13 2.46 2.58 1.94
1975 1.91 1.80 1.67 1.78
1980 1.75 1.84 1.60 1.68
1985 1.76 1.84 1.80 1.51 1.74
1990 1.54 2.08 1.85 1.62 2.13
1995 1.42 2.02 1.71 1.54 1.74
1996 1.43 2.03 1.73 1.54 1.61
1997 1.39 2.03 .. . .. .
1998 1.38 *
Year Germany!) France Spain Italy
1950 2.92 2.46 2.52
1955 2.07 2.70
1960 2.34 2.72 2.81 2.31
1965 2.50 2.82 . . . 2.55
1970 2.01 2.47 2.82
1975 1.45 1.96 2.53 (1978) 2.14
1980 1.46 1.99 2.05(1981) 1.61
1985 1.30 1.83 1.54(1986)
1990 1.45 E 1.78 . . . 1.36
1995 1.25 E 1.70 1.18 1.19
1996 1.32 1.72 1.15
1997 . . .
1998
Source: Demographic Yearbook, excluding Japan.
Figures of Japan are from National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR) (2001). 
1) before 1991figures are from West Germany..
* roughly calculated figure E=Council of Europe, Recent demographic developments in Europe 1997 
U=U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Vital Statistics Report,Vo\A7,N°lS.
In conventional understanding, a decline in fertility rates is linked to an
expansion of educational and employment opportunities for women, which both
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increase the length of time women spend in education and attractiveness of paid 
employment. The puzzle in the Japanese case is that fertility rates continue 
declining without an increase in married women’s labour force participation in the 
service economy.
6 Summary
Sections 2-5 have illustrated the Japanese puzzles in relation to gender inequality at 
work and fertility rates. These puzzles consist of three characteristics. The first is 
that women with higher educational qualifications in Japan are less likely than other 
women to participate in the labour force after their mid-thirties. Women with lower 
qualifications tend to work in traditional sectors such as manufacturing, retail, 
wholesale and catering. Married women with high qualifications are less likely to 
work in this pattern. In Western OECD countries, women with higher educational 
qualifications are more likely to participate in the labour force, particularly in paid 
employment. In most Western OECD countries, the expansion of white-collar jobs 
has benefited women by increasing their participation in paid employment, in 
particular women with higher educational qualifications, and, as a result, female 
paid employment increased in the 1980s and 1990s when services expanded. In 
case of Japan, paid employment for young single women, particularly for women 
with higher educational qualifications, has increased since the mid-1980s, when 
business services expanded and the Equal Employment Opportunity Law was 
introduced. Nevertheless, most women tend to leave a job to start a family in their 
late twenties and early thirties. After marriage, part-time employment provides job
opportunities to married women, but mainly for those with lower educational
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qualifications. Because some women, including most notably married women with 
higher educational qualifications, do not or can not work for pay after the 
interruption of full-time paid employment, female labour force participation has 
changed little from 1975 to 1998.
The second characteristic is that gender wage differentials for both 
full-time and part-time workers have proved very resistant to change in Japan in 
1975-1998. In Western OECD countries, partly due to the increased opportunities 
in service employment from the 1980s onwards, women steadily increased their 
hourly wages relative to men’s. This is particularly marked in Anglo-American 
societies where most types of services are exchanged in the market. In Japan, by 
contrast, the new services that expanded since the late 1980s are limited to business 
services that provide jobs to men and young single women with high educational 
qualifications. This is strongly linked to the wage structures and employment 
practices in large sized firms in Japan. Women in general are left to 
self-employment or working in family owned (small size) businesses, where wage 
rates are relatively lower. Consequently, gender wage differentials are rigid in 
Japan.
Furthermore, in Japan, the relative wage rates of female part-time workers 
rapidly decreased in the late 1970s and continued declining in the 1980s and 1990s 
although part-time employment makes up a larger proportion of the total labour 
force every year. In West European OECD countries, female part-time workers also 
have lower wage rates than male full-time workers’, but their relative wage rates are 
never as low as those in Japan. In the US, female part-time workers are paid 
significantly less than full-time workers, but the proportion of part-time workers is 
not increasing.
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The third characteristic is that the total fertility rate in Japan has constantly 
declined since 1975 despite the fact that married women have not increased their 
labour force participation. The US, the UK, the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden 
experienced a rise in total fertility rates from 1985 to 1990, and after this period, 
total fertility rates either fluctuated slightly or declined more slowly than in Japan. 
The pattern in France, Spain and Italy was closer to that of Japan, that is, a rapid 
process of decline. The key point is that the Japanese experience adds an exception 
to the predicted changes in fertility; for rapid decline in fertility rates is 
accompanied elsewhere with increased participation in the female labour force. 
This is not the case in Japan.
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Part II Current Analysis and Alternative
Chapter Two
Gender Inequality in Neoclassical Theory 
1 Introduction
Human capital theorists work within the basic model of neoclassical economics. In 
its basic form, orthodox neoclassical economic theory takes individual preferences 
as exogenously given, randomly distributed, and fixed over time. Rational 
individuals with perfect information make choices that are efficient not only for 
themselves, but also (under the assumption of perfect markets) for society as a 
whole.1 This gives no weight to collective identity (for example, altruism amongst 
people who share common characteristics or goals); this, in turn, makes collective 
action unlikely or at best, unstable (Becker 1991; Cigno 1991).
Relatively few economists today endorse this pure model. Most economists 
today, including statistical discrimination theorists and theorists of efficiency 
wages, concede the possibility that markets can be imperfect, that information can 
be limited, and that preferences may be culturally shaped. Their amendments to the 
basic model greatly increase its applicability.
Nevertheless, they do little to redirect attention away from an emphasis on the 
efficiency of individual choice (Folbre 1994). Consequently, most empirical 
research within neoclassical theory deploys data on relative income and prices to 
make predictions regarding choices, assuming that individual decisions basically
1 Perfect markets means that markets have an infinite number of economic agents that compete with 
each other and that they make economic agents who offer the lowest possible price stay.
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reflect individual preferences. This chapter examines the three versions most used 
by Japanese economists: human capital theory, statistical discrimination theory, 
and the theory of efficiency wages.
2 Human Capital Theory
2.1 Sexual Division of Labour and Women’s Paid Employment
Human capital theorists see the sexual segregation of employment and the tendency 
for women to engage in lower paid jobs as reflecting women’s ‘choice’ for marriage 
and children. As a result of women’s decision to specialise in non-market 
production, women have lower levels of educational qualifications and 
work-related skills and hence earn less than men (Becker 1985; Pollachek 1981, 
1995). Gender job segregation therefore takes place both because men and women 
choose different jobs, and because women take responsibility for care work in the 
household. Human capital theorists stress that women, not men, will choose to 
interrupt paid employment for the family, and that this taste regarding paid 
employment creates occupational gender segregation (Becker 1985). Women are 
concentrated in the low paid jobs in which they do not need to invest as much time 
and effort (Polachek 1984,1985, and 1987). Becker speculates that because of their 
domestic responsibilities, women exert less intense effort on paid employment, 
saving their energy for domestic pursuits.
Human capital theorists expect that once women make an equal 
investment to men in developing their human capital, gender wage differentials will 
disappear. Once women attain the same skills through higher education as men, the
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service economy which requires skilled labour will increase the proportion of 
female workers. Employers tend to prefer hire skilled female workers to skilled 
male workers if women’s wage is lower than men’s. Gender inequality at work will 
disappear in the process of technological advance. White-collar jobs require 
specific knowledge such as Information Technology (IT) skills rather than the 
physical strength demanded in blue-collar jobs. This makes it rational for 
employers to hire women as well as men if women have higher educational 
qualifications (Goldin 1995). According to human capital theory, technological 
advancement enables highly educated women to move into high-paid positions 
alongside their male counterparts. Technological advance will thus have 
particularly favourable consequences for women, and will reduce gender 
inequality.
According to human capital theorists, women, as individuals, make 
efficiency choices in order to benefit themselves and their family financially. When 
women have lower rates of participation in paid employment, this is because the 
gender division of work within the family is efficient. Women make decisions 
which lead to an efficient outcome for them and their family.
Theorists of human capital, most notably Becker (1976, 1981,1985, and 
1991) and Mincer and Polachek (1974), focus on the household side of both the 
labour supply and the gender pay gap, using a traditional neoclassical model of 
family decision-making. This takes place in a context where the wife and husband 
possess unequal amounts of human capital, such as qualifications, skills and 
experience. As long as women have a smaller amount of human capital (i.e. lower 
educational qualifications, skills and experience) and lower expected wages than 
men in the market, it will be more efficient for a wife to specialise in unpaid care
73
work at home and for a husband to specialise in paid work in the market (Becker 
1985). ‘Efficiency’ in this context means that the combined income of a husband 
and wife is optimal when the husband specialises in paid work and the wife in 
unpaid care provision for the family. Women will only close the gender wage gap 
and reduce occupational gender segregation if they increase their experience in paid 
employment and educational qualifications. But as women increase such 
experience relative to men, their wage rate increases faster than their productivity 
increase at home, and as a result, women’s participation in paid employment should 
increase (Goldin 1990).
Human capital theorists argue that if empirical differences in earnings 
between women and men can be explained by differences in skill, qualifications or 
work experience then this is to be seen by these theorists as a return to human 
capital which reflects a (genuine) productivity difference rather than a gender bias. 
They argue that such gender earnings differentials reflect the difference in 
possession of employment-related skills, qualifications and work experience, 
which differ significantly by gender (Polachek 1995: 66). Polachek (1975a, 1975b) 
decomposes various factors that can determine the wage in the US; the 
determinants are sex, age, years of in education, years of paid employment and 
marital status. In his later work (1995: 69), he argues that most of the gender 
earnings differential is explained by the fact that women, particularly married 
women, possess less educational qualifications and work experience; between 30 
and 48 per cent of gender wage differentials for the US is, in his view, explained by 
schooling and experience. These two can be the largest factors causing wage 
differentials between groups (Ehrenberg and Smith 1994: 400).
But why then does the acquisition of employment-related skills,
74
qualifications and work experience differ largely by gender? The standard 
explanation is due to the interruption to women’s paid employment for physical 
reproduction, both directly and indirectly (through expectations of a different 
life-course) leading to gendered patterns of human capital formation. Polachek 
(1995:69) argues that expected lifetime labour force participation explains between 
63 and 93 percent of the gender gap. One marked factor relating to women’s labour 
force participation is women’s interruption of paid employment for child rearing. 
Becker (1991) and Polachek (1995) argue that women with higher educational 
qualifications face a larger negative impact on wage prospect than women with 
lower educational qualifications because the more educated exhibit the largest 
depreciation rate in marketable skills, as do those in more technical and managerial 
type of occupations. Married women with higher educational qualifications are, 
then, paid less after re-entry to labour market as their skills may have become 
obsolete during the interruption for child rearing.
Human capital theorists assume that women interrupt paid employment 
and invest less in marketable skills and experience because of their biological 
difference from men (Becker 1985,1991). For example, Becker explores the sexual 
division of labour as follows.
Although the sharp sexual division of labour in all societies between the market and 
household sectors is partly due to the gain from the specialized investments, it is also
partly due to intrinsic differences between sexes Women not only have a heavy
biological commitment to the production and feeding of children, but they also are 
biologically committed to the care of children in other, more subtle ways. Moreover, 
women have been willing to spend much time and energy caring for their children 
because they want their heavy biological investment in production to be worthwhile. ...
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Men have been less biologically committed to the care of children, and have spent then- 
time and energy on food, clothing, protection, and other market activities...(Becker 
1991:37-38).
Since the biological natures of men and women differ, the assumption that the 
time of men and women are perfect substitutes even at a rate different from unity is not 
realistic. Indeed, their times are complements in sexual enjoyment, the production of 
children, and possibly other commodities produced by the households with men and 
women are more efficient than households with only one sex, but because both sexes are 
required to produce certain commodities produced by the household... Since specialized 
investments depend on the allocation of time, the investments of men and women more 
strongly reinforce their biological differences when differences in comparative advantage 
are larger and complementarities weaker (Becker 1991: 39-40).
Polachek (1995:71) defends his analysis of the sexual division of labour by quoting 
his early work.
Investment must be motivated by economic returns. Being shackled with home 
responsibilities, either by one’s own choice or for some other external reason, does not 
bode well for providing sufficient economic incentives for women to invest at least 
comparable to men. Whereas I have not researched why there is a division of labour in the 
home which causes this gendered dichotomy, I do note societal and governmental forces 
at work.
From a societal perspective women are inevitably younger, and at least in the 
past less educated, than their husbands, thereby causing a male comparative advantage 
towards specialization in labour market activities (Polachek 1975b).
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On this basis, human capital theorists argue that women are not 
discriminated against in the labour market. In order to support this, they point out 
that not all women are paid less by employers, and that they are paid as much as 
male counterparts if they possess the same market-related skills and experience. 
Polachek (1995:66) points out that younger single women who are as highly 
educated as their male counterparts face a much smaller gender earnings 
differential; single women earn more than 90 per cent of male earnings in Germany, 
the UK, and the US (Blau and Kahn 1992: 534). This trend is the same in all 
Western OECD countries (Goldin 1995) and human capital theorists anticipate a 
similar development in non-Western industrial countries.
As they see no significant discrimination against women, human capital 
theorists argue that policies such as equal pay legislation have limited application 
(Roback 1986; Paul 1989). Some of the gender wage differential undoubtedly 
arises from past discrimination against women by educational institutions: 
educational institutions did not admit women to certain programmes, or counselled 
them in different directions from men. But employers are not responsible for this 
(Williams and Kessler 1984; US Commission on Civil Rights 1984). As 
discrimination in hiring is generally costly to employers, it is on the contrary 
sensible to hire qualified women and ethnic minorities equally with their white 
male counterparts (Rector 1988; Paul 1989). If there is an appropriate policy 
initiative to reduce gender inequality at work, the best approach might be to provide 
women with assistance in their home-related activities, because it is their 
responsibilities at home that apparently discourage women from pursuing their 
career in the labour market.
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2.2 Fertility Decline
A similar explanation applies to changes in fertility rates. Because the growth of the 
service economy demands persons with high educational qualifications in 
white-collar jobs, having children becomes more costly for people with such 
qualifications; technological advance changes the relative costs and benefits of 
having children (Schultz 1969; Becker and Barro 1988). The loss of earnings to 
qualified women who give up work to care for children becomes higher, while the 
premium now attached to educational qualifications simultaneously increases the 
educational costs associated with having children. Thus, a service-based economy 
increases women’s paid employment while it decreases the number of children in 
society.
The most influential explanation for the effect of changes in social and 
economic structures on fertility behaviour derives from Becker (1960). This treats 
children as analogous to consumer durables. Some orthodox neoclassical 
economists apply rational choice theory to fertility decline, and argue that fertility 
rates reflect the rational decision-making of the household as a response to changes 
in relative prices (Schultz 1969; Becker and Barro 1988).
First of all, Becker (1960) reasons that under industrialised conditions, the 
net costs of having a child are positive. Thus, people would have a child only if 
doing so led to a non-specific commodity such as a good, which is valued for its 
own sake. Under industrialised conditions, wealth maximising individuals would 
have no children; people who nonetheless choose to have children must be acting 
on the basis of some value other than maximising wealth. If children are immanent 
goods whose desirability is subject to a budget constraint, the number of children
78
that parents demand should be a function of their income. The higher their income 
the greater the number of children they should desire, ceteris paribus. The bulk of 
evidence, however, suggests that family size relates negatively to parents’ income 
in developed societies (Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa 1999). Becker suggests 
that access to contraceptive technology is correlated positively with income, and 
that this obscures the true causal relationship between income and family size.
After Becker’s work, Schultz (1969) created an orthodox rational choice 
model in his empirical study of Puerto Rico where the household, presumably the 
head of household, enacted rational decisions leading to changes in fertility rates 
according to changes in migration, labour force participation and marriage 
practices. As technological change increases the demand for women’s labour, it 
also increases the opportunity cost of time devoted to child rearing. As 
technological change also increases the pressure to invest in education for children, 
the costs of young children increase. Fertility decline is arguably the household’s 
response to changes in relative prices. In Schultz’s model, parental altruism is 
exogenously given and constant over time, whatever economic and technological 
changes take place. Accordingly, the more opportunity for paid employment 
women have outside the household, and the larger the costs the household pays for 
young children, the smaller the number of children the average household will 
have.
Becker revised his argument by weakening the analogy between children 
and consumer durables. Children remain treated as consumer durables providing 
immanent goods, but unlike automobiles and refrigerators, they are time-intensive 
(Becker 1981). Becker and Barro (1988) portray the costs of children as 
consumption goods by paying attention to time spent on children.
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Because of this revision, the opportunity costs of having children are 
affected crucially by shifts in the values of parents’ time. The value of time would 
appear to be rather easily measured. It increases as the wage rate shifts upward. If 
this change takes place, Becker’s approach can derive the following empirical 
implications. If children are more time-intensive than the average consumption 
commodity, and if the real value of a persons’ time increases, then the price of 
children will increase in relation to other goods. Schultz (1986) argues that some 
other cheap goods will substitute partially for children within parents’ budget 
constraint, which is defined through time and goods. Further, if child care is more 
intensive for the mother’s and father’s time, and if the value of women’s time 
increases relative to the value of men’s time, then children will be more expensive 
and fewer of them will be sought.
It is important to note that this is embedded in a certain type of family 
value (Becker 1981; Becker and Barro 1988). Human capital theorists assume that 
individuals seek the highest level of utility operating by self-interest in the market 
and altruism in the household. Becker (1981: 173) argues that a male household 
head can act as a benevolent dictator, with the other family members being what he 
terms a ‘rotten’ wife and kids incapable of making efficient decisions. He argues 
that even a selfish “rotten” spouse or child will be induced to “behave” because the 
altruistic household head reinforces others in the household to follow his decisions. 
The patriarch is conceived as an altruist who knows the needs of the other members 
of the household and can make decisions on their behalf (Becker 1976,1981). This 
argument has led to the creation of the ‘Rotten Kids’ theorem. As Becker points out, 
‘rotten kids’ who act against the patriarch’s decision -  for example, by taking on the 
‘wrong’ kind of jobs - will be worse off than when they act upon the decisions of a
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benevolent patriarch who maximises the joint utility of the family. This 
controversial assumption has attracted various criticisms, which will be discussed 
later.
Because Becker’s approach focuses on value in pecuniary terms, it cannot 
explain the case in which parents set a value on having children that outweighs the 
value in pecuniary terms (time and income) they give up by having children. In 
order to adjust the model, Becker (1996) and Becker and Murphy (2000) argue that 
individual preferences and social values develop through their past experiences and 
social influences from personal and social capital stocks. They apply this to 
accessing the effects of advertising, the power of peer pressure, the nature of 
addiction, and the function of habits. This modifies his assumption regarding a 
gender division of labour that not only biological difference but also gender 
difference in experience may cause a sex division of labour. This adjustment allows 
their model to deal with a gender division of work as endogenous while it still does 
not fully explain why men and women have different experience and eventually 
possess different capital stocks.
Female participation in the labour force initially falls at early stages in 
development and then rises as economic development exceeds a given threshold 
(Goldin 1990; 1995). The more advanced the technology, the more skills workers 
need, thereby encouraging women to have a white-collar job in the service 
economy. This occurs because educational qualifications play a major role in an 
advanced service economy. The history of women’s advancement in obtaining 
educational and vocational skills and employing these productive talents in the 
home and labour force starts with the experience of countries that have 
industrialised first, in Western Europe and areas of European settlement. Education
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and the emergence of a white-collar sector have played important roles in fostering 
the paid employment of married women (Goldin 1995). In particular, married 
women with higher qualifications can obtain jobs that are as highly paid as those of 
their male counterparts.
The greater the opportunities for obtaining paid employment and the more 
the costs of having children rise, the more married women are discouraged from 
having children. The fertility rate, then, gradually declines as services expand and 
more married women gain higher qualifications. Despite the fact that they are 
different in some respects, Western OECD countries have experienced a similar 
pattern of economic development and gender inequality, and this is expected to 
happen in a similar fashion everywhere.
3 Statistical Discrimination Theory: Labour Demand
Statistical discrimination theory amends the assumptions of human capital theory 
and applies them to the demand for labour (Stigler 1961, 1962; Arrow 1974; 
Diamond and Rothchild 1989). It has analysed gender discrimination as the 
consequence of employers’ rational choices that do not necessarily match women’s 
real possession of human capital. This theory was developed from the basic model 
of neoclassical economics, in this context, Becker’s analysis of the ‘taste’ for the 
discrimination, and adjusted to take account of the limited information available to 
employers as buyers of labour. Since employers cannot directly observe the 
attributes of their workers, they may assume that most women will have a 
preference for leaving wage employment sooner than men in order to marry and 
raise children; this tendency is an attribute of a ‘female’ worker.
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In the pure theory of neoclassical economics, employers have no 
incentives to discriminate against women in employment. Rather, in a perfectly 
competitive labour market, employers should seek to hire workers at the lowest 
possible wage per unit of output. If employers have a ‘taste’ for discrimination 
against women, this lowers the demand for their labour, and other employers who 
have no distaste for women would then seize the competitive advantage. So, in a 
perfectly competitive market, even if  some employers have a ‘taste’ for 
discrimination against women, other employers will demand women, and this will 
bring the price of female labour back to its market price (Becker 1957). In Becker’s 
analysis, employers, workers and customers may indeed have a taste for 
discrimination.2 Following the usual assumption of neoclassical economics that 
tastes are exogenous to economic models, he saw this as a result of pre-market 
factors.
However, such discrimination may also emerge because employers obtain 
limited information regarding the quality of workers. Becker’s taste discrimination 
model is based on an orthodox neoclassical model, in which the market is perfect, 
information is perfect and preferences are exogenously given. The key insight of 
statistical discrimination theory is that it is costly to gather the information relevant 
to decisions. Discrimination may then persist against the predictions of basic 
neoclassical economic theory. First, when a few employers dominate the market, 
they can select their workers from many applicants (Madden 1993). Second, 
because limited information is available on applicants, employers use data 
regarding the group that the applicant belongs to when they decide to hire them
2 Becker originally referred to racial discrimination, but his discussion is applicable to gender 
discrimination.
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(Arrow 1972; Phelps 1972).
In statistical discrimination theory, employers are said to employ an 
average taken from the variances of achievement tests for selected skills by gender 
and race group, because it would be too expensive and impossible to obtain full 
information on each individual (Arrow 1972; Phelps 1972; Thurow 1975). Thus, in 
selecting candidates for employment, the employer uses the group average of 
productive capacity, such as the group average of the skills in achievement tests. 
The employer prefers members of the group with higher average figures. Given 
limited information, such discrimination is efficient.
Women allegedly have higher turnover rates than men (Landes 1977; 
Barron, Black and Loewenstein 1990; Kuhn 1991); they are, on average, more 
likely to leave a job for family reasons or to prefer shorter working hours due to the 
responsibilities of their family. Statistical discrimination theory argues that in the 
light of these averages, it is rational for employers to segregate women’s jobs from 
men’s. This is particularly so in jobs offering on-the-job training. If women do not 
stay as long, on average, as men, the cost of initial training per year is greater, and 
the net productivity of female workers becomes less due to their allegedly higher 
turnover rate. As a result, employers are said to be reluctant to hire women for jobs 
that require firm-specific training or skills; this means that demand for female 
labour increase little. Statistical discrimination theorists argue that employers’ taste 
for discrimination against women is efficient in cases where they lack full 
information regarding the preferences of workers.
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4 Efficiency Wage Theory
A further addition to this is the theory of efficiency wage. Efficiency wage models 
provide one possible explanation for wages being higher in some jobs than others in 
a way that is not accounted for either by statistical discrimination or the demands of 
human capital. The key insight of efficiency wage models is that paying higher 
wages may induce behaviour in workers that increases rather than decreases profits. 
By offering an efficiency wage, the employer attracts high quality labour, 
encouraging workers to work hard, to stay with the firm and not to unionise. He is 
likely to offer efficiency wage to male workers and maintains women’s relative 
wage to men’s at the lower level.
Efficiency wage models differ from orthodox neoclassical economic 
models in asserting that such workers’ behaviour is endogenous rather than 
exogenous to the wage. In this situation, it may be profit maximising for the 
employer to raise wages above the market-clearing level implied by the usual 
supply-demand model. Wages will be raised as long as this leads to a revenue 
increase greater than the cost of the wage increase.
One efficiency wage model is the shirking or effort elicitation model 
(Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Bowles 1985). Even with minimal surveillance, 
workers know there is a probability of losing their jobs for shirking. If they are paid 
more than they could make at other firms, they will have a motivation to avoid 
shirking so as to avoid the wage drop they would experience if they were caught 
and fired.
A second efficiency wage model focuses on turnover (Stiglitz 1987). Here, 
above-market wages lower turnover. This reduces the costs that firms expend in
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screening and training new employees. This model suggests that above-market 
efficiency wages will be found in occupations, industries or firms where hiring and 
training costs are larger.
A third efficiency wage model is the gift exchange model (Akerlof 1982,
1984). In this model, workers perceive a wage above the market-clearing level as a 
gift and as compliance by the employer with norms of fairness. This increases both 
workers’ morale and their effort. Akerlof’s model is different from other models of 
efficiency wages since it assumes that economic actors are not entirely selfish, but 
may demonstrate some altruism among both employers and employees. If 
employers in all sectors benefited from the gift exchange efficiency wage to an 
equal extent, the notion would have little relevance to explaining why some jobs 
pay more than others. However, workers’ norms of fairness may include the notion 
that firms can pay higher wages when they have a higher profit level. If so, then 
firms with a higher profit level will gain more in workers’ morale and productivity 
from paying above-market wages than other firms (Katz 1986).
Efficiency wage theory, then, provides one possible explanation for 
persistent inter-occupational, inter-firm, and inter-industry wage differentials that 
cannot be explained by differences in human capital or compensating differentials. 
Efficiency wage theory argues that above market level wages induce workers to 
work harder, and produce efficiencies for the firm even when it pays higher than the 
market wage.
As will be clear, all the above explanations focus on the ‘rational’ choices of women 
and families regarding women’s paid employment and fertility, and the ‘rational’ 
choice of an employer regarding hiring and rewarding workers. Statistical
discrimination theory and the theory of efficiency wages amend the assumptions of 
neoclassical economic theory and thereby increase its applicability. However, they 
do little to redirect attention away from emphasis on the efficiency of individual 
choice (Folbre 1994). I now turn to the limitations of this approach.
5 Critical Assessment
Alternative perspectives to neoclassical economics have expressed considerable 
dissatisfaction with the assumption of the standard model of neoclassical 
economics theory (England and Kilboume 1990; Folbre 1994; 1998). Human 
capital theorists follow the pure model of neoclassical economic theory, whereby a 
rational person makes choices in which preferences are independent of each other; 
where collective actions of any group of people sharing characteristics or goals are 
unlikely; and where preferences are randomly distributed. Alternative perspectives 
do not suggest that individual choices are unimportant, or that people have no 
agency or effectiveness in changing the social world. However, the nature of 
individual choice needs to be understood within a broader framework.
Critics argue that the basic model of neoclassical economics theory is 
problematic in the following three ways. First, it employs a problematic assumption 
regarding individual preferences; second, it pays too little attention to power 
relations amongst agents; and third, it barely addresses interaction between 
individual preferences and power relations. They suggest that these shortcomings 
are even more serious when the standard model deals with the family. Critics argue 
that these approaches provide insufficient explanations for gender inequality at 
work and fertility decline, both theoretically and empirically.
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5.1 General Critique from Alternative Perspectives
5.1.1 Interdependent Preferences
Critics argue that the most problematic factor is the assumption that people’s 
individual preferences are independent; and that individuals who are perfectly 
selfish outside the home, are nonetheless perfectly altruistic inside the family. 
England describes the neoclassical economic model in the following way.
I call the neoclassical economic model ‘separative’ because it presumes that humans are 
autonomous, impervious to social influences, and lack sufficient emotional connection to 
each other to make empathy possible. This is how they are presumed to behave in ‘the
economy’ or ‘the market’ A more implicit assumption in many neoclassical
economic models is that individuals do not behave according to the separative model 
vis-^-vis their families. In the family, individuals (particularly men) are presumed to be 
altruistic. Thus, empathetic emotional connections between individuals are emphasized 
in the family whereas they are denied in analysing markets. (England 1993:37).
Because neoclassical economic theory evolved for market analysis, it is particularly 
inadequate in its analysis of the family, which includes agents, such as children and 
the elderly, that do not fit well with a theory based solely on the market. One 
recurring criticism is that the theory treats the value of children and childcare work 
simply in order to compare these with the value of paid employment in pecuniary 
terms alone (Folbre and Hartmann 1988; Folbre 1994).
Feminist scholars argue that neoclassical economists pay insufficient 
attention to the fact that utility can be interdependent between groups such as care
88
providers and the cared-for, and between members of other types of collective 
groups than the family (Folbre 1986a: 8; Folbre and Weisskopf 1998; England 
1993: 41). Becker’s ordering of preferences is, then, problematic because it misses 
the fact that individuals act according to multiple self-identities, some of which are 
stronger than others. In his analysis of how individuals make decisions by mixing 
their preferences in major and minor choices, Becker does not distinguish major 
from minor decisions. Folbre (1986a: 8) argues that this treats all choices as if they 
were related to the choice of a commodity, and that this obscures the nature of the 
relation of a mother to her children. By ignoring interdependent individual utility, 
the neoclassical model takes too little account of the role of emotions behind 
preferences, and the way these affect material resource allocations (Folbre and 
Hartmann 1988).
Such interdependent preferences, to some extent, relate to the social norm 
of ‘female’ carers. A female carer may internalise her role, but the role is given to 
her socially by norms that operate through her sense of responsibility (Folbre and 
Weisskopf 1998). These social norms, combined with their emotional attachment to 
their children, mean that mothers tend to prioritise decisions regarding care work 
for their family members; these decisions often relate to the death and birth of those 
cared for (Folbre 1986a).
Moreover, people form emotional ties not only in the family, but also 
outside it through collective identities. Assuming selfishness in the market is not 
merely a ‘male’ model of self that fits women less well (England 1993: 46); it also 
fails to take account of what may be termed men’s altruism in market behaviour, 
which can itself work to the disadvantage of women. Elster (1979) and Sen (1987) 
argue that when people engage in collective action, a kind of selective altruism may
89
be at work, at least in the initial stages. Some level of altruism among members of 
social groups or “teams” is very much in their collective self-interest, and a large 
literature now describes the role that altruism plays in solving the class 
co-ordination problems represented by the prisoner’s dilemma (Collard 1978; Stark 
1995; Folbre 1998: 62; Reskin and Roo 1990). This suggests that individuals are 
neither entirely altruistic at home nor entirely selfish in the market, because they 
connect to each other through emotions.
5.1.2 Power Relations
Feminist scholars also argue that power relations enable men to coerce women into 
the traditional gender division of work; if  so, it can hardly be said that the male 
household head is ‘altruistic’. According to Becker’s rotten kids theorem, the male 
household head allocates the collective resources in the household in ways that are 
efficient for all. If a ‘rotten’ wife and kids act against his collective decisions for the 
family, they will hurt themselves by experiencing loss. So, wife and kids eventually 
follow the collective decisions of the family. Nevertheless, Folbre (1996: xv) points 
out that if the male household head is not benevolent, his decisions are not as 
efficient as Becker predicts. It is necessary for Becker’s model to prove that a male 
breadwinner is truly more benevolent than other members in the family. If he is as 
altruistic as Becker argues, his allocation of resources is fine for all the members 
within the family. But unless proved, Becker’s model does not sort out the problem 
of distribution within the household (Folbre 1982, 1986b; Folbre and Hartmann
1988).
It is particularly ironic that altruism, often thought of as more typically
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‘female’, is here credited to men (England and Farkas 1986: ch.3 and 4; England
1989). Though some neoclassical economists are now beginning to explore the 
possibility that women are more altruistic than men (Eckel and Groaaman 1996a, 
1996b; Seguno, Stevens, and Lutz 1996) this has not so far been taken sufficiently 
into account in the neoclassical economic paradigm.
Importantly, power relations cause conflict between agents when they 
pursue self-interest, but they may hardly emerge in clear form; conflict may come 
into effect via social norms, which, in turn affect the power relations in the family. 
Groups of people with unequal power act as a group and create social constraints 
through collective action. Some in the stronger group are less restricted by social 
constraints and act according to individual preferences that reflect desire (Folbre 
1994). However, other groups of people are more restricted by social constraints, 
and have to take greater account of others’ needs in forming their individual 
preferences. These social constraints restrict individuals differently by gender, age, 
sexual orientation, class, race and national context (Folbre 1994). Through such 
attributes of the agent, social constraints are organised within uneven power 
relations of agents.
For example, families, like firms, have an authority structure and a 
division of labour. By custom and law, older men are often designated household 
heads. Custom and law are the outcomes of previous collective actions in which 
older men were actively involved, but not women and children. Such customs and 
laws help the household head maintain the clear sexual division of work in the 
family because men have a better bargaining position than women in the customs 
and laws outside the family (Agarwal 1994). Thus, by way of social constraints, the 
power relations of agents outside the family can affect agents within the family
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when they form individual preferences.
5.1.3 Normative Interaction
Finally, critics have argued that individual choices are made via preferences that are 
interconnected with social constraints (Folbre 1994; Ferguson 1996; Kuran 1995). 
Individual preferences ‘interact’ with power relations because personal preferences 
are formed within social constraints that are themselves ordered by power relations. 
In this interaction, social norms play a significant role. Social norms assist powerful 
agents in maintaining the present form of social constraints because they make 
people believe that they are given and constant.
Conflict may arise because the social norms require women to provide 
unpaid care services for the family. When the social provision of care services is 
inadequate, this increases pressures on women to take up the unpaid carer role for 
their family. As women take up the carer role, social norms on gender are 
strengthened. Nelson (1999) points out the cyclical nature of women’s unpaid care 
provisions. She argues that people’s preferences do not necessarily reflect their own 
desires, but may reflect the ‘needs’ of others; women are possibly more likely to be 
sensitive to such needs than men. Such ‘needs’ arise not only out of the intrinsic 
nature of the person, but also out of social constraints; as Folbre and Weisskopf 
argue, these may be institutionalised in law.
Traditional patriarchal societies stipulate property rights that seriously constrain of 
women’s choices to specialize in anything but the provision of care services to family 
members. Women are denied access to the acquisition of non-home-related skills and 
limited to the least remunerative form of work. Until the mid-twentieth century, men in
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most countries had the legal right to prevent their wives working outside the home. They 
retain that right in some countries today. Explicit rules can give men control over 
women’s caring services. A late nineteenth century Prussian law gave husbands the legal 
right to specify how long their wives should breast feed (Bebel 1971). Even today, most 
legal traditions define the marriage contract in terms that are disadvantageous to wives, 
mothers, and children. Contrary to the concept of partnership, they are denied any specific 
claim to the income of a husband or father and are legally owed nothing more than 
subsistence support. Wives often lack any explicit protection from physical abuse or rape 
within marriage.
Why did such gender-based property rights evolve? Their historical 
importance challenges the conservative assumption that women’s specialization in the 
provision of care services reflects nothing more than biological instincts, God-given duty, 
or comparative advantages. If women had voluntarily agreed to such extreme 
specialization, it would have been unnecessary to establish such coercive gender-biased 
rules. Evidence suggests that men have engaged in rent-seeking behaviour designed to 
lower the costs of caring services... (Folbre and Weisskopf 1998:182-83).
The implication is that neoclassical economists wrongly take individual 
preferences as exogenously given and constant over time, with individual choices 
directly connected to preferences (Folbre 1994; Poliak and Watkins 1993). Some 
argue that this assumption may deflect attention from the social construction of 
human desire, the very notion of which remains underdeveloped by theorists 
ignoring the emotions and focussing entirely on the cognitive processes of 
calculation (Folbre 1998: 62; Nelson 1999). Folbre argues that people are often 
blinkered with regard to factors such as gender, national context, race, class and
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other aspects of group identity, and may be unable to think systematically about the 
positioning of these in the social hierarchy.
Kuran (1995) argues as follows. People are reluctant to disagree with one 
another, and as a result, may distort their individual preference to bring it in line 
with group preference, being guided by opinion leaders in the group. He shows that 
social norms may play the role of opinion leader and can mould individual 
preferences to collective preference. The power of suggestion and “consensus” may 
be so great that it influences the outcome of single cognitive experiments. One 
example he gives is where people are asked to judge the relative length of two lines. 
An audience typically enjoys a success rate of 99 per cent, unless someone planted 
in the audience loudly and immediately pronounces an incorrect answer; this then 
has a significant effect on the accuracy of the group’s perception. This suggests that 
opinion leaders can significantly distort individual perceptions and, by extension, 
individual preferences.
Kuran’s insights can be applied of gender differences in the formation of 
individual preferences. Most feminist scholars argue that with the present social 
organisation of reproduction, married women, particularly those over the age of 35, 
are more restricted by their ‘need’ to take care of family members, and that these 
constraints are socially constructed. The greater assets one has, the greater the 
power one has to ask others to share such responsibilities. Most wives have limited 
power to do so. More importantly, social norms value women who act more 
altruistically than men, and this makes it even harder for women to act according to 
their individual desire (Agarwal 1994, 1997; Nelson 1999; Folbre and Weisskopf 
1998). Women can then be said to form preferences based both on the needs of 
others in the family and on their personal desires, and they may have to choose
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between these in making decisions. For a number of reasons, including altruism, 
intrinsic joy, a sense of responsibility, the expectation of an informal quid pro quo, a 
well-defined and contracted-for reward, and coercion, they may prioritise the needs 
of the others.
In combination, these arguments suggest that individual preferences are 
endogenous and subject to change over time. Moreover, due to uneven power 
relations between agents, weaker agents may be more likely to follow social norms 
in forming their individual preferences. This is most clear in Folbre’s work, where 
she argues that people make choices but in the context of serious and often binding 
social constraints. Her argument does not suggest that individual choices are 
unimportant, for this would be to deny that people are agents who can change the 
social world. Individuals make decisions and act accordingly, but they make these 
choices within social constraints that favour some choices over others.
5.2 Specific Critiques of Schools in the Neoclassical Economic Perspective
The previous section suggested some general methodological shortcomings in the 
basic model of neoclassical economics, which has particularly informed human 
capital theory. This section focuses on more specific shortcomings in the analysis of 
gender inequality at work and of rates of fertility decline.
As already noted, some schools within neoclassical economic theory 
present gender wage differentials as a result of job segregation by gender, and 
fertility decline as efficient for both women and the family. Employers cannot 
directly observe the preferences of their workers; they must simply assume that 
most women have a preference to drop out of paid employment in order to marry
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and raise children. As a result, they will be reluctant to hire women for jobs that 
require firm-specific training or skills. The rationale for gender job segregation is 
that it is efficient for the firm, women’s relatively greater rates of turnover to men’s 
being taken as evidence of women’s different preferences.
Critics argue that these models pay scant attention to the gender structure 
of society as a whole (Folbre 1994). For example, employers and male workers may 
have an incentive to maintain their ‘taste’ for discrimination against women for 
reasons relating to their self interest and identity (Madden 1973; Hartmann 1976; 
Strober 1984). The gender structure at home and work is moulded not only by 
biology but also by a variety of collective actions, which affect women’s decisions 
about paid employment and having children (Folbre 1994). These institutional 
factors are largely ignored in the neoclassical perspective. This section details 
critiques of human capital theory, statistical discrimination theory, efficiency wage 
theory, and the standard basic theory applied to the decline in fertility rates from an 
institutionalist point of view.
5.2.1 Critiques regarding Gender Inequality at Work 
Critique o f  Human Capital Theory
The predictions of human capital theory have attracted most criticism because of 
contradictory empirical evidence on three points. Regarding the first point, it is 
evident that not only women’s preferences, but also institutional arrangements, 
affect gender differences in human capital investment for on-the-job training. Some 
research indicates that it is the employer, rather than the women, who helps widen 
this gender job segregation by controlling job assignments for women, even when
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they have the same qualifications as men (Corcoran and Duncan 1979; Barron, 
Black and Loewenstein 1990).
This is illustrated by the fact that female jobs are attached to shorter 
mobility ladders than male jobs, thus reducing women’s possibilities for promotion 
(Smith 1979; Rosenbaum 1980; Bielby and Baron 1984; DiPrete and Soule 1988). 
Similarly, very few female jobs involve supervision of other workers (Jaffee 1989; 
Wolf and Fligstein 1979; Hill 1980; Ward and Mueller 1985). Because the employer, 
rather than female employees, controls the assignment of jobs and tasks, the 
employer helps widen the gender gap in experience (Bergmann 1986). This relates 
to the critique of statistical discrimination theory below.
The second point is that the pay for female jobs is less than for male jobs 
because the employer, in favouring male jobs, tends to give weight to the length of 
time in paid employment and assesses women’s skills as being of lower value 
because they are different from those of men. There is substantial evidence that 
women’s concentration in jobs with different kinds of skills affects the gender gap 
in pay. Net measures of job skills (i.e. sum of various job skills) or worth result in 
the pay for female jobs being less (Remick 1984; Rothchild 1984; Acker 1989; 
Orazem and Matilla 1989). For example, women are more often found in jobs 
involving social skills of nurturing. These not only have lower returns than jobs 
requiring other skills, but also the women may suffer a loss from these jobs when 
the costs of investment in occupational training are subtracted (Killboume, England, 
Farcas, and Beron 1990; Steinberg, Haignere, Possion, Chertos, and Treiman 1986; 
Jacobs and Steinberg 1990; Steinberg 1990). Why are some skills more valued than 
others? It is suggested that men may simply place a higher value on job skills that 
they possess (England 1992: 35).
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A third point is that if women are in traditionally male jobs, they do not 
experience wage depreciation during absence from the labour force (England 1992: 
52). Polachek emphasises women’s “depreciation” of skills as the cause of gender 
wage differences and job segregation. “Depreciation” refers to the obsolescence of 
job skills occurring during periods of homemaking that lead one to receive a lower 
real wage upon returning to employment than that held prior to leaving the job. 
However, most tests of this hypothesis have not supported it (Cocoran, Duncan, and 
Poza 1984; Abowd and Killingsworth 1983; England, Farcus, Kilboume and Dou, 
1988). These findings support the view that women are paid less not because they 
plan, as Polachek argues, to break from employment for homemaking but because 
they are in female jobs that are valued less than male jobs.
Because of the empirical evidence, human capital theory is often 
combined with further explanations to make sense of discrimination. It is important 
to recall that if women are discriminated against, they will have lower incentives to 
invest in human capital. Some of the gender wage differentials and segregation that 
have been explained by current gender differences in seniority or experience may 
be better explained by a past discrimination that led to women gaining less seniority 
(England 1992). This raises the question of the theoretical status of discrimination 
within the neoclassical economic perspective, as discussed below.
Critique o f Statistical Discrimination Theory
Critics argue that the exclusion of women from better paid jobs acts as an 
encouragement for them to leave paid employment. Feminist scholars explore the 
gender segregation of jobs as discrimination against women by employers and male 
co-workers due to a need to maintain male interest and identity. Some studies show
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that employers discriminate against women despite the fact that they satisfy the job 
requirements in all but gender (Rosen and Jerdee 1974, 1978; Levinson 1975; 
Rosen 1982; Milkman 1987).
In addition, employers foster gender discrimination through institutional 
inertia that perpetuates segregation. Doeringer and Piori (1971) argue this using 
dual labour market theory: the market for highly paid jobs is segregated from the 
market for low-paid jobs, where many women crowd in. Institutional inertia 
perpetuates this gender segregation. Social institutions have a pyramid shaped job 
hierarchy and employees often move from their first job at the bottom of the 
echelon to jobs in higher layers. Employees move upward in the echelon as if 
climbing up the ladder of jobs within institutions (i.e. mobility ladder). Such 
structured mobility ladders are named internal labour markets and England (1992) 
points out that many firms have them. The jobs at the bottom of the mobility ladder 
are filled up from outside, and as these jobs are considered entry-level jobs for new 
graduates, the competition is higher than for the jobs higher up the job ladder.
The segregation that occurs at the point of entry perpetuates segregation 
up the ladder and throughout the life cycle of each cohort of workers. While some 
jobs are a “dead end” from which one cannot be promoted, others lead to a 
sequence of jobs through which promotion is common. Women are crowded into 
dead-end jobs as a result of discrimination, with employers using women’s rates of 
turnover as their rationale for discrimination in job assignments (Bergmann 1974). 
Moreover, because there is an oversupply of women in the low-paid labour market, 
employers have leverage to set a low wage. As a result, gender discrimination 
benefits employers by saving on labour costs and gender segregation is maintained 
by institutional inertia.
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A large body of empirical evidence suggests that women’s higher rate of 
turnover is the outcome not only of women’s choice, but also of pressures from 
employers and male peer workers. Indeed, some studies have indicated that women 
do not necessarily have higher turnover rates (Price 1977: 40; Waite and Berryman 
1985; Donohue 1987; Lynch 1991). At first glance, this seems rather 
counter-intuitive because we know women leave the labour force for child rearing 
more often than men, but this apparent anomaly is explained by the fact that men 
change firms more often than women (Barnes and Jones 1974).
Women’s turnover does not reflect women’s preference for paid 
employment, since it is an endogenous factor rather than exogenously given. 
Employers can encourage women to leave a job. In general, workers of any sex, and 
any race are more likely to quit a job when it is low paid or has little opportunity for 
advancement (C. Smith 1979; Grounau 1988; Kahan and Griesinger 1989; Light 
and Ureta 1989). Thus, if women are placed in less desirable jobs due to 
discrimination, this could explain part of their higher turnover (England 1992: 33). 
Some studies suggest that these differences disappear, or reverse, after statistically 
adjusting wages or wage-related job characteristics (Viscusi 1980; Blau and Kahn 
1981; Harber, Lamas, and Green 1983; Shorey 1983). This then suggests that the 
high turnover rate for women is, to some extent, endogenous rather than 
exogenously given, but this “chicken and egg” question is difficult to answer on the 
basis of statistical figures (England 1992: 33; Waite and Berry 1985; Donohue 
1987; Lynch 1991).
It is in the interests of male co-workers, as well as employers, to keep 
women out of male jobs. Employers and trade unions allow male co-workers to 
constrain women in traditionally male jobs (O’Farrell and Haran 1982; Schroedel
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1985). Men’s motivation in this is either fear that the entry of women into their jobs 
will lower their wages, or that it threatens their sense of masculinity (Reskin and 
Roo 1990; Hartmann 1976). Furthermore, male workers also have control over a 
woman’s job assignment when she enters a male job (O’Farrell and Harlan 1982). 
These cases indicate that male co-workers have a male group interest and act 
together in order to keep women out. Importantly, male co-workers have incentives 
to discriminate against female workers for their male identity as well as their 
interest (Reskin and Roo 1990).
Accordingly, both employers and male co-workers have incentives to 
maintain gender job segregation even if women satisfy job requirements as 
sufficiently as men. In fact, one can use statistical figures to rationalise 
discrimination against women.
Critique o f  Efficiency Wage Theory
The higher-than-market wage of efficiency wage theory represents an anomaly 
within orthodox neoclassical economic theory. The anomaly is that none of the 
inter-job lifetime wage differentials between workers in various industries, firms, 
or occupations, can be explained by human capital or compensating differentials 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971; England 1992: 87). Critics argue that men’s 
higher-than-market wage discourages women from staying in paid employment, 
and that it may decrease the sum of productivity where both male and female 
workers’ incentive to work hard is counted. They also stress that employers may 
offer men, and not women, a higher-than-market wage due to male collective 
action.
First, critics argue that due to men’s higher-than-market wage, more
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women than men tend to leave their jobs because losing a job is less costly for 
women. Employers pay lower wages to most women where they pay an efficiency 
wage for men. Some firms find it cheaper to reduce shirking by increasing wages, 
than by increasing the costs of surveillance. Nevertheless, if women incur less loss 
than men in losing their jobs, they forgo the higher-than-market wage for only the 
limited period while they are single. If workers in their middle ages and over are 
paid higher-than-market wages, they may continue working in the market. As this 
normally applies to male workers, they stay in employment for a long period of 
time. Women are, on the other hand, paid low wages from the beginning of their 
employment to retirement. This can discourage women from staying in 
employment. If so-called efficiency wages were applied to women as well as men, 
they might continue working as long as men. If it applied to both male and female 
workers, a higher efficiency wage would thus do less to deter women’s than men’s 
shirking (Bulow and Summers 1986; Aldrich and Buchele 1989).
Second, critics argue that when employers pay only men a 
higher-than-market wage, this is not only discriminatory against women, but also 
inefficient. Employers use men’s lower rates of turnover as a rationale to pay a 
higher-than-market wage for men. However, if women’s turnover rates are more 
sensitive to their wages than men’s, this might be a mitigating factor distorting the 
rationality of statistical discrimination against women in these jobs. This is the case 
even if women are doubted to have a higher turnover rate on average or to have a 
variable turnover. The studies of Kahn and Griesinger (1989) and Blau and Kahn 
(1981) show that women have a greater wage elasticity of quitting than men. Thus, 
it is not clear that it is rational for employers to discriminate against women in jobs 
where they are trying to deter turnover (England 1992).
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Third, critics argue that men’s higher-than-market wage may be formed by 
men’s collective action. The model of the gift exchange type of efficiency wage has 
more promise when it explains gender-related differences although Akerlof (1982, 
1984) himself did not discuss this application. The model indicates that group 
norms will affect wage differentials since workers make more effort when they see 
that employers are following the norm. It follows that if prevailing norms are sexist 
then they devalue traditionally female jobs and skills, and the model predicts lower 
wages for female jobs. However, this is true only if women as well as men hold 
sexist norms, or if the male job efficiency wage increases men’s productivity more 
than it lowers women’s (England 1992: 89).
Accordingly, where such implications have been suggested, these hinge on 
assuming that women have higher turnover rates. Yet, we lack compelling evidence 
that women have higher turnover rates that are exogenous to discriminatory 
treatment by employers.
3.2.2 Critique regarding Fertility Decline
Critiques o f  Human Capital Theory Applied to Fertility Decline 
Critics argue that Becker’s fertility theory is also problematic as it uses assumptions 
based on the pure neoclassical economics model. First, Becker’s explanation may 
be invalid unless parents treat children as durables comparable to some other 
expensive durable (Folbre 1986a, 1994). Becker’s fertility theory does not 
sufficiently explain the way that people actually order their preferences between 
having children or not (Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawal999; Folbre 1994).
Second, some economists argue that endogenous preferences, shaped by
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the circumstances in which children grow up and assess their own well-being 
relative to their parents’, influence family size (Easterlin 1966; Easterlin, Poliak 
and Wachter 1980; Poliak and Watkins 1993). Other economists, with a more 
institutionalist approach, emphasise that an increase in the relative costs of children 
is partly due to an increase in relative bargaining power within the family and partly 
the reduction of intergenerational income flow from the young to the old (Caldwell 
1981; Folbre 1994, 1997). These economists argue that the reverse relation to that 
produced by human capital theory is also possible between the dependent variable, 
fertility rates, and the independent variables, such as migration, labour force 
participation and marriage. Such factors, treated as exogenous, can be endogenous 
when the household makes decisions regarding having more children (Folbre 1994, 
1997).
Poliak and Watkins (1993) challenge the model of the rational actor with 
fixed preferences of orthodox neoclassical economists and introduce variable 
preferences, diffusion and culture to explain changes in fertility rates by using the 
Princeton European Fertility Project, a survey of demographic transition in Europe. 
They identify the diffusion of family planning practice, through mass media and 
informal networks, as a significant influence on fertility decisions. They argue that 
culture is a particularly important factor for an estimation of changing fertility rates, 
as it is the bundle of practices that can constrain individual preference and 
opportunity.
Economists with a more institutionalist approach argue that fathers have 
an interest in having fewer children than previously in industrial societies and that 
women’s choices, based on instrumental value, are not solely responsible for 
fertility decline (Caldwell 1981; Folbre 1994, 1997). They argue that fathers shift
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the costs of children to mothers, who cannot afford to have as many children as 
before due to financial pressures, and this is combined with a lack of support from 
the husband. Economic development weakens the power of parents over adult 
children and modifies traditional intergenerational income flow when examined in 
a historical context (Caldwell 1981). As paid employment for both men and women 
expands in the economy, this weakens male control over adult children and reduces 
the benefits of children to parents by setting up further exploitative relationships. 
Nevertheless, as the patriarch’s control over the children is shifted, he avoids 
payment for the costs of children too.
According to this literature, the preference for having children is an 
endogenous, not an exogenous factor for the family and is affected by cultural as 
well as economic factors. Cultural factors do not act simultaneously with economic 
changes since people do not respond instantly or effortlessly to an increase in the 
costs of children, which are often difficult to anticipate (Caldwell 1981; Poliak and 
Watkins 1993). Folbre particularly emphasises that the motives for raising children 
are mediated by values, norms and preferences that are independently resistant to 
change.
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6 Conclusion
This chapter has considered explanations of gender inequality at work and fertility 
decline from human capital theory, statistical discrimination theory and efficiency 
wage theory. Critics argue that the explanations these schools of economists give 
are subject to serious limitations. In spite of them, some neoclassical economists 
attempt to explain the Japanese puzzles through a combined model based on human 
capital theory and supported by statistical discrimination theory and the theory of 
efficiency wages.
Human capital theory alone is said to hold too closely to the basic 
assumption of the pure model: that the market is perfect, the information is 
symmetrical, and individual preferences are exogenously given. The development 
of this stresses that gender inequality at work occurs when employers have limited 
information on workers, or when it has become efficient to pay higher-than-market 
wages for men Yet, as critics have argued, all of these approaches pay too little 
attention to the interdependent nature of individual preferences, to power relations 
between agents, and normative interactions between individual preferences and 
social norms.
The gender imbalance in human capital is partly socially created; too few 
employers select women for on-the-job experience; and employers attach lower 
value to aspects of human capital, such as abilities and skills in care work; that 
women are likely to possess. Far from being a rational response to women’s high 
turn over rates, gender job segregation encourages women to leave their jobs, such 
that women’s high rate of turnover is a consequence of gender job segregation 
rather than simply the cause of it. And rather than being an incentive to men to work
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hard, higher-than-market wages to men can arise as result of male collective action. 
Finally, fertility decisions cannot be understood simply in terms of changes in 
relative prices, but also as a reflection of cultural norms.
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Chapter Three
Neoclassical Theory as Applied to Gender Divisions in Japan 
1 Neoclassical Economic Theory in Japan
Most neoclassical economists in Japan follow human capital theory to explore the 
gender wage differentials, which they see as an inequality originating from gender 
job segregation. Some mainstream economists attempt to explore gender inequality 
at work and fertility change by creating a model that combines statistical 
discrimination theory and efficiency wage theory with human capital theory 
(Tomita 1988; Wakisaka 1990; Higuchi 1991). They combine this with other 
theories to fit the Japanese experience with Anglo-American experiences, and 
argue that the gender division of work at home and at work is efficient (Wakisaka 
1990; Hicuchi 1991; Machiko Osawa 1986, 1993; Yashiro 1995). Some of them 
(Wakisaka 1990; Higuchi 1991) stress women’s preferences whilst others 
(Shinozuka 1982; Machiko Osawa 1986, 1993) pay more attention to employers’ 
preferences.
These economists commonly base their views on two assumptions: one, 
that women prefer traditional marriage arrangements to paid employment 
(Wakisaka 1990: 137); and two, that the form of wage structure in large firms is 
different from and more efficient than the West. This last draws on the efficiency 
wage theory of Koike (1977,1988 and 1991).
At first glance, the combination of models used to explain the Japanese 
case seems to fit the Japanese experience reasonably well. However, they have 
inherited the advantages and disadvantages of the basic neoclassical economic 
model.
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2 Neoclassical Explanations of the Japanese Experience
This section explores the existing explanation of Japanese neoclassical economists 
as follows: Sections 2.1 and 2.2 explain the two common assumptions noted above. 
Sections 2.3 and 2.4 relate the explanation to the Japanese experience within 
neoclassical economic theory from the supply side (the family) and the demand side 
(the firm). Section 2.5 shows how some neoclassical economists explain the decline 
in fertility rate.
2.1 Women’s Preference for Marriage and Unpaid Work
Most neoclassical economists assume that women’s preference for marriage is 
exogenously given and constant over time. As an example, Wakisaka argues that 
women make choices about educational qualifications and paid employment, 
taking into account marriage arrangements, which are the most important 
(1990:112-35). He argues that women’s preference is efficient for the family:
Productive women are trained in the firm and have a happy family after leaving a job (for 
marriage). These wives with higher qualifications do not directly contribute to society. 
However, they contribute to society indirectly by rearing good children and support the 
husband who works hard in the firm.... From the point of view of rational individual choices, 
it is efficient for a woman to become a high-paid worker who the employer evaluates as a 
‘good’ woman, and it is efficient for the husband to marry her and make her specialise in 
home production and unpaid care work at home (Wakisaka 1990: 137).1
1 Translated from Japanese by the author.
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Wakisaka’s argument represents the way that neoclassical economists in Japan 
assume a strict gender division of work within the family. Wakisaka’s view is that 
the present form of marriage arrangement in Japan is given and most efficient 
(1990: 180-82). He argues that highly qualified women choose highly qualified 
men as their marriage partners and that because their husbands earn above the 
market level of wages, these wives are less likely to have financial motivations to 
work for pay. Wakisaka stresses that even though the government encourages them, 
via its policies, to participate in paid employment, they may not continue working. 
He idealises the popular form of marriage arrangement in which the husband earns 
more than the wife, is older than the wife by two or three years and is taller than the 
wife.
In surveys in magazines targeting single women as their readers, women often respond 
that a ‘compassionate’ character is the most important factor when they decide on their 
marriage partner. In fact, women choose their marriage partner not by his compassionate 
character, but by his height, educational qualifications, and age. This tendency is the 
same for arranged marriages and romantic marriages. As the height and age of a marriage 
partner are innate attributes, the person may not be able to change. However, educational 
qualifications are acquired attributes that the person can change if he makes an effort to 
do so, and importantly relate to social status. The wife may have the same level of 
educational qualifications as her husband, but the husband tends to have educational 
qualifications from more established educational institutions than the wife. An example 
of this is that most wives who graduated from Tokyo University, the most established 
educational institution in Japan, have a husband with higher educational qualifications, 
and 80 per cent of them married a husband who also graduated from Tokyo University
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(Wakisaka 1990: 125).2
Wakisaka suggests that if  an employer is rational, he will pay higher wages 
to women who have the attributes of the ‘ideal’ wife, as skills for the ideal wife are 
similar to those for the ideal female worker. Wakisaka, then, argues that women 
with higher educational qualifications are better suited to the role of ideal wife. This 
makes women with higher educational qualifications more likely to leave their jobs 
even when they are paid relatively well because, according to Wakisaka, most 
women prefer a traditional marriage to paid employment. However, wives with 
higher qualifications continue participating in paid employment without 
interruption in three particular cases (1990: 181): first, in cases where they have 
‘mistakenly’ married men who are less qualified; second, when they divorce a 
highly qualified husband; and third, in cases where the husband has an artistic or 
scholar-like job. Wakisaka states that these cases are so rare that firms should not 
expect them routinely.
Wakisaka puts strong emphasis on the form of marriage arrangement 
based on the strict sexual division of labour. He argues that employers, through the 
personnel officers in the firm, should advise single female employees with high 
qualifications, to help them find an ‘appropriate’ marriage partner who is 
supportive to encourage them to stay in paid employment.
2 Translated from Japanese, by the author
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Single women at the average age of marriage hardly see through the personality of their 
candidate for marriage since they are too young and not experienced enough. Thus, as the 
personnel clerks in the firm are more experienced, they should help them find marriage 
partners. These seniors in the firm should find a partner within the firm, because such 
husbands will be more helpful and understanding of their wife’s job. However, this is not 
the case for managers who have frequent relocation of posts and need to change residence 
accordingly... Marriage is a personal matter and should respect individual choices. 
However, has the employer ever interfered in the marriage market (marriage match 
making)? The employer has helped men with high qualifications find matching marriage 
partners, hasn’t he? Such ‘caring’ personnel management, i.e. interference in private life, 
assists male workers in forming the status quo as business elites, who compete hard with 
each other, but share something in common. The employer should expand this interference 
to highly qualified female employees.... (Wakisaka 1990: 182).3
Wakisaka suggests that employers should actively assist wives with higher 
qualifications to continue working for a lifetime, through interference in their 
private lives to find ‘appropriate’ husband for them. Wakisaka attempts to erase the 
line between the workplace and the family, to facilitate highly qualified employees 
to continue in their present job after marriage and child rearing. He admits that the 
firm functions to some extent as if it is the traditional family to male workers, but 
would also like some selected women to join this family firm. Wakisaka’s view on 
the marriage arrangement is extreme, but most economists implicitly cite him in 
taking the present form of marriage arrangement as the given and efficient form.
3 The author translated Japanese text into English and added quotation marks.
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What is particularly interesting here is that the neoclassical tradition, 
which does not officially recognise the role of social norms, here builds them into 
its understanding of the Japanese labour market.
2.2 Efficiency Wage Theory in the Japanese Context
As indicated, the majority of neoclassical economists in Japan cite Koike’s 
efficiency wage theory (1977, 1988, 1991, and 1994). Koike (1994) stresses the 
importance of the worker’s capacity to adapt to changes in tasks and cope with 
unforeseen events, such as machine breakdown, in distinction to the operational 
skills used to perform routine tasks. Koike has identified two types of work 
organisation: the separate system, in which standard operational tasks and 
problem-solving tasks are entrusted to different specialised workers; and the 
integrative system, in which two types of tasks are integrated in individual workers. 
Japanese firms fit the latter type of work organisation while US firms fit the former. 
He argues that male workers in large Japanese firms obtain firm-specific skills 
through their long service for the same firm and unofficial personnel network. 
According to this stress on capability, Koike argues that employers in large 
Japanese firms reward workers with higher than market level wages. He 
emphasises that the Japanese worker obtains more skills through experience in the 
same firm than is the case in the US.
Koike has long argued that the essence of what appears to be team-work or 
group-oriented behaviour at the Japanese factory is not so much collective, as an 
exercise of the individual’s ‘collective skills’ in performing the non-routine element 
of tasks in the integrative system. He holds that male workers develop unofficial
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networking to the extent that they can cope with any unexpected event that may 
emerge in the workshop by consulting others through their unofficial network. 
Koike argues that workers rely on a supervisor or boss, but that control over the 
worker is not as strong as in the US.
Koike’s (1994) argument is a further development of Aoki’s (1988) work. 
Aoki initially categorised firms into two groups: the US and Japanese type o f firm. 
He argues that the US type functions through a relatively static command and 
control structure in a vertical communications network. The Japanese type is 
loosely connected with an ongoing developing horizontal unofficial networking 
that saves the firm time in sorting out minor day-to-day problems. He argues that 
this unofficial network is maintained by frequent reshuffles of workers across 
various fields of work. Through this reshuffling, workers in Japanese firms 
experience various jobs in a field, but are less likely to have specialised skills 
compatible with another firm.
Koike’s efficiency wage theory, strengthened by Aoki’s argument, is 
influential among economists in interpreting the nature of shop-floor efficiency 
within the Japanese firm (Aoki and Dore 1994:2). Tachibanaki (1992), for example, 
thinks that male workers in large-sized firms possess a much higher level of skills 
than those in either Japanese small-sized firms or firms of foreign nationals on 
Japanese territory. Tachibanaki (1995) emphasises that lifetime employment for all 
men made no special allowances by way of occupational benefits for workers at the 
commencement of their employment in a Japanese firm in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
An unwritten agreement between employer and male worker in Japan, which is 
more a feature of large firms, guaranteed seniority pay and lifetime employment to 
all men during this period. This means relatively young workers did not expect a
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pay reward equal to work done immediately, but accepted deferment of their reward 
until their mid-50s (Yashiro 1995). Consequently, young male workers have an 
incentive to work hard for the firm to get this return later in their working lives.
More recent authors argue that this style of management is efficient 
because it makes for strong competition among employees. However, concern has 
been raised over the ability of Japanese firms to sustain this incentive system during 
a period of recession, because seniority wage and lifetime employment contracts 
are designed on the basis of strong economic growth (Yashiro 1995; Kawakita 
1997; Sato 1997).
2.3 Gender Inequalities for Women with Higher Qualifications:
Stressing Women’s Individual Preference
Amongst Japanese neoclassical economists, Higuchi (1991), Wakisaka (1990) and 
Machiko Osawa (1993) focus on the work pattern of women with higher 
qualifications. They find that wives with higher qualifications tend to choose 
full-time unpaid care work at home, and argue that this is more efficient because 
their husband tends to be older, have a higher level of educational qualifications, 
and earn more. These economists stress that the costs of interruption to work are 
greater for women with higher qualifications than for women with lower 
qualifications. Both Higuchi and Machiko Osawa indicate that these costs are more 
for highly qualified women in Japan when compared to similarly qualified women 
in the US. According to them, even though an individual woman suffers loss of 
income on losing her job, wives with higher qualifications prefer marriage and 
child rearing to possible paid employment; this choice, it is argued, leads to an
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efficient allocation of resources at the family level. Despite the fact that Higuchi, 
Wakisaka and Machiko Osawa provide slightly different explanations as to whose 
preference may affect the paid employment of women with higher qualifications, 
they have one point in common: women choose home production and unpaid care 
work at home over paid employment with or without gender discrimination.
Higuchi basically agrees with Wakisaka and Machiko Osawa in taking 
women’s individual choices to be the cause of gender inequalities in the labour 
market. However, these three differ as they situate their work within different 
theories. Higuchi uses a model closer to human capital theory and Koike’s 
efficiency wage theory. On the other hand, Wakisaka uses a model based on 
statistical discrimination theory with Koike’s efficiency wage theory, and Machiko 
Osawa uses a mixed model of human capital theory, Koike’s efficiency wage theory 
and Doeringer and Pore’s dual market theory.
As they are based on different theories, Higuchi, Wakisaka and Machiko 
Osawa explain why women leave their jobs in different ways. Both Higuchi and 
Wakisaka argue that women in Japan choose to leave their jobs because they prefer 
home production and unpaid care work at home. They stress women’s individual 
choice of marriage over paid employment, and argue that employers are indifferent 
about who they employ, although women are less likely to choose paid employment 
within the present conditions of paid work. On the other hand, Machiko Osawa 
emphasises employers’ preference for discrimination against women and argues 
that women make choices by taking into account an employer’s preference for 
discrimination against them. She argues that women are less likely to choose paid 
employment in response to gender discrimination at work.
Amongst these three scholars, Higuchi’s argument is the most influential.
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Higuchi applies the human capital approach, originally employed by Mincer (1962), 
to analyse the gender division of tasks and time in the labour supply in Japan; he 
combines this, however, with Koike’s efficiency wage theory. Using raw data from 
the Employment Status Survey and the Female Employment Status Survey, he 
examines the pattern of women’s labour supply in Japan, particularly wives’ labour 
supply, and finds that wives with higher qualifications have a different work pattern 
from wives with lower qualifications. He contrasts the pattern of the Japanese 
female labour supply with the female labour supply pattern in the US to see in what 
ways these are similar or different.
Higuchi predicts that the female labour supply pattern in Japan will imitate 
the pattern of the US from the 1930s to the present day, but proceeding with a time 
lag behind the United States. Higuchi (1991: 65) found that women in the US have 
increased their labour market participation because of social and political changes, 
and quotes Easterlin (1980) and Goldin (1988). Easterlin argues that women in the 
US are more likely to participate in paid employment if  they increase their 
educational qualifications, if they delay marriage and if fertility declines.
Following Easterlin and Goldin, Higuchi stresses the important role that 
economic interest plays in overcoming customs discouraging wives taking up paid 
employment. He prioritises the economic interest of the firm and, in line with the 
general approach of neoclassical economics, treats government policies and 
changes in structures of industry and demography as of secondary importance; he 
treats them as exogenous factors to firms’ economic interests. On this basis, he 
examines how wives with different levels of qualification participate in paid 
employment. Higuchi predicts that the trend of female labour in Japan will follow 
that of the US, but finds that this is not the case for wives with higher qualifications.
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Women with higher qualifications in the US continue working full-time without 
interrupting their paid employment during marriage and child rearing. In contrast to 
this pattern, Higuchi notes that highly qualified women in Japan tend to interrupt or 
leave paid employment for marriage and child rearing.
To explain this abnormality, Higuchi uses Koike’s efficiency wage theory, 
asserting that it is efficient for firms in Japan not to hire women for high-paid jobs, 
as a lifetime commitment to work is important in them. He also implies that not 
hiring women is more efficient for the employer in Japan than would be the case in 
the US. For example, like Goldin, Higuchi argues that employers do not hire 
women with higher qualifications equally to their male counterparts unless they 
have a labour shortage. He stresses that until employers face a labour shortage and 
become eager to use highly qualified women, discrimination against women at 
work will persist. Higuchi insists that women with lower qualifications have greater 
mobility in entering and exiting the labour market, as part-time jobs are available to 
them: the same part-time opportunities are not available for those with higher 
qualifications.
To present an employer’s discrimination against women as reasonable, 
Higuchi suggests that women, in general, have different incentives from men to 
work hard, even if they have similar qualifications. Higuchi argues that a wife’s 
incentives to work are not determined by her qualifications but, rather, are affected 
by her husband’s income (1991: 144-69). This view is consistent with those of the 
neoclassical institutionalist economist, Shinozuka (1982) and neoclassical 
economist, Katada (2002): Shinozuka also stresses this aspect of the individual 
decision with regard to wives’ labour supply pattern while Katada views wives’ 
incentives to work as different from the qualifications that they hold. She argues
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that wives with higher qualifications prefer to work for pay only if they have 
non-pecuniary incentives to work hard.4 She contrasts highly qualified wives with 
relatively low-qualified wives, discovering that those with lower qualifications tend 
to participate in paid employment for family financial reasons. She presumes that 
wives generally prefer unpaid care work in the family, and that wives with higher 
qualifications will continue to work for pay only if the job also provides them with 
satisfaction in non-pecuniary terms; wives with lower qualifications will continue 
to work for pay for the sole reason that their family needs extra income. Katada 
suggests that marriage arrangements play an important role in this difference.
According to Higuchi’s explanation, the Japanese firm is efficient as it 
rewards workers more by the length of uninterrupted time in paid employment than 
by qualification. Women, in general, are more likely to interrupt paid employment 
due to marriage and child rearing than men. As a result, gender plays a more 
important role than qualifications when employers assess women’s incentives to 
work hard. Rational employers avoid assigning women jobs in the high paid career 
path of men. They treat highly educated women in the same way as women in 
general. Higuchi, thus, stresses that workers are selected first by gender and only 
second by qualification in Japan.
Combining this with human capital theory and efficiency wage theory in 
his model, he argues that gender wage differentials are slow to decline in Japan 
because of the striking importance of length of work in Japanese firms. The 
emphasis on the length of time in paid employment is consistent with the arguments 
of the neoclassical institutionalist economists, Shinozuka (1982), Okazaki (1988),
4 She illustrates this with the empirical results of the ‘Chu-Shikoku Survey’ (Regional Survey of 
Chugoku region of the main island and Shikoku island, both of which are located in the western part 
of Japan).
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Tomita (1988), Wakisaka (1990) and Machiko Osawa (1993), all of whom also use 
Koike’s efficiency wage theory.
If Higuchi had strictly followed human capital theory, he would have 
rejected any interference in the market regarding both individual women and 
employers. Instead, he advocates policy interference, arguing that paid parental 
leave for mothers and flexible working hours for mothers will encourage women to 
continue participating in paid employment without interruption. In his collaborative 
work in Waldfogel, Higuchi and Abe (1998), he argues that such policies are an 
effective encouragement for mothers to choose paid employment in conjunction 
with unpaid care work at home.
Wakisaka and Machiko Osawa recommend a more active policy than 
Higuchi in order to maintain the traditional provision of care work in the Japanese 
family. Higuchi is optimistic on the prospects for decreasing gender discrimination 
while Wakisaka and Machiko Osawa are more cautious. All argue that gender 
discrimination will persist unless policy alters the individual choices of women and 
firms. On this point, they are critical of human capital theory, for relying 
exclusively on individual choices within a laissez-faire policy.
2.4 Firms’ Individual Preferences Influencing Women’s Individual Choices
Some economists use a more neoclassical economic institutionalist approach. 
Based more on Phelps’ (1972) and Arrow’s (1974) statistical discrimination theory, 
Shinozuka (1982), Okazaki (1988), Tomita (1988), and Wakisaka (1990) argue that 
employers form a ‘taste’ for discrimination against women since women are on 
average more likely to leave a job for marriage or child rearing. They too draw on
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Koike’s (1977, 1988, and 1991) efficiency wage theory. Also to be included here 
are both Machiko Osawa (1993) and Yashiro (1984,1986), who stress that rational 
employers in large firms are less likely to hire women for high paid jobs because 
they prefer to avoid risk. They argue that women over middle age lack work 
experience because they have had a shorter working life and a lifetime of family 
responsibility. They also argue that employers in Japan reasonably assign men and 
women to separate career paths, with all men on career ladders in high paid jobs, 
but not women.
On this basis, their argument supports the gender division of career paths 
from the first job assignment. Yashiro (1984) employs Koike’s efficiency wage 
theory to examine the way that large firms form an internal labour market. He also 
adopts internal labour market theory which has developed outside the neoclassical 
economic perspective, as in dual market theory. In Japan, the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Law (EEO law), passed in 1985, and becoming effective in 1986, 
requires employers to provide equal jobs for men and women, ceteris paribus. 
However, since the EEO law was passed, large firms, particularly those in finance 
and insurance, have introduced two career paths for female workers in order to 
separate those who follow the male work pattern from others who follow the female 
work pattern that existed before the law: one is the same as for highly qualified men, 
requiring the incumbent to follow the male work pattern; the other is the 
female-only assistant’s job, for which the pay is less (Lam 1993). Astonishingly, 
this had not been deemed illegal under the EEO law; though it has been challenged 
in a number of cases which I discuss in Chapter Seven. Before the early 1980s, 
employers in Japan strictly separated women from male career paths in which 
workers are successively provided with high-paid positions (Lam 1993: 202-3).
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Yashiro displays the career hierarchy that is based on gender selection to form 
career paths.
Although Yashiro notes that some women enter a male career path, he pays 
little attention to the fact that all male workers are on a high-paid career path in 
large firms, but not all women. He insists that employers’ preference for male 
workers is efficient. Yet, even though men have, on average, a longer time in 
employment than women, men’s length of time in employment is not as constant as 
is suggested. One problem with the analysis is that it takes it for granted that men do 
indeed have an uninterrupted period in paid employment. Yet, as indicated in 
Chapter Two, men’s length of time in paid employment is not as constant as it 
seems. Indeed, Higuchi (1991) notes that men, on average, had a relatively high rate 
of turnover in the 1970s, but that this declined in the 1980s. Some women have 
worked as long as their male counterparts, but have not been rewarded as well as 
men because employers push women into low-paid career paths without their 
consent (Miyaji 1996; Harano 2001; Ishida 2001). Since the EEO law was 
implemented, employers have openly selected women for lower-paid career paths, 
while only some women, but all men, are on high-paid career paths.
Since workers with higher qualifications spend a longer time in training, 
employers incur a larger loss when they leave a job. Thus, neoclassical 
institutionalist economists argue that rational employers do not provide women 
with high-paid jobs when in all likelihood they will leave a job much quicker than 
men. They argue that by hiring men, rational employers avoid losing their training 
costs, invested at the early stage of employment and that this is therefore efficient.
The neoclassical institutionalist economists admit that social constraints 
influence men and women differently and that such constraints may create a gender
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difference in the time available for paid employment. Nevertheless, their central 
focus is on the market and the rest of the social structure is not taken into full 
consideration. In general, the neoclassical institutionalist economists prioritise 
self-interest in the market over other individual interests and the ideologies of other 
societal organisations. Japanese scholars within this paradigm tend to view gender 
inequalities in the household through a lens of economic efficiency. For example, 
Shinozuka quotes the argument of Komiya as a ‘rational’ explanation regarding 
gender discrimination and admits it is perfect rationality on the basis of efficiency. 
‘When we look at women’s lower financial and social status, without discussing ethical 
values (on sex discrimination) such as ‘good’, ‘bad’, ‘fair’, or ‘unfair’, we should objectively 
pay attention to what discrimination is. From the employers’ point of view, it is better 
(efficient) to hire men, and to maintain sex discrimination in pay, recruitment and promotion’ 
(Statement of Komiya 1980; in Shinozuka 1982: 146-7).5
Komiya attempts to avoid discussing social values regarding gender 
inequalities, but this means the present form of employers’ preference is taken as 
given. He accepts the concept of efficiency in the market, in which social values 
prioritise pecuniary gain. Most institutionalist economists hold a similar stance in 
spite of minor differences on policy implications. However, they fail to recognise 
the implication that their work reinforces the present form of social values. In this 
sense, institutionalist economists in Japan are not so different from human capital 
theorists.
Although Komiya developed his theory twenty years ago, it is still the 
most accepted explanatory framework regarding gender discrimination at work in
5 Translated from Japanese, by the author.
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Japan, and is reflected in government policy and legal decisions. For example, the 
Osaka regional court accepted in 2000 an employer’s defence of gender 
discrimination as ‘fair’ in the provision of high paid jobs based on statistical 
discrimination (Chapter Seven discusses this in detail). Other relatively recent 
authors - Okazaki, Tomita, Wakisaka, and Machiko Osawa -  rely on both statistical 
discrimination theory and efficiency wage theory, insisting that although gender 
discrimination is negative for women, it is reasonable for employers to so 
discriminate. They argue that gender wage differentials are changing so slowly 
because it takes time for employers to update information regarding women’s 
preference for paid employment.
Although similar to the human capital theorists, the institutionalist 
economists regard gender discrimination as problematic for human capital theorists 
and offer some policy implications for its reduction. From their ranks, Shinozuka 
applies statistical discrimination and efficiency wage theory to explain gender 
discrimination at work, but applies Doeringer and Piore’s (1971) dual market 
theory to women’s part-time jobs. In accordance with this, Shinozuka argues that 
gender discrimination is structurally created. She refers to the importance of social 
values and gender norms working behind social structure, but these are still located 
outside the discussion of her ‘economics’. As a result, her policy implications stress 
the role of women’s individual choices only.
Tomita (1988) argues that employers provide job rotation with residential 
mobility and opportunities of promotion, and that the more employers assign 
women to lower paid jobs, the more likely women are to leave their jobs. He 
examines the correlation between women’s job upgrading and cross panel data, 
using Mincer’s human capital approach. Through his findings, he suggests that an
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explanation based on statistical discrimination theory does not fully fit gender 
discrimination at work in Japan. He implies that the employer should provide job 
rotation for women as well as men, though this often requires workers to live apart 
from their families.
As noted earlier, Wakisaka (1990) suggests that employers should assist 
women to continue working by marriage match making and providing maternity 
and parental leave, an approach that would increase women’s participation in the 
labour market but also maintain the gender division at home. This is consistent with 
the policy implications of Higuchi (1991) and Waldfogel, Higuchi and Abe (1998), 
who suggest that society should provide maternity and parental leave. Such policies 
are argued to reduce employers’ risk of losing the costs of training by hiring women 
instead of men. But Wakisaka and human capital theorists in Japan propose these 
reforms without going on to query the social values and norms of the marriage 
arrangement and the clear division of paid work and unpaid care work. Equally 
worrying is that Wakisaka advises employers to provide maternity and parental 
leave according to the skills that working mothers possess, in order to avoid ‘free 
rider’ problem in mothers’ leave for childcare. He proposes that employers should 
allow only hard working mothers to take family leave.
Machiko Osawa (1993) expands dual market theory to apply to the gender 
career path of full-time workers, unlike Shinozuka who applies dual market theory 
solely to part-time workers. Both argue that social and political constraints restrict 
women’s choices on paid employment and, as long as women prefer marriage and 
child rearing, rational employers will not provide them with equally high-paid jobs 
to men. Machiko Osawa points out that the application of efficiency wage only to 
men means that the employer pays a disproportionate amount of labour costs for
125
men. As a result, he wants women to be hired for jobs that do not require payment 
higher than the market wage. The employer maintains this job hierarchy by not 
hiring women at all for high-paid career paths. Machiko Osawa argues that 
employers have strong incentives to maintain their taste for discrimination against 
women, and suggests that gender discrimination will not disappear unless active 
policies are introduced. She proposes, firstly, that women should have opportunities 
to gain skills outside the firm; secondly, that the government should revise taxation 
and social security, such as pensions and health insurance, from its basis in the 
household unit to an individual unit, to encourage wives to become financially 
independent; and thirdly, that the government should provide maternity and 
parental leave, with paid public and private care facilities to assist women to 
participate in paid employment.
The more institutionalist economists in Japan all stress that wives should 
work for pay in the same pattern as men with a little assistance from care services to 
complement the care they currently provide alone within the family. Although they 
are aware of discrimination against women at work and find it problematic, they 
encourage women to adjust their work pattern to fit employers’ needs, and not vice 
versa. This occurs since their emphasis is on the market and not the rest of social 
relations. I clarify this by using Wakisaka and Machiko Osawa as examples.
Whatever the analytical differences, the policy implications of Wakisaka 
and Machiko Osawa are much the same as Higuchi. Both Wakisaka and Higuchi 
agree that it is up to women’s individual preferences whether to work for pay or not, 
though they also argue that society should increase the provision of care services to 
replace the present sole provision of care work by mothers, and thereby modify 
these preferences. Higuchi expects that women in Japan will eventually follow the
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work pattern of women in the US, where the market provides care services for the 
family on behalf of mothers with high income. Wakisaka, by contrast, suggests a 
more active policy to encourage wives with higher qualifications to work for pay 
while taking care of the family, arguing that the Japanese family prefers traditional 
care provision by mothers rather than a market provision of care work.
Machiko Osawa also advocates active policy interventions to decrease 
gender discrimination at work. Unlike Higuchi and Wakisaka, she pays more 
attention to the fact that women make their choices within social and political 
constraints. She points out that human capital theorists neglect the gender bias in 
social and political constraints restricting individual choices, and argues that the 
social provision of care services would increase women’s paid employment and 
encourage employers not to discriminate against women in the hiring of workers. 
Feminist scholar Mari Osawa (1994) argues, however, that Machiko Osawa’s 
policy recommendation are insufficient because Machiko Osawa pays little 
attention to the nature of the care services that wives currently provide at home, not 
of which can simply substituted by market or social provision. Without a full 
consideration of care provision, Machiko Owasa’s policy implications are the same 
as Higuchi’s.
On the one hand, therefore, the institutionalist economists in Japan 
encourage employers to provide women with the same high-paid jobs as men, 
requiring women to conform to a male work pattern that demands long working 
hours. On the other hand, they encourage employers to provide wives with 
maternity and parental protection in order to make it easy for them to maintain a 
traditional marriage arrangement. Their policy implications lack a comprehensive 
view on gender discrimination; partly as a result, policies on gender inequality in
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Japan are rather ad hoc (Shirahase 2001).
2.5 Fertility Decline Dependent Largely on Individual Choices of the 
Household
Japan experienced a rapid fertility decline from the 1980s, the pace of decline being 
high in historical terms. Some neoclassical economists argue that fertility decline is 
the consequence of wives’ increased opportunities in paid employment (Becker and 
Barro 1988; Machiko Osawa 1986, 1993; Yashiro 2001). Machiko Osawa (1986, 
1993) and Yashiro (2001) are close to human capital theory in their analysis of 
fertility decline in Japan during the 1970s, 80s and 90s.
The human capital theory approach, as represented by Becker and Barro 
(1988) models fertility decline relative to price. Following the basic assumptions of 
neoclassical economics, Becker and Barro contrast parental altruism and parental 
identity at home with individual selfishness and professional identity at work. 
Machiko Osawa and Yashiro create a model based on the assumption that parental 
altruism is exogenously given and constant. They implicitly follow Wakisaka’s 
assumption that women prefer a traditional marriage arrangement with children and 
a strict division of work within the family. They further their argument by taking 
women’s preference for marriage and having children as exogenously given. On 
this assumption, Machiko Osawa and Yashiro argue that fertility rates will fall 
when women delay marriage and having children, and that married women will 
have fewer children because women are now more likely to be in paid employment 
than before the 1970s.
Machiko Osawa (1986) argues that the rapid fertility decline is due to
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young women choosing opportunities to work for pay outside the home. She 
stresses that changes in technology since the mid-1980s in Japan make it more 
costly for women to quit paid jobs and take up childcare at home. Machiko Osawa 
(1993) argues that working women tend to avoid time-costs of children by delaying 
marriage or having no children as this is efficient for them. The policy implication 
is that the government should provide and promote public and private childcare 
facilities and employers should be encouraged to offer time off work for childcare 
as regulated by state law.
Similarly, Yashiro (2001) considers that fertility rates declined as women 
did not wish to incur the costs of lost work opportunities for the sake of marriage 
and childbearing. Basically, he agrees with Machiko Osawa’s policy proposals to 
encourage women in paid employment to have more children. In addition, he firstly 
proposes that the government should ask employers to provide more job 
opportunities for wives who re-enter paid employment by abandoning the lifetime 
employment contract for all men. He admits that neither employers nor 
representatives of large trade unions will welcome this proposal, but argues that this 
is the biggest barrier to women who want to continue participating in paid 
employment and have children as well. Second, in terms of paid childcare provision, 
he suggests that the government should pay an allowance to mothers to enable them 
to choose appropriate care services, rather than subsidise public childcare facilities 
as it has done since the 1970s. In other words, he suggests market competition in 
childcare services. Third, the government should encourage families to live outside 
the central city to gain better access to childcare support, by de-taxing or providing 
allowances to do so; he also argues that the government should give tax allowances 
to those employers paying the large commuting costs of their employees. Fourth,
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the government should revise the tax system, where income tax and social 
insurance are charged to the household as a unit and where wives are often not 
taxed as individual workers, even if  they are working part-time for pay.
To sum up, both Machiko Osawa and Yashiro argue that fertility rates 
would stop declining if women did not lose their paid employment as a result of 
childbearing and if the cost of childcare was to fall. For them, the decline in fertility 
rates is simply a matter of a cost and benefit analysis of children for women and the 
family.
3 Critiques of Japanese Neoclassical Economic Theory 
3.1Critique of Human Capital Theory in Japan
The general problems within human capital theory are reinforced by an assessment 
of its applications to Japan: in the specific as well as the general case, it fails to 
conform to the empirical evidence, and rests on dubious assumptions about 
women’s preferences. The first and most obvious empirical flaw is that human 
capital theory -  at least when combined with Koike’s efficiency wage model - 
implies that women will have a higher average starting wage than men because 
employers delay rewarding male workers in order to ensure their commitment over 
a long period of time. Female workers, by contrast, should have flatter wage 
trajectories through their time in employment (Zellner 1975; Hashimoto 1981). 
However, women’s average starting wage is lower than men’s in all educational 
groups in Japan (Hashimoto 1996: 35). In 1993, women with higher qualifications 
averaged 181,900 yen per month as their starting wage, while men with higher
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qualifications averaged 190,300 yen. This gap in starting wage by gender exists 
across all age groups: men are typically paid 10,000 yen (approx. 50 sterling 
pounds) per month more than women with comparable qualifications (Hashimoto 
1996: 35 table 2-3).
The theory does not, then, fit the empirical evidence on wage rates. 
Secondly, women’s possession of human capital is underestimated because 
women’s jobs often involve skills associated with care work, which are not valued 
highly in the market (Takenaka 1989: 209-10; Hashimoto 1996: 40). Hashimoto 
argues that the average wage for female jobs is historically lower than that of male 
jobs. Nursing, kindergarten teaching, nursery teaching, and child minding are 
skilled jobs that require a relatively long time in education. Nevertheless, women in 
these jobs are paid less than men in jobs requiring equivalent levels of education. 
X-ray engineers and clinical laboratory engineers have a similar educational 
background to nurses, but male x-ray engineers are paid 25 per cent more than 
female nurses and 30 per cent more than female kindergarten teachers if they work 
for longer than 15 years (Hashimoto 1996:40). Women overwhelmingly dominate 
nursing and kindergarten teaching: 96.74 per cent of nurses and 94.70 per cent of 
kindergarten teachers are women (Hashimoto 1996: 39). Hashimoto argues that 
socially given values create such occupational gender segregation and affect the 
valuation of these skills.
Ida (1994) provided evidence to show that demanding female tasks are not 
sufficiently rewarded because of male collective action. Repetitive tasks, for 
example, are characteristic of jobs that female part-time workers engage in, 
particularly in high tech factories. Ida argues that employers there assign boring 
repetitive jobs that nonetheless require demanding concentration, to female
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part-time workers. Even if these women cannot stand the tasks for any length of 
time, they are easily replaced by new part-timers. Factories with high-tech 
industrial robots create more complex mechanical and technological tasks for men, 
including repetitive tasks such as checking the quality defects of the product. 
High-tech industrial robots cannot detect such defects and need someone to carry 
out physical checks. However, as such repetitive tasks are unbearable for a long 
period of time, male unionised workers refuse to do them. It is, therefore, left to 
female part-time workers to engage in such tasks (Ida 1994: 51-2). This makes it 
efficient for employers to use female part-time workers, even if they may leave a 
job within a short length of time.
The Association of Pay Equity (1997) extends Hashimoto’s argument to 
clerical jobs and argues that the existing job assessment fails to take account of care
o
relating and communication skills. They interviewed 45 men and women in nine 
different trading companies, and surveyed 318 workers (228 women and 90 men) in 
fifteen trading companies. The study examines what position the worker has, what 
tasks the worker does, and how tasks are assessed. Women’s tasks typically require 
interpersonal communication in addition to patience due to their repetitive nature 
and frequent interruptions, and are as strenuous as the tasks undertaken by male 
workers. Nevertheless, the tasks performed by women are treated as of lesser value 
(Ida 1994; Takenaka 1989; Tsumura and Kita 1994).
Ida argues that women tend to prefer marriage and child rearing when they 
observe how employers have treated their female predecessors; i.e. this is not an 
exogneous preference, but is formed due to the perception of social constraints. He
8 The Association of Pay Equity is the name of a women’s organisation whose members work in 
major training companies as clerks.
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points out that the Equal Employment Opportunity Law has been introduced with 
reduced female labour protection, such as permitting women to work late night 
hours and extra work hours since 1986. This pressurises women to follow a male 
work pattern if they continue paid employment, and makes it more difficult for 
women to pursue career and family life together.
Ida (1994: 53-4) argues that the surveys carried out after 1986 reflect the 
institutional changes, and that some new female recruits avoid the high paid male 
career path because they predict that employers will discriminate against women as 
well as pressurise them to follow male work styles. The survey of Kao Sofina 
beauty centre (1991) indicates that women tend to prefer a satisfying private life to 
having both paid employment and family after the institutional changes.9 Mainichi 
Newspaper (1991 22 May) reported that this might be women’s response to the 
gender job segregation (i.e. two-tier career path: the male career path open to 
women and the female job path as assistants). It reported that 42 per cent of 
large-sized firms with over 5,000 employees introduced the two-tier career paths 
after the legislation in 1986. The survey of recruits reported that seven per cent 
more women preferred the assistant career path in 1991 than in 1989. Ida argues 
that these examples indicate that new female recruits foresee the expected 
difficulties of male jobs if they desire to continue in paid employment.
Tsumura and Kita argue that employers assign men rather than women to 
jobs with on-the-job training. They illustrate this with a gender discrimination case 
pursued by a Tokyo local court, which focused on a gender wage discrimination 
case as an example of gender bias in on-the-job training (1992). The employer 
explained that in order to qualify for higher female wage rates, workers needed to
9 Kao is a large-sized chemical company, one of whose businesses is cosmetics.
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experience jobs requiring on-the-job training, and these workers did not have 
experience equivalent to their male counterparts. He, then, argued that gender wage 
differences were reasonable. The workers claimed, however, that the employer 
provided on-the-job training unconditionally to male workers, but required 
permission from the direct boss for female workers to have the same on-the-job 
training. They argued that the employer had discriminated on a gender bias in 
providing jobs with on-the-job training, and that the employer had intended to 
create gender wage differentials. In this case, the court found in favour of the 
female employee, stating that it was the employer’s fault that he treated this female 
employee in the way he did paying less for the same work as carried out by male 
colleagues, even when she was a breadwinner of the family (Tsumura and Kita 
1992: 201; Nakashima 1992).
Takenaka (1989: 148; 1994:22) argues that by taking women’s preference 
for marriage and child rearing as given, employers introduce gender job segregation 
at the point of recruitment, job assignment, on-the-job training and, as a result, 
promotion. Takenaka (1989:148) and Ohba (1983) argue that women have 
restricted choices in paid employment regarding the processes from recruitment to 
promotion, but that employers retain control over human capital investment. They 
stress that employers are less likely to take account of individual workers’ 
preferences for paid employment than their own given perception of women’s 
preferences. This relates to the critique of statistical discrimination theory 
discussed below.
Third, empirical findings indicate that women do not necessarily prefer 
low paid and less demanding jobs, but ‘choose’ these because institutional 
arrangements restrict their choices in paid employment. Hashimoto (1996) argues
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that mothers may choose low-paid and less demanding jobs, as they have to provide 
unpaid care work at home. Mothers are expected to be sole carers in the family, and 
this perception pervades institutions as a whole (Hashimoto 1996:66-90). As a 
result, care work concentrates on mothers instead of fathers and other members of 
the family and society. If mothers choose full-time jobs, they are expected to spend 
work hours as long as their male colleagues, and additionally spend time on care 
work at home. They are, thus, more likely to work as temporary employees and 
short-term contract employees, where employment is not stable and often lacks full 
social insurance cover (Hashimoto 1998:40). As long as the institutional setting 
requires mothers to take sole responsibility for care work in the family, women’s 
choices regarding paid employment are restricted.
Fourth, educational investment is not given exogenously, but is 
endogenously formed. Nakamura (1999) refers to the contrasting gender norms 
between men and women with higher qualifications, and argues that through 
education, gender norms may be imprinted on women if they major in their higher 
education in ‘female’ orientated subjects such as domestic science and literature. 
Brinton (1993) stresses that gender segregation by majored subject exists despite 
women achieving the same level of qualifications as men, and argues that parents, 
in particular fathers, affect the educational choices of their sons and daughters. She 
argues that as parents form their preference for educational investment within social 
norms, in particular, the girl’s ‘choice’ of subject at college or university is not 
necessarily her own.
Fifth, women with higher education do not necessarily have low 
incentives to work hard due to their preference for marriage and child rearing (Ida 
1994; Japan Labour Research Institute 2000). The Japanese Labour Research
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Institute (2000) reported that women with higher qualifications are likely to have 
high incentives to continue in paid employment when they are first hired. It carried 
out a survey collecting samples of 5,000 highly qualified women, and found that 40 
per cent of highly qualified women intended to continue in paid employment when 
they took their first job. In the same survey, thirty per cent of them reported 
preferring to interrupt paid employment for having a family and to re-enter paid 
employment after the demanding childcare period in the company where they were 
first hired. In contrast, only twenty per cent preferred to specialise in home 
production and childcare after marriage or having a child.
Nevertheless, women with higher qualifications do not appear to act upon 
their initial preference in paid employment. Katada (2002) shows that 42.9 per cent 
of highly qualified women specialise in home production and childcare, while 27.3 
per cent are in paid employment. This survey collected samples in relatively rural 
areas in the western region in Japan. This may affect the result, for even women 
with higher qualifications may be more likely to prefer to specialise in unpaid care 
work in the family in rural areas than in urban areas such as Tokyo or Osaka.10 
Despite the fact that the survey results as a whole may have a sample bias, this 
finding still indicates a mismatch between women’s initial preference for paid 
employment and their actual decision on paid employment.
Ida argues that human capital investment by employers discriminates 
against women with higher education and that as a result, they quit paid 
employment. In 1992, 42.6 per cent of female workers with higher qualifications 
responded that they preferred having a high-paid demanding position. This
10 Brinton (1993) argues that women in rural areas tend to hold more traditional views on the gender 
division of work than those in cities, and cites the opinion survey in Hino city as an example.
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contrasted with 69.9 per cent of women with lower qualifications who stated that 
they did not prefer a high-paid, demanding position (Ministry of Labour 1992).
These critiques show that neoclassical economists explain give little 
consideration to the gender norms and social values that underpin their assumptions 
regarding women’s preference for paid employment, marriage arrangements and 
child rearing. These critiques usefully show the problematic assumptions of 
neoclassical economists, and shed light on the important role that social constraints 
play, particularly regarding childcare services. With the exception, however, of 
Brinton, the neoclassical economists pay too little attention to the fact that 
individuals are the agents who make choices; while individuals are passive over 
social constraints they are active in responding to them by making choices.
3.2 Critique of Koike’s Efficiency Theory
The other problematic assumption regards Koike’s efficiency wage theory, which 
understates the role of collective action. As many critics argue, large firms in Japan 
pay male workers a higher-than-market wage in order to avoid conflicts with 
workers and to encourage them to work hard for a long period of time, by providing 
seniority wage and lifetime employment, and selecting favoured workers according 
to the employer’s taste for discrimination (Futamura 1987; Mari Osawa 1993; 
Numura 1992; Hashimoto 1996:38).
First, critics argue that after the 1970s, firms’ trade unions have tended to 
act collectively with employers. Large Japanese firms provide male workers, 
particularly union workers, with a seniority wage and lifetime employment in 
exchange for reduced conflicts (Futamura 1987; Ono 1989; Nomura 1992; Mari
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Osawa 1993). Historically, employers in large-sized firms started offering a 
seniority wage and lifetime employment to male workers with higher qualifications
thbecause their skills were precious at the beginning of the 20 century (details in 
Chapters Six and Seven).
Seniority wage and lifetime employment practices became established 
during the wars, and developed into a life support wage in the post-war period, 
finally settling into its present form after a period of intense conflict between 
employers and workers in the 1970s (Nomura 1992). Mari Osawa (1993) argues 
that employers and unions created the system of seniority wage and lifetime 
employment specifically for male workers in large firms. Due to this background, 
the wage structure in Japan still has the characteristic of a ‘family wage’ paid to the 
male breadwinner. Women in large firms and both men and women in smaller sized 
firms are excluded from the seniority wage and lifetime employment policy (Shiota 
1994: 148).
Male workers are not paid for the tasks they have done, but by male 
membership of the firm that they work for. Nomura (1992: 14) argues that as long 
as employers pay a higher wage to all men, they need to utilise them by investing in 
various firm-specific work skills and experience, and assigning high paid jobs 
through relocation. It is not efficient for employers to assign these male workers to 
low-paid ‘female’ jobs (Mari Osawa 1993: 67). Since employers need to provide 
high paid jobs for male workers with seniority wage and lifetime employment, 
women’s jobs are limited to ‘female’ low-paid jobs.
Second, critics show that Koike’s explanation does not stand on the basis 
of empirical evidence; workers in small firms are equally skilled but are paid less, 
whilst workers in large firms are less skilled but are paid more. Mari Osawa reveals
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evidence indicating that Koike’s theory is inappropriate for explaining all male 
workers’ high wages. In the first place, workers in smaller-sized firms can also 
obtain firm-specific experience, but Koike pays little attention to this (Ono 1989). 
In the second place, although Koike stresses that seniority wage is a reward to 
firm-specific skills and experience obtained through working for a long period of 
time in the same firm, some employers pay seniority wage to the men whose 
turnover rates are high. Not only in Japan but also in South Korea, male workers are 
paid a seniority wage. Although male workers in South Korea have high turnover 
rates, the employer pays a seniority wage to all men (Ono 1989). In the third place, 
if  employers pay for firm-specific skills, workers who specialise in firm-specific 
tasks for a few years are paid more than those who have been recently employed. 
However, regardless of their firm-specific skills, male workers of the same age 
receive the same wage rate (Nomura 1992). This suggests that seniority wages are, 
in fact, provided for membership of two collective groups: first, the group of male 
employees; second, the group of employees in the large-sized firms.
Third, critics argue that employers and male workers act collectively 
because employers may favour those who act together when they assess the skills of 
workers. Employers’ job assessment of workers gives them the chance to select 
workers that they favour regardless of the tasks performed by the workers (Mari 
Osawa 1993: 66-7; Nakano 1991). Firms’ trade unions were usually reluctant to 
accept employers’ assessment of skills in the 1970s and thus they took industrial 
action against employers (Shirai 1992: 27-32). After the oil crisis in the 1970s, 
however, they shifted their focus to maintaining the seniority wage and lifetime 
employment for male workers who share the same employment status, leaving 
behind the problem of employers’ assessment of skills. Employers can thus still
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select their favourite workers for higher positions (Mari Osawa 1993: 66-7; 
Miyatake 1986). Tsumura and Kita (1994:189) argue that it is not yet established 
that this assessment of skills is gender-neutral. At the beginning, firms’ trade 
unions refused to accept employers’ assessment of skills, but changed their attitude 
after the oil crises in the 1970s. As discussed above, male union workers now act 
together with employers as long as both of them abide by their self-interest to keep 
women out of high-paid male jobs. Thus, collective male action after the 1970s 
created the system of employers’ assessment of skills, and this works systematically 
to the disadvantage of women.
Women are particularly disadvantaged by the introduction of assessed 
skills because employers reflect their taste for workers via their assessment of 
‘skills’; in this context, assessment is not of skills but the worker as a person 
(Tsumura and Kita 1994:189). Employers’ assessment of workers works negatively 
for female workers because employers have room for discretion (Takenaka 1989: 
170-71; Shirai 1992:23-32; Nakano 1991:4-5,17; Employment Information Centre 
1990: 30-7). Employers regard gender difference in their assessment of workers as 
a fair reason for gender job segregation within the firm. They do not, however 
provide a satisfactory explanation in cases where men and women are in different 
paid positions, but share most tasks (for example, Sumitomo Steel’s court case 
discussed in Chapter Eight).
Employers are not clear about what makes such a difference between men 
and women in their assessment of workers, only vaguely explaining that women do 
not satisfy their expectations (Employment Information Centre 1990:30-7). 
Nakano (1991:17) argues that via their expectation criteria in the assessment of 
workers, employers reflect their discriminatory perception of women in only
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assigning assistant tasks to them while men perform tasks with responsibilities. By 
way of their job assessment, employers can evaluate by whether female workers fit 
gender norms or not. If employers prefer to pay a ‘family wage’ to all men, as Mari 
Osawa argues, employers have incentives to take advantage of the assessment of 
workers to differentiate female from male workers.
This thesis basically agrees with these critiques, but further investigates 
why male workers have acted collectively with employers since the 1970s, by 
considering their motivations to do so. The critiques above indicate the extent of 
collusion from the 1970s, but say little about why it happens even when workers 
may not gain directly. Chapter Seven provides a more detailed discussion of this 
issue.
3.3 Critique of Statistical Discrimination in Japan
Statistical discrimination theory is also flawed, and at odds with much of the 
empirical evidence. First, men, as well as women, had a high rate of turnover before 
the 1970s in Japan (Nomura 1992: 11; Tabata 1991: 259-60). Nomura (1992:11) 
argues that in one large world-famous automobile firm, 25 per cent of male workers 
quit their jobs within a year, and 50 per cent of them left their jobs in the third year 
of employment in 1971. Tabata (1991:259-60) argues that the lifetime employment 
practice in Japanese firms is relatively new. Before the two oil crises in the 1970s, 
workers in Japan moved from one firm to another within a few years, and mass 
recruitment and mass quitting were common in automobile firms. After the second 
oil crisis in 1979, even workers in the automobile industry tended to stay working 
for the same firm. Since then, the lifetime employment practice for all male workers
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has been a characteristic of large sized Japanese firms, and, consequently, male 
rates of turnover fell after the 1970s. Nomura’s argument is consistent with 
Higuchi’s (1991) finding that workers in Japan had higher rates of turnover in the 
1970s than in the 1980s.
Second, women’s high turnover rates do not reflect their preference for 
paid employment because institutional factors also encourage women to leave their 
jobs. The lifetime employment practice was the outcome of male collective action 
in large-sized firms (Futamura 1987; Mari Osawa 1993: 67). Female workers are, 
however, not hired under the lifetime employment practice partly because few of 
them work in large-sized firms, and partly because these firms are not unionised. To 
maintain lifetime employment for most men in large firms, employers and male 
workers need the labour that firms make redundant in a recession. Takenaka 
(1994:22), Uji (1992: 23, 25-28), Tokunaga and Sugimoto (1990), and Shiota
(1994) argue that female workers are used as such labour, and that women’s rate of 
turnover is the outcome of employers’ and male workers’ collective action and thus 
endogenously formed. Because employers and male workers have incentives to 
keep women away from highly paid jobs, men may emphasise gender norms so as 
to encourage women out of employment (Takenaka 1994:22; Ida 1994: 52; Mari 
Osawa 1993: 68; Hashimoto 1996: 37).
This is consistent with the fact that some employers still clearly segregate 
female jobs from men’s even after the Equal Employment Opportunity Law was 
passed in 1985. Nakamura (1999:3) argues that employers assign female jobs even 
to women with higher qualifications, and that this reduces their incentives to 
continue in paid employment. Ida (1994: 52) shows that 46.4 per cent of firms still 
expected women to leave their jobs at a certain age in 1992 (Ministry of Labour
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1992).11 In 1990, 70.6 per cent of firms still applied age limitations (Tokyo City). 
Tsumura and Kita (1994: 200) illustrated the prevailing attitude, with one 
employer’s answers from an interview with the Women’s Occupation Fund in 1990.
“We use female workers as flexible labour that we can replace at a few years’ interval, 
and this saves our labour costs since we spend on male labour as we have to anticipate 
future costs (for seniority wages) (Women’s Occupation Fund 1990: 97; cited in 
Tsumura and Kita 1994:196).
Such gender segregation is not treated as discrimination against women since 
employers, as well as male workers, are hardly aware of it as such (Sechiyama 
1990).
Gender discrimination works through gender norms and discourages 
women from staying in paid employment. Nakamura (1999) furthers this argument 
as a problem of social norms accepted as efficient and reasonable in society. She 
argues that women may choose marriage and take responsibility for the family 
because they feel guilty in acting against social norms that emphasise the wife’s 
sole responsibility for the family. Shiota (1994) argues that gender norms are 
penetrating the firm and family, leading employers to expect female workers to 
follow norms such as “corporate wife” or “pretty daughter”.12 Women who do not 
fit these gender norms may be more likely to leave a job.
Third, employers foster gender discrimination through institutional inertia 
that perpetuates segregation, and employers in large firms maintain their own 
interests by fostering firms’ hierarchy in Japanese industries. Employers have an
11 The survey did not give the age limit for women. Customarily, the age limit was below 30 years 
old before the 1980s, and perhaps between 30 and 40 years old now.
12 Nohara (1992) coined these terms.
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incentive to create and maintain gender job segregation within the firm but this only 
works efficiently if employers hire young single women who leave within a short 
time and mothers who are paid low wages and work without full social insurance 
cover (Ida 1994; Takenaka 1994; Hashimoto 1996: 37). The male work pattern 
requires long working hours that presume that someone else, often a full-time 
housewife, is responsible for taking care of them. Furthermore, male workers are 
assumed to have financial dependants because they need dependants to look after 
them in the family (Takenaka 1994: 22; Mari Osawa 1992a: 39-40,1993: 73).
Male workers have achieved their wages since the 1970s as a consequence 
of collective action against and with employers. Mari Osawa (1993) argues that 
employers suffered heavily from lost working days in the 1970s when industrial 
action was common. Tabata (1991) shows that employers lost working days 
because of strike action associated with redundancy after the first oil crisis in 1973. 
After the oil crises, employers, therefore, preferred stable relations with male 
unionised workers, and as a result, guaranteed male lifetime employment (Hazama 
1991: 27; Tokunaga and Sugimoto 1991: ch. 6 and 10).
However, in the case of recession, employers have to change the amount of 
labour they employ as they change the level of output. For this purpose, employers 
need some workers they can more freely hire at lower wages and then discharge. 
Such workers are young female workers in large-sized firms and middle-aged 
wives working part-time in small- or middle-sized firms (Ujihara 1966; Takenaka 
1989:216,1994:22). Uji (1992:23) argues that employers in large firms need cheap 
product suppliers outside the firm in order to maintain their own male workers, and 
that those in small-medium firms need cheap and flexible labour, such as older men 
working on a short contract basis and married women working part-time. He argues
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that employers in large-sized firms generally reduced their subsidiaries due to the 
oil crises, and started buying products from small-medium sized firms outside their 
corporate network. He stresses that employers in small-medium sized firms 
reduced their number of full-time workers and increased workers with short 
contracts and part-time workers, to whom employers neither pay as high a wage as 
full-time workers nor cover the full social insurance costs for.
According to Watanabe (1992: 50), 70 to 80 per cent of total employees 
work in small-medium sized firms or governmental institutions, and women are 
more likely to work there than in large-sized firms. Chuo University Research 
Institute (1985) argues that small-medium sized firms in rural agricultural areas 
supply their products to large- sized manufacturing firms at relatively cheap prices. 
It studied small-sized factories in a central rural area of the Nagano prefecture on 
the main island of Japan, and found that while wives engage in agriculture as their 
family business, they work for these factories as Ujihara argues. The use of such 
cheap female labour is arguably the factor that explains how Japanese firms reduce 
production costs while keeping expensive male labour in large sized firms (Chuo 
University Research Institute 1985: ch. 3 and 4; Uji 1992). However, most 
neoclassical economists in Japan focus on large-sized Japanese firms as ‘excellent’ 
firms for giving workers incentives to work hard in the 1980s, and pay insufficient 
attention to the majority of Japanese workers who are not employed by large firms.
Mari Osawa (1993) emphasises that job segregation by firm size and 
gender job segregation within the firm are intrinsic features of Japanese industry 
and were strengthened by the oil crises. She quotes Ujihara’s (1966) argument as an 
illustration. Ujihara argues that women are put into female jobs that are socially 
created by male employers’ interests. He emphasises that female workers have flat
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wage curves even as age increases, and that this is because they hold specifically 
female jobs in large-sized firms while they are young and single, and female jobs in 
small-medium sized firms once they have a family. Workers in large-sized firms 
have larger collective power to bargain with employers, but workers in 
smaller-sized firms do not have such power. He argues that the pay for these female 
jobs is less because the jobs are considered less skilled.
Ujihara has the following insightful explanation for this. He develops the 
argument that employers assume that women compare poorly paid work in a very 
small firm with unpaid work in the household in an agricultural society. He argues 
that employers take on less skilled women and pay them less than men because they 
see women working under a male household head for free. In an agrarian society, 
such as Japan in the 1950s, a family head controlled all family production in the 
fields (Ujihara 1966). As employers, like women, compare unpaid family work 
with women’s lower wages, they believe they pay enough to women and are not 
fully aware of how low the payment is. In addition, women themselves may not be 
aware that they are being unreasonably underpaid.
Fourth, male union workers act together to prevent women’s entry into 
high paid male jobs (Tokunaga and Sugimoto 1990; Uji 1992: 25-8). Tokunaga and 
Sugimoto argue that male workers in large firms know that female workers are paid 
considerably less and that their working conditions are poor. Nevertheless, firms’ 
trade unions do not take action on behalf of these workers, in particular female 
part-timers, because male union workers know that to act for these workers is 
against their own interests (Takenaka 1989:273; Tokunaga and Sugimoto 1990; Uji 
1992: 25-8). Uji (1992: 25-8) argues that firms’ trade unions do not rectify female 
workers’ position them because they fear that this may weaken their bargaining
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power.
Consequently, women are less likely to be members of firms’ trade unions. 
Women are also less likely to use collective power to bargain over their pay and 
working conditions as they work in non-unionised small-medium sized firms 
(Ujihara 1966). Japanese unions are not based on occupational groups or, indeed, 
industry groups, but on individual firms’ unions (Mari Osawa 1993). Workers in 
smaller firms find it difficult to organise trade unions, and, as a result, they have 
lesser bargaining power (Uji 1992: 25-18).
3.4 Critique of the Explanation of Fertility Decline
In theory, fertility decline should be accompanied by an increase of women in paid 
employment and an increase in their relative wages (Becker and Barro 1988). As 
already noted, some neoclassical economists in Japan argue that fertility decline is 
the consequence of wives’ increased opportunities in paid employment (Machiko 
Osawa 1986,1993; Yashiro 2001).
Here, too, there are discrepancies in the evidence. First, empirical 
evidence has established that fertility decline has proceeded without a 
corresponding increase in women’s labour force participation (Retherford, Ogawa, 
and Sakamoto 1999; Retherford, Ogawa, and Matsukura 2001). It has, however, 
been accompanied by a significant postponement in marriage, which may be 
leading to a secular trend not to get married (Ogawa and Retherford 1993; 
Retherford, Ogawa, and Sakamoto 1999; Retherford, Ogawa, and Matsukura. 
2001).
Ogawa and Retherford (1993) argue that rates of fertility in Japan fell after
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1973 because of an increase in those who stay single for life, of childlessness within 
marriage and a higher incidence of one-child families. They also argue that delayed 
marriages are contributing to the trend of declining fertility, as indicated by the rise 
over time in the mean age of marriage in Japan, and that this trend towards later 
marriages helps to explain the postponement of childbearing since the mid-1970s. 
Retherford et.al. (2001) argue that delaying marriage plays a significant role in 
Japan.
In the 1980s and 1990s, women stayed single for longer periods of time 
and delayed marriage due to the fact that they were more likely to be in paid 
employment than before the 1980s (Retherford, Ogawa, and Sakamoto 1999). This 
is consistent with the fact that single women, more than married women, in Japan 
have increased their paid employment since the 1980s. Rates of fertility in Japan 
fell sharply from 1986 to 1992 (Retherford, Ogawa, and Sakamoto 1999: 142-3). 
Single women have thus increased their opportunities in paid employment and 
delayed marriage, and as a result, rates of fertility have continued to fall since the 
1980s.
Second, critics argue that the value of marriage and children in Japan has 
changed since 1973, and that this has also caused a decline in fertility rates 
(Retherford, Ogawa, and Matsukura 2001). Retherford et.al. (2001) argue that 
contrary to the theory of fertility decline in human capital theory, most 
demographers emphasise the negative “externalities” that arise from population 
growth, and predict that the security or insurance value of children declines toward 
the end of a demographic transition.
This helps explain the rapid fall in fertility rates in Japan since the 
mid-1980s. In the first place, the security or insurance value of children declined in
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Japan as the pensions paid for the elderly can compensate for the security or 
insurance that adult children used to provide to elderly parents from the late 1960s 
(Ogawa and Retherford 1997). Associated with this, parents in Japan changed their 
perceptions of children. Before this period, parents needed children for financial 
security, to some extent. This is still the case for agricultural families and 
family-run businesses, but it became less common among the majority of workers 
in paid employment from the 1970s.
Since the value of children as social security has collapsed, both the values 
of children and of marriage have changed, encouraging single women to stay in 
paid employment, delaying marriage, and allowing married women to have no 
children (Retherford, Matsukura, and Ogawa 2001). A key factor promoting later 
and non-marriage has been the near-complete erosion of the institution of arranged 
marriage that forced men and women to have children for security reasons because 
elderly parents tend to live with the eldest son’s family or receive financial support 
from adult children. Thus, the current decline in fertility rates in Japan is taking 
place because changes in society and in the economy have eroded traditional values 
of marriage and children.
4 Conclusion
Using the basic model of neoclassical economics, most Japanese economists 
provide insufficient explanations for the Japanese puzzles. They argue that gender 
job segregation creates rigid gender differentials in Japan, and discourages married 
women with high educational qualifications from working for pay because they 
normally prefer marriage and having children to paid employment. It is said that in
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Japan, women commonly choose their marriage partner within the same or higher 
level of educational qualification group (Wakisaka 1990). Furthermore, some 
argue that if their husband’s income is high, married women tend not to work for 
pay (Arisawa 1956).
Some Japanese economists argue that fertility rates are declining because 
women find it financially difficult to have children. The paid employment available 
for women with children is largely limited to part-time jobs, segregated by gender, 
when they re-enter the labour market; fulltime jobs are limited because most senior 
men occupy lifetime jobs. The costs of children are remarkably high due to the 
insufficient social provision of care services.
The above arguments are valid, however, only if gender job segregation is 
efficient as many Japanese economists assert. As noted in Chapter Two, the 
efficiency of gender job segregation has not been fully proven; indeed, gender job 
segregation arises partly because men act collectively in order to prevent women 
from sharing their high-paid positions. Critics argue that women’s high rate of 
turnover is a consequence of gender job segregation, as well as a cause. More 
importantly, women’s preference for marriage and having children over paid 
employment is not given, but is formed through the interaction of individual 
preferences and social constraints. When social constraints strongly restrict 
individual choice, their preferences are also restricted. In contrast with men, 
women face stricter constraints in choosing paid employment. This indicates that 
women form their preference for marriage and child rearing over paid employment 
in such social conditions.
Critics in Japan have provided empirical evidence establishing that gender 
job segregation, created by male collective actions, can discriminate against women,
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and argue that fertility rates decline not only because women respond to changes in 
relative prices but also because economic shifts change the value of children. 
Using women’s preference for marriage and child rearing as the rationale for gender 
job segregation, Japanese employers hire women for jobs that require little 
experience and provide them with little on-the-job-training. Gender job segregation 
encourages women in Japan to leave their jobs following marriage or childbirth. 
Because of lifetime employment and the seniority wage, women with higher 
educational qualifications have lower wage rates than men with lower educational 
qualification after ten to fifteen years in paid employment. As the jobs available for 
married women are often significantly low paid part-time jobs, this hardly 
encourages married women with higher educational qualifications to continue 
working for pay. This is because the firm tends to internally provide men with 
lifetime employment the jobs that married women with greater skills can do as 
part-time jobs.
While lifetime employment and the seniority wage for men create low 
paid part-time jobs for middle-aged women and old men, social organisations in 
Japan create married women’s ‘preference’ for low paid jobs, or no paid jobs via 
their maintenance of this system. Consequently, women with higher educational 
qualifications are less likely to work once they have children because there are few 
part-time jobs that require their skills.
Critics in Japan argue that the decline in fertility rates in Japan has come 
about through the increase in single women’s paid employment rather than that of 
married women; women had fewer children in the 1980s and 1990s because they 
now prefer to delay marriage and children. If so, this must be partly because the 
social norms of having children have changed. The change in norms regarding
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children has also changed the value of marriage, and as a result, single women 
enjoy paid employment more than before the 1980s.
The Japanese experience suggests that the Japanese puzzles are best 
viewed as the outcome of discrimination against women that social organisations 
create and maintain. Fertility rates have declined without a corresponding increase 
in married women’s paid employment, and this suggests that societal norms as well 
as economic factors significantly affect fertility decisions. The Japanese case, 
therefore, provides a good illustration of the limitations of neoclassical economic 
theory in explaining gender wage differentials, women’s labour supply pattern, and 
the decline in fertility rates.
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Chapter Four
Alternative Approaches: The Theories of Folbre and Kuran
1 An Alternative to the Neoclassical Economics Perspective
This chapter considers the alternative approaches of Nancy Folbre and Timur 
Kuran. Both Folbre and Kuran try to accommodate the problems of power relations 
and normative interaction between individual preferences and social norms in their 
accounts of preference formation. However, they explore accounts of preference 
formation differently. Folbre explores gender inequality at work and the decline in 
fertility rates by taking into account interdependent preferences, power relations 
and normative interaction between individual preferences and social norms. Kuran 
gives a more detailed account of preference formation in which public opinion 
plays a key role when people form their willingness to reveal their innermost 
preference. In contrast to Folbre, Kuran very rarely bases his analysis of preference 
formation on gender.
2 Nancy Folbre’s Theory
2.1 Framework of Folbre’s Preference Theory: Folbre’s Early Work
Folbre (1994) creates a model in which social constraints and individual 
preferences interact along the characteristics of gender, age, sexuality, race, class 
and nationality. Due to the connection between social constraints and individual 
preferences, social structure forms and is, in turn, reinforced by individual choice.
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Folbre argues that individuals make choices according to both self-interest and 
self-identity, but that self-interest and self-identity are not entirely free from a social 
context organised by collective action. In her model, individuals do not behave or 
decide as agents outside a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script 
written for them by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen 
to occupy as Granovetter (1985) argues.
Choice plays an important role. Individuals are not perfectly rational utility maximizers, 
but they are purposeful agents who make decisions to buy, to sell, and to engage in various 
social activities. Their choices are affected by relative prices and probabilities of gain, the 
economist’s traditional arbiters of efficiency. But they are also shaped by the social 
construction of individual preferences and cultural norms.
Choices take place within certain social structures, themselves the outcome of previous 
choices and structures. The ownership of the means of production, or, more broadly, the 
distribution of initial assets, is an important dimension of social structures. But political, 
cultural and psychological factors also define the groups to which individuals belong, and 
locate their position within them (Folbre 1994: 38-9).
Individuals make choices within social constraints, which incorporate 
various inequalities, but social constraints are not restricted to the allocation of 
assets; they also include political rules, cultural norms and psychological factors. 
Individuals produce goods and services, exchange them, are coerced and 
co-ordinate their self-interests and identities in the firm, the State, the market and 
the household. The individual produces goods and services in the firm and 
exchanges them with the employer, and this exchange should be seen as the source
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of coercion between these agents, who co-ordinate their conflicting interests and 
identities within social constraints. Folbre does not limit assets here to assets that 
are property-based, and does not assume that relations based on material 
considerations always have primacy.
Folbre argues that individual preferences describe what individuals like 
and how much; i.e. the dimensions of desire rather than the ‘testes and preferences’ 
to which neoclassical economists normally refer. In this context, desire represents 
deeper emotional involvements as is often case with care service provision for 
children. Taste and preference are more superficial and often used in selecting 
certain brand of products. Preferences are, to some extent, given biologically: for 
example, people generally prefer living to dying. Most preferences, however, are 
moulded by social norms: people in similar circumstances often want similar things. 
Folbre stresses that social constraints encourage people to want the same things in 
the same circumstances.
Individual preferences are generally subject to change not only by social 
constraints such as assets, rules and norms, but also by personal experience and 
learning (Folbre 1994: 42; Moore 1994: 55). Some individual preferences may be 
evident at an early age, and persist over a lifetime. Others may be changeable 
through the influence of outsiders. For example, sometimes people do not know of 
what their preferences are, or find that some of them are at odds, and ask therapists 
to help them understand their own mind; and, sometimes, people have 
‘meta-preferences’, framed by conscious efforts to think about what they should 
like (Folbre 1994: 42-3).
Following this interpretation of preferences, Folbre argues that they are
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partially endogenous, and similar to assets, rules and norms. What people want, and 
are encouraged to want, relates to social identity, characterised by factors such as 
gender, age, sexuality, race, class and nationality.
People do not belong to a certain class simply because they have a certain endowment of 
assets. They belong to a class because a combination of assets, rules, norms and 
preferences identify their position in a socially constructed spectrum called class. 
Similarly, individuals do not belong to a certain gender simply because they have a 
certain endowment of biological assets. Rules, norms and preferences also create the 
meaning and implications of biological differences (Folbre 1994: 43).
As a result, individuals cannot be located in a single set from the possible 
bases of conflict when they make choices; they operate in many different collective 
dimensions as members of many different groups, both chosen groups that they 
have selected and given groups to which they belong due to innate attributes. Folbre 
argues that gender becomes one among other possible vectors for conflicting 
interests and collective action, such as age, class, race, sexual preference or 
nationality. She points out that membership of given groups creates common 
identities and interests that are conducive to collective action, and that some given 
groups are more powerful than others. Men’s collective efforts to keep women out 
of male jobs, either out of self-interest or for male collective interests, and to keep 
male jobs as more valued than the jobs of females, is one illustration of this.
As individuals belong to societal groups both given by birth and chosen 
later, they may belong to several social groups where self-interests are contradictory. 
Individuals do not always seek the self-interest and identities that agree with their
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collective interests and the identities of a given group. This is because they can 
belong to chosen groups that reinforce the material or non-material assets of their 
other given groups. As individuals make decisions regarding their chosen groups, 
they are actively, rather than passively, involved in collective action. Chosen groups 
are what neoclassical institutionalist economists and political scientists call 
‘interest groups’. Individuals choose to join and have a great deal of freedom to 
enter and exit: examples include the National Organisation of Women, the National 
Rifle Association, or a committee to study race and gender bias in the economic 
curriculum. Individuals have mobile self-interests and identities according to their 
position. When individuals choose a stance from which to pursue interests and 
identities, they interpret their positions; in this interpretation process, the 
dominating values and norms in society affect individual preferences.
As applied to gender, this generates the following analysis. Women choose 
their work pattern within social constraints, and these social constraints differ from 
those of men’s, mainly due to social norms that pressurise women to be carers 
within the family. To share their care work with someone else, women would have 
to bargain with the husband, other family members, and the sources of paid care 
services outside the family. Social constraints make it difficult for them to do so. 
Because of the lack of bargaining power, women may be unable to share care work; 
they may also find it difficult to share, because of their emotional involvement with 
members of the family, particularly children. Both of these help sustain the current 
gender structure.
Power relations come into effect through emotional elements in preference 
formation as well as lack of resources. Some emotions, such as the sense of
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responsibility for care services, are encouraged not only by the lack of other sources 
of carer services but also because of a would-be carer’s self-identity. In some cases, 
even when other sources of care services are available, carers such as parents, 
particularly mothers, feel so responsible for caring for their own children that they 
provide childcare services by themselves; they identify themselves as carers and as 
a result decide to take care of the children by themselves.
Folbre, in her early work, stresses that self-identity plays an important role 
when people make choices. At this point, however, she focuses more on the 
structure of preference formation than the motives behind care provision.
2.2 Interaction between Individual Preferences and Social Norms via 
Emotional Elements: Folbre’s Later Work
2.2.1 Carer Roles for the Family and Emotional Involvement
In contrast to her early work, Folbre’s later work (1998, 2001b) and Folbre and 
Weisskopf (1998) explores how the motives behind care provision interact with 
social norms. This deepens her argument regarding interdependent preferences and 
the interaction between self-identity and social norms.
Folbre stresses the importance of interdependent preferences through 
emotional elements; social norms encourage women to have certain emotions such 
as a sense of responsibility for childcare provision. People act in certain ways when 
feelings of responsibility based on gender self-identity arise, for example, being a 
‘mother’. Social gender norms dictate that it should be ‘mothers’ who look after
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children. When persons identify themselves as mothers, they may use the social 
norms associating with mothering as basis for deciding what childcare services to 
provide.
In practice, it is difficult to differentiate which type of preferences - the 
preference induced by ‘pure’ feeling and the one induced by social norms - is at 
work, because the emotional elements of motives are difficult to differentiate. 
Folbre (1994) and Folbre and Weisskopf (1998) argue that personal preferences are 
interdependent, and that this is especially likely to be the case among family 
members. Care providers connect to those cared for by way of emotion.
Feminist scholars argue that emotional factors play an important role in 
family labour in connecting individuals with others within the family. Himmelweit
(1995) points out that the shift of commodity production to outside the household 
depersonalised the production of commodities, inasmuch as they were now 
produced for the market, not for any particular consumer, and bought from the 
market rather than from any particular producer. Exchange within the 
depersonalised characteristics of the market is embodied in the wage-labour 
relation. Because of an excessive focus on wage-labour relations, the personal 
elements of family relations are paid insufficient attention. What is identified as 
personal here, is the emotional involvement in providing care services within the 
family.
The family is concerned about the poor standard of care services in the 
market, because parents cannot expect the carer to be as emotionally involved in 
childcare as parents and grandparents and to their working hours will be less 
flexible (Folbre 1986a, 1994, 1998; England 1989; Nelson 1999). As family
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services are not dealt with in the market, where prices are given for goods and 
services, the market economy undervalues family care. However, since the family 
is outside the mechanism of market pricing, the market economy undervalues care 
work in the family. Nelson (1999:53) argues that Becker, for example, disconnects 
emotional elements such as caring for others (empathy) in paid work in his model, 
then suddenly re-connects them when he addresses childcare.
The rhetoric that individuals are motivated ‘by money’ and driven by their ‘own interests’ 
when engaging in relationships of exchange also needs unpacking. The connotation of 
these phrases tends to be morally suspect materialism and selfishness (at least from some 
leftist, religious or cultural feminist points of view). One is seen as working for love or 
money; that is out of spiritual values, affection and altruism, or out of crass materialism, 
self-interest and greed. Such a dichotomy implicitly assumes, however, (along with 
neoclassical economics), first, that market agents’ actions spring from their unquenchable 
(nonsatiable) wants, and second, that they are autonomous monads.
...Men have traditionally been thought of as having identities defined by separation from 
nature (that is, being above animals because of a superior consciousness) and from other 
people (distinguishing themselves from their peers by their individual exploits and 
accomplishments), to the point of mythical isolation. Women have traditionally been 
defined by connection (as cooks and childbearers, and as wives, mothers, or daughters of 
men) to the point of mythical engulfinent (Nelson 1999:48).
In contrast to some schools of neoclassical economists, feminist theorists 
argue that the emotional elements of the self are not separable (England 1993; 
Nelson 1993). They have called into question the primacy of ‘want’ over ‘need’ in
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thinking of care services for the family, and the notion of the ‘separative’ self. 
Neslon (1999) argues that a real person desires something for his/her needs, as well 
as for his/her consumption; when a person is asked what he or she wants the money 
for, we may hear about groceries and rent as well as fancy clothes, restaurant meals 
and extravagant vacations. She stresses that whilst it has not been fashionable in 
mainstream economics to talk about ‘needs’, human needs for basic food and 
shelter are at the base of our working for money (Nelson 1999: 48). Similarly, most 
people at some point in their lives will want money for their children’s clothes and 
education, or their parents’ medical bills. Money is used to meet responsibilities 
rather than to satisfy self-interest in this case. A separative self does not hold up 
when motivations are more closely scrutinised.
Care-giving involves not only money, but also trust, affection and 
appreciation (Nelson 1999: 46). This is rarely acknowledged in the analysis of 
traditional neoclassical economics. The quantity, quality and reciprocity involved 
in care-work are seldom adequately rewarded in the market (Folbre 2001b: 51). 
Owing to this lack of acknowledgement, mainstream economic theory is 
inadequate for explaining the way that women form preferences over care work for 
the family, and the way society evaluates care work. Here, I explore the emotional 
involvement in care work, by way of Folbre’s exploration of the interaction 
between personal preferences and social constraints.
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2.2.2 Interactions between Individual Preferences and Social Constraints
Social norms affect individual choices. Because individuals form their preferences 
within both imposed gender roles and their emotional attachment to others, their 
preferences tend to differ significantly according to their social roles. Social roles 
may also encourage some individuals to act sensitively according to the ‘needs’ of 
others rather than their own ‘wants’ (Nelson 1999); and the character of emotional 
involvement can vary by gender, age, sexual orientation, class, race and national 
context. Gender roles are socially constructed, and women often act within such 
socially - given roles through emotional involvement (Folbre 1994; Folbre and 
Weisskop 1998). Regardless of intentions, the present form of care provision for the 
family helps to maintain and enforce social roles, in the interest of a certain 
collective group’s interests and identity by means of the social construction of 
work.
Care services are not simply performed on the basis of love but also on the 
basis of calculations about future return. If care provision is enforced and women 
cannot expect any future returns from their services to the family, this will 
discourage them from providing care for the family. Nelson (1999: 44-48) argues 
that there is evidence that what can drive forth caring feelings is not the movement 
of money itself, but rather the social meaning given to this movement. She argues 
that people providing care may come to change the way they feel about what they 
do, with negative consequences. Worry about market notions of self-exchange 
comes to corrode ties of affection and obligation (Folbre 1995:83). This suggests 
that if a person comes to focus on the future return for the care services they provide,
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this discourages them from providing care for others (Folbre 2001a). If care 
providers cannot expect to receive a return from what they do, care services become 
merely a gift rather than a reciprocal exchange of services (Folbre 2001a; 2001b). 
This tension between gift (love) and exchange (market) is reflected in sociological 
and anthropological work on ‘gift’ versus ‘commodity’ exchange (Carruthers and 
Espeland 1998; Nelson 1999:45).
It is important to analyse what motivates women to provide care services 
for the family. Mothers may have various preferences, but in a market economy, the 
observable ones will be those of either a dependent mother or career woman. As 
social constraints can encourage individual preferences to be shaped in a certain 
form, love is not necessarily the key motivation for mothering (Folbre and 
Weisskopf 1998, Folbre and Nelson 2000; Nelson 1999). On this basis, Folbre and 
Weisskopf (1998) argue as follows.
Individuals perform care services for six motivations and are most likely 
to have mixtures of these motivations. The first is where people take care of others 
out of a sense of altruism. In this case, people are prepared to do a great deal of 
work providing care services to those whom they love or for whom they feel 
affection. A genuine relationship of love or affection may be regarded as 
completely voluntary, unburdened by any element of coercion. This motive itself is 
independent of social formation of preferences. However, in reality, people are 
likely to act because of a mixture of motives, some of which are more evidently 
affected by social constraints. It is not realistic to expect people’s motives to care 
for others to depend solely on altruism.
Altruism is the term most commonly used to describe satisfaction derived
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from enhancing the well-being of another person. Altruistic preferences, however, 
may be somewhat endogenous, because if they remain entirely unappreciated they 
often dissipate over time (Folbre and Weisskopf 1998: 175; Folbre 2001b). Parents 
take loving care of their children for many years, but after a certain point, usually 
expect their care to be reciprocated to some extent. If this expectation is completely 
disappointed, their preferences may change. Similarly, a spouse or partner may 
provide one-sided care out of genuine affection, but, in the long run, lack of 
reciprocity often dampens the willingness to continue this.
Second, people may do care work because they feel responsible for caring 
tasks, or feel guilty if  they neglect them. Most people recognise certain duties or 
obligations that they perform even though they derive no direct pleasure from them. 
One could argue that an individual derives no direct pleasure from fulfilling their 
duty, but moral categories cannot always be reduced to utilitarian calculus (Sen 
1987). It is important to consider the possibility that moral values, central to a 
person’s character and identity, motivate caring labour; for example, the care of 
senile relatives or the care of a delinquent child. Care labour is undertaken here out 
of a sense of responsibility, and does not require direct reciprocity between the care 
provider and the care receiver. Nevertheless, these responsibilities are socially 
constructed, and are often based on some generalised reciprocity. If fewer people 
conform to the social norms of responsibility, the norms themselves tend to weaken. 
Thus, an individual’s willingness to fulfil care responsibilities may depend, to some 
extent, on his or her perception of how seriously others take such responsibilities.
Third, people may take care of others because they intrinsically enjoy 
helping. They may take care of others simply because they enjoy it: caring can be
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its own reward; for example, when parents help a child learn to talk or walk. 
Participating in this process can be a satisfying and enjoyable experience, although 
it can also reflect obligation to some extent. That women are generally considered 
to exhibit this preference, based on enjoyment, to an extent greater than men, 
suggests that it is not randomly distributed, and is influenced by cultural norms as 
well as perhaps biological factors (Fuchs 1988). Furthermore, intrinsic enjoyment 
usually entails some affection for the person being cared for, and often requires 
some show of reciprocity from the cared-for person.
Fourth, people may take care of others because they expect them to 
provide something in return. The motivation here involves the expectation of an 
informal quid pro quo. Examples are when two persons living together take turns 
preparing meals for one another, or two friends take turns caring for one another 
during illnesses. The caregiver, however, has no guarantee of a quid pro quo and no 
recourse to adjudication if it is not forthcoming; for example, one person within the 
family may stay at home and nurture the family, while the other earns a wage to 
provide the financial resources for the household, but there is no guarantee that the 
care recipient will reciprocate. If he (usually male) fails to do so, the caregiver will 
cease to do her work. There is a significant element of self-interest here; I am 
willing to do something for you because I expect that, as a result, you will do 
something for me. Folbre and Weisskopf argue that people tend to enter into this 
kind of imprecise and un-enforceable exchange if they can live with the possibility 
that the other will not reciprocate soon, or if  they can trust others ultimately to 
reciprocate. In both conditions, people show some respect for others in this 
exchange, and this makes the relation an informal quid pro quo rather than a simple
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instrumental media for achieving goals.
In the fifth case, people take care of others and are paid or compensated. 
This is based on a well-defined contract for reward. Much of the care service labour 
undertaken in our society is done not in the general expectation of some informal 
quid pro quo, but in the virtual certainty of a precisely-defined reward. This is 
clearly the case with care service labour supplied in the labour market in exchange 
for an agreed-upon wage. It would appear that most care service labour in modem 
societies is motivated by contractual reward, for we know that there are legions of 
hospital workers, school teachers, social workers, day care workers and others, 
providing care services in exchange for a wage or salary. Nevertheless, many of 
these workers are likely to act upon other motives in addition to this. Some are also 
altruistic or feel responsible for those for whom they are caring, derive intrinsic 
enjoyment from it, or expect informal reciprocity.
Sixth, people do caring tasks in order to avoid a penalty or punishment. 
Instead of being offered a positive reward for doing the work, they face a negative 
sanction for failing to do it. Commonly, this will involve some lesser deprivation. 
For example, the wife in a traditional patriarchal family may do housework, raise 
children, and provide other services to her husband because failing to do so would 
expose her to the likelihood of ridicule and possibly social ostracism from the 
community (Folbre and Weisskopf 1998: 174-8). Folbre and Weisskopf use the 
term ‘coercion’ to describe this motive for providing care service labour, because 
the labour is being produced under duress. This involves cases where a person 
provides care services out of self-interest rather than not, so the choice to do it is not 
in that limited sense ‘voluntary’. However, in the case of coercion, the terms of the
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choices are much less favourable to the person choosing.
It is difficult to identify which care service labours are provided out of a 
sense of ‘affection or concern for others’, rather than out of narrow self-interest. It 
may be that women provide care service labour partly because they are more 
altruistic than men (England 1989). But what is clear is that socially and culturally 
constructed gender norms encourage women to take up caring services. Men and 
women make decisions in a social context. What we want and how we will behave 
is strongly affected by our perception of what other people want and how they are 
likely to behave (Folbre 2001b: 30).
The fact that men are reluctant to undertake care work, means that women 
are pressured into doing it so as to avoid breaking up the marriage. Other pressures 
come from cultural norms. Folbre (1994: 99) gives the following examples; ‘If you 
do a man’s job outside the home you cannot be a real woman inside the home’. 
‘You think you are as good as a man, but I can beat you’. These threats are based on 
social norms of how women should be, which are determined at a macroeconomic 
or macro-cultural level, rather than at an individual microeconomic level. Men’s 
macro-level of norms, regarding their ideal image of women, influences the 
negotiation between individuals in the household.
Social norms regarding the ideal woman, such as the wife and mother, are 
constructed by men’s collective action, which, in turn, pressurises women to follow 
these norms. Women may not want to do devalued care work, but violating these 
norms entails penalties, and if women are afraid of the consequences of violating 
these norms, they will still take on the responsibility of care work; in this case, care 
service labour is motivated by coercion (Folbre and Weisskopf 1998).
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It is not just social norms, but also a lack of substituting care services, that 
force mothers to provide care services within the family themselves (Folbre 2001b: 
41). For example, Japan and Italy provide little or no social support for 
child-rearing because both societies have strong pro-family values (Folbre 2001b: 
41; McDonald and Kippens 2000). In these cases, women can be coerced into a 
choice of care-giving because the society’s values impose on them a sense of 
responsibility through to be a ‘good’ mother.
Whatever the motive or mix of motives, care-giving produces many 
unintended side effects that are passed on from one person to another in surprising 
and complicated ways. One clear disadvantage of care giving is the loss of the 
mother’s earnings. Both in the market and in the household, the economic risk 
attached to having children is, therefore, high (Pujol 1995; Hartmann 1981). 
Statistical analysis in the US shows that motherhood tends to lower women’s 
earnings even when they do not take much time out from paid work (Folbre 2001b: 
34).
Clearly, women, as care providers, bear certain costs because of rearing 
children. However, it is not always mothers alone who pay the costs of having 
children. The claim that individuals consider the costs of raising children when 
making decisions about whether to commit themselves to caring for them does not 
imply that they are selfish. In an economy in which the private patriarch, employer 
and male worker do not share the full costs of having children, women can choose 
either to have children or to continue working without children, but social 
constraints make it difficult for them to do both. During the pre-industrial era, a 
private patriarch had strong control over his family members and strong incentives
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to have a large family since that directly served his self-interests. At the same time, 
mothers and fathers clearly have common interests as parents. If children promise 
important economic benefits, the conflict between individual self-interest and large 
family size is reduced (Folbre 1994: 76). Men gain from coercive pro-natalism, but 
they also gain from helping to provide for their children, because it is in their 
economic self-interest to do so (Divale and Harris 1976; Harris and Ross 1987).
In an advanced industrialised economy, the rising costs of having children 
pressure parents to have fewer children, because parents need to finance them and 
invest time and energy in their care. The increasing demands for an educated labour 
force require parents to support children to obtain educational qualifications 
(Folbre 1994: 104). In certain circumstances, men respond differently from women 
to the increased financial pressures that childrearing imposes, and reduce their 
commitments to children through desertion and divorce (Folbre 1994: 105). If 
mothers and fathers live together, they share the burden of a reduced market income. 
In fact, fathers may work long hours in their jobs to make up for this. In addition, 
many women may be forced to work long hours in low-paid jobs to make up for the 
lower income, and the risk of separation and divorce is high (Folbre 2001b: 34: 
Stone 1999). Childcare support agreements are difficult to negotiate and even more 
difficult to enforce. As a result, women who choose to become mothers risk making 
themselves and their children vulnerable to poverty and other kinds of economic 
stress (Pear 1999; Eaton 1996; New York Times 26 April 1999).
Even after a private patriarch withdraws his control over having more 
children, public patriarchy, such as that of the state and of social organisations, is 
unlikely to pay the full costs for childcare and rearing. These public agents are also
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self-interested, and tend to see children as commodities rather than public goods 
(Folbre 1995). The costs of children to individuals are heavily influenced not only 
by relationships between mothers and fathers, but also by relationships between 
parents and children, families and societies as a whole (Folbre 1994: 105). Due to 
their weaker social positions, however, mothers are more likely to be left to pay a 
disproportionate amount of the costs associated with children. The lack of resources 
for childcare has a coercive effect in guiding women’s preferences. Folbre and 
Weisskopf call this ‘patriarchal coercion’.
As this suggests, women form their personal preferences subject to the 
societal level of finance and ideologies regarding childcare, and in contexts that 
vary by age, sexual orientation, class, race and national context. If mothers have 
high qualifications in a country where care services are available in the market, they 
are more likely to be able to avoid patriarchal coercion. The element of patriarchal 
coercion is potentially eased by three elements: income, the social provision of care 
services and the nature of gender roles.
As preferences are formed endogenously, this may create a circular 
process that greatly lowers enforcement costs (Folbre and Weisskopf 1998:184). 
This happens because caring may be addictive. Folbre and Weisskopf (1998: 184) 
argue that adults who spend time providing caring services to dependants often 
come to feel more affection for their dependents than those who do not. In contrast 
to the addiction to drugs, this addiction provides positive consequences for society, 
but it may still have negative consequences for caregivers as individuals. Through 
this process, the values and norms that pressure women to behave in more altruistic 
and responsible ways may successfully increase the supply of caring labour by
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women. Accordingly, at least some of the happiness and stability of the traditional 
family rests on coercive practices that limit women’s potential for individual 
autonomy and enforce cultural values and norms associating femininity with 
altruism and masculinity with self-interest (Folbre and Hartmann 1988). Women’s 
lower valued work and weaker bargaining position within the family creates a 
vicious circle connected by individual preferences formed within social norms in 
certain social values.
Accordingly, Folbre (1994) argues that men, in general, have an incentive 
to act together to pressure women to provide care service labour even when women 
and children are vulnerable to poverty. The image of the unproductive housewife is 
connected to a cultural norm that portrays women as dependants who should be 
grateful for their husband’s support. Men want women to take responsibility for 
devalued care work in the household, since men want to preserve their greater 
bargaining power in the household and the market. By enforcing the norms that 
present women’s subordination as natural and necessary, men can avoid a conflict 
of coordination with women who want to both share their care work with someone 
and have their care work re-valued. Folbre found that there is an implicit 
dichotomy within the couple behind this coordination: unless either the husband or 
the wife is willing to sacrifice the time involved in caring, the marriage 
arrangement must end and the home will fall apart. Since women are more 
vulnerable financially when marriages collapse, this provides a further incentive for 
them to work to sustain the home.
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2.3 Gender Inequality at Work: Women’s Undervalued Work
The costs and risks of caring for dependants have another dimension that has less to 
do with economics than with psychology (Folbre 2001b: 38). When a person 
spends time with those who need his or her care, he or she often becomes attached 
to them. An initial decision to care for someone can lead to a spiralling level of 
commitment. Usually, it is the mother who agrees to take time away from her career 
to stay at home with the baby, and to move where the father’s career dictates, so that 
he can earn a salary sufficient to support the family. The father is, however, less 
attached to the children and more attached to his career and he divides time 
proportionately between the family and career. Mothers are particularly vulnerable 
to becoming prisoners of love, if only because they experience the early and 
intimate physical contact with children.
Time spent on childcare gives us one of the keys for explaining gender bias 
in time use within the household. The existence of children in the household has a 
large impact on the time mothers spend in the household in an industrial society. 
The largest shifts in women’s time use are associated with the care of young 
children (Bittman and Pixley 1997; 101-11). Folbre (1982,1983, and 1994) argues 
that the gender division of labour is the outcome of sharing the benefits and the 
costs of raising children. Society, in the present and in the future, does not 
redistribute the costs of having children, but leaves them to the mother at the 
expense of her opportunity costs (Ferguson and Folbre 1981). In an economy in 
which rewards are increasingly based on performance in paid employment, the 
costs and risks of parenthood are rising (Folbre 1994, 1998, and 2001b:33).
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However, the head of the household, as male breadwinner and ‘private patriarch’, 
promotes and forwards the costs of having children onto the wife, who then needs 
to pay for them through spending time and energy on care work.
On the other hand, the employer and male worker can share the costs of 
childcare with mothers by offering them paid time off work for childcare, payment 
during childcare leave, in-firm childcare facilities and re-valuing the nurturing 
skills that mothers provide in childcare work. One solution is to provide women 
with entitlements as individuals, rather than as wives or mothers, or to socialise the 
costs of children (Sainsbury 1996). This implies policies that encourage a strong 
attachment to the labour market and improving gender equality in earnings, 
especially the lifetime earnings of mothers (Joshi 1991; Waldfogel 1997). 
Nevertheless, the state is reluctant to promote such attachment in mothers, on the 
grounds of efficiency or corporate culture, and this reluctance is to the detriment of 
working mothers. This suggests that as mothers must look sifter their children due to 
their low-valued cultural capital, both the employer and the father can benefit from 
men spending more time on paid work. Accordingly, women have undervalued 
skills and capabilities because they are obliged to satisfy the demands of their 
families. Women’s paid jobs can be undervalued because they are given a lower 
value than their actual value within a social context.
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2.4 Fertility Decisions
The decline in the rate of fertility in an economy where people do not share the 
costs of childcare can be women’s reaction against social constraints that do not 
allow them to be fully-fledged workers and good mothers simultaneously. 
Technological factors seem to affect fertility by changing individual costs and 
benefits and fostering certain constraining structures. Folbre (1994: 106) argues 
that the ability of individuals to respond to changes in the relative risks and costs of 
family commitments are limited by their institutional context. In particular, 
decisions on having children are one of the choices made within weighty social 
constraints through socially given gender roles and emotional attachments (Folbre 
1986a).
Social norms and values encourage certain preferences about the sexual 
activities of an individual, for example when society supports legally married 
mothers, but not mothers out of wedlock. This underpins the preferences to either 
work without having children or to be a full-time mother. In such circumstances, 
fertility decline is not only the result of changing relative prices, but is also the 
outcome of social contexts regarding sexual activities and mothering. Women find 
it harder to care for children while working outside the home. This is because as the 
costs of having children rise, the costs of coercive pro-natalism also increase 
(Folbre 1994: 108).
According to this analysis, a decline in fertility is linked to a devaluation of 
women’s work and their lower paid positions in the workplace within a social and 
cultural context. These features of women’s work and fertility are not merely the
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results of individual preferences but also the restrictions of social constraints. Due 
to the multidimensional structure of social constraints, socially stronger agents 
cannot see how they are advantaged in pursuit of their interests, which appear to 
them to be fair. Socially weaker agents choose the best possible options to satisfy 
their self-interests and identities and these are more likely to have an emotional or 
personalised quality orientated to the care of others. In contrast to the view of 
neoclassical economics, Folbre (1994, 1998), Folbre and England (1999) and 
Nelson (1999) argue that men and women are not equally altruistic within the 
household; because of their greater altruistic qualities women tend to become 
socially weaker agents.
Within Folbre’s theory, women’s low status in the workplace is presented 
as the result of their devalued capital and choice of care work, with legal and 
customary restriction on women’s access to high-paid jobs, all in the form of a 
circular relation. By contrast, women’s choice of care work is seen in the 
neoclassical economic paradigm as a result of individual preferences taken by a 
person who is free from social constraints. This suggests that Folbre’s theory can 
better explain the differences between one society and another in the pace of change 
in gender wage differentials and occupational gender segregation. People may or 
may not choose a job that enables them to gain more skills and capabilities. If 
individuals pursue their self-interests, they act to add more cultural capital for 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary gain. Social constraints, however, enhance the pursuit 
of certain types of cultural capital and diminish the opportunity for other types.
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3 Kuran’s Theory of Preference Falsification
In contrast to Folbre, in whose account gender and emotions are important factors, 
Kuran explores the mechanisms of normative interaction between individual 
preferences and social norms via self-interest in various national and cultural 
contexts. Although Kuran (1990, 1991, 1993, 1995)’s theory of preference 
formation focuses little on gender aspects, it shows us the way that social 
constraints shape various preferences into certain forms, since people usually act in 
accordance with values and norms that favour the status quo.
Kuran stresses that public opinion plays a key role when individuals form 
preferences. Kuran argues that precisely because people who express different 
opinions do get treated differently, individuals normally tailor their expressions to 
the prevailing social pressures in various cultural contexts (1993, 1995: x). Kuran 
describes and analyses the tailoring of preferences as a source of rigidity, a shaper 
of ideology, and a cradle of surprise - as in the sudden transition of political systems 
observed in former communist countries in Eastern Europe. Through his account of 
preference falsification, Kuran attempts to classify, connect and explicate the 
unintended consequences of preference falsification.
Kuran argues that individual agency and social norms discourage people 
from expressing preferences on specific issues (preference falsification); and that 
they create a gap between the preferences that appear in public and the intrinsic 
preferences that may be of a different order. The preference that an individual ends 
up conveying to others is called the ‘exposed preference’; the preference that 
reflects his or her genuine preference is termed ‘intrinsic preference’ or ‘private
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preference’. These preferences do not always agree with each other because of the 
tendency to hide some preference that social values and norms discourage them 
from expressing; people may hide the preferences unconsciously, and such hiding 
of intrinsic preference is termed preference falsification.
As illustrated in Figure 4-3-1, the exposed preference emerges as the total 
utility; the sum of utility by intrinsic utility, reputational utility, and expressive 
utility (Kuran 1995: 36 figure 2.2). Kuran argues that this can be distinguished from 
‘private preference’, which is defined as what a person would express in the 
absence of social pressures. Intrinsic utility is utility including the satisfaction that 
people gain by acting according to their private preferences. Reputational utility is 
the reward gained from others by making a choice on that preference, and 
expressive utility is self-satisfaction (Kuran 1995: 26-30). Kuran argues that the 
possible rewards include smiles, cheers, compliments, popularity, honours, 
privileges, gifts, promotion, and protection. Goldin’s work (1995) provides an 
example; she argues that women may take account of their husbands’ preferences in 
their choice of employment in the rural areas in Colombia. Expressive utility gives 
the greatest value when a person acts according to his or her intrinsic preference 
Kuran argues that people’s choices must be satisfying a need other than social 
approval and respect: people derive self-esteem from resisting social pressures and 
establishing themselves as people to be reckoned with; people find satisfaction in 
speaking their minds, opening up their hearts, acting themselves.
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Figure 4-3-1: A Case where society's decision is effectively beyond the individual's 
control
Intrinsic utility being fixed, as individual selects a public preference on the basis o f  a two-way
trade-off between reputational and expressive utilities.
Utility
Taken from Kuran (1995), p.37
Kuran explains the interaction between agent (self) and public as follows. 
Three distinctive considerations may enter a person’s calculation; the satisfaction 
that he/she is likely to obtain from a society’s decision, the rewards and punishment 
associated with his/her chosen preference that appears in public, and finally, the 
benefits that he/she derives from truthful self-expression (Kuran 1995: 3-21). 
Usually, this offers a trade-off between the benefits of self-expression and those of
total utility
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being perceived as someone with the right preferences. Where the later benefits 
dominate, individuals will be encouraged to engage in preference falsification. 
With reputational utility and expressive utility, people’s total preferences can be 
guided in a direction that favours current cultural values and norms (Kuran 1995: 
24-6).
Kuran, on the one hand, stresses that preference falsification influences a 
public discourse. To conceal our private preferences successfully, we must hide the 
knowledge on which they rest; that is, we must reinforce preference falsification 
through ‘knowledge falsification’ (Kuran 1990, 1995: 157-246). In doing so, we 
distort, corrupt, and impoverish the knowledge that rests in the public domain. 
People conceal from others facts that they know to be true and expose themselves to 
facts that they know to be false (Kuran 1991, 1993, 1995: 19). The distribution of 
real preferences across individuals makes up a public opinion and that of private 
preferences forms private opinion (Kuran 1995: 17). The latter distribution is 
hidden, and insofar as people’s preferences determine which political programmes 
are to be implemented, it is the former distribution that pressure groups have the 
most immediate stake in controlling.
Kuran, on the other hand, explains the way that preference falsification in 
turn affects private preferences. The task requires recognising that our private 
preferences on political issues rest at least partly on beliefs shaped by public 
discourse, which consists of the suppositions, facts, arguments, and theories 
communicated publicly (Kuran 1995: 19). People do learn from their personal 
experiences and think for themselves, however the limitation of our cognitive 
power allows us to reflect deeply and comprehensively on only a fraction of the
179
issues on society’s political agenda. However much we might want to scrutinise 
every issue on our own, we all rely heavily on public discourse, and often on its 
superficial elements at the expense of our private knowledge and preferences.
Kuran argues that at any given equilibrium, public opinion may differ 
from private opinion. The equilibrium may owe its existence and stability largely to 
preference falsification on the part of people who may be unsympathetic to the 
policies that makes it possible. Such disgruntled people may refrain from dissenting 
even though they form a huge majority, because of social pressures -  pressures that 
they themselves sustain through acts of preference falsification.
Such an outcome is more likely for issues where private knowledge is 
drawn largely from others (Foucault 1978; Kuran 1995: 157-175). It is less likely 
for matters where personal experience is the primary source of private knowledge. 
Kuran argues that two other factors can influence the level of ignorance generated 
by preference falsification: one is that if public opinion has reached an equilibrium 
devoid of dissent, individuals are more likely to lose interest in alternatives to the 
status quo\ the other is that widespread ignorance is more likely in a closed society 
than in a open society that may be affected by external influences (Kuran 1995: 
19-20). People are reluctant to disagree with one another. As a number of theorists 
have argued, the power of suggestion and ‘consensus’ is so great that it can 
influence the outcome of simple cognitive experiments (Folbre 1998: 62; Kuran 
1995:78-83; Milgram 1974: chaps. 2 and 3).
This brings us to another possible consequence of preference falsification 
-  the widespread ignorance of the status quo's disadvantages (Kuran 1995: 
157-246). Kuran explores how disadvantages may once have been appreciated
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quite widely. However, as long as public discourse excludes criticism of 
fashionable political choices, their shortcomings will tend to be forgotten (Kuran 
1995: 19). He illustrates this by the example of the fall of East European 
communism. People who objected to communism did not know how widely their 
resentment was shared, but also were ignorant of their biased knowledge regarding 
the status quo, and this encouraged people pervasive sense of powerlessness (Kuran 
1995: 124-25). Individuals believed that they could do nothing to change their 
government or its policies, that attempts at reform were futile, and that the only 
prudent course of action was co-operation with the Party. In 1985, a survey 
conducted in Hungary, by then one of the two most relaxed Soviet satellites, found 
only 10 percent of the population felt capable of doing something against a decision 
inimical to their interests. The figures compare with 46 percent for the Netherlands 
and 75 percent of the United States in 1978 (Bruszt 1988). In the process, members 
of society lose their capacity to want change. The status quo is sustained because 
people are afraid to challenge it, and will persist since no one understands its flaw 
and can imagine a better alternative.
Kuran’s argument recalls what sociologists call ‘socialisation’ and 
neo-Marxists call ‘false consciousness’ (Bourdieu 1977; Cherry 1987; Shulman 
1989; Scott 1990) and is inevitably open to question in the way it seems to posit a 
‘true’ or ‘real’ preference, that has been subsequently falsified or distorted. While 
he does not satisfactorily address the possible criticisms of this, he does effectively 
establish the need to differentiate between different levels or kinds of preference, 
and the likelihood than some are more ‘deeply’ held than others. True and false 
elements can blur into one another, partly, as Kuran argues, because sustained
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preference falsification creates intellectual narrowness and ossification. When this 
point is reached, preference falsification ceases to be a source of political instability 
and people begin to support the status quo ‘genuinely’; preference falsification has 
become so effective as to eliminate the inclination to want anything different.
Kuran argues that preference falsification may have unintended 
consequences. People tend to rely on public discourse as a reference point forming 
preferences, but the public ‘knowledge’ they draw on can itself be the product of 
past preference falsification. Knowledge is subject to serious limitations that tend 
not to predict the downside of the status quo. As people’s preference formation is 
heavily influenced by knowledge, this may lead to unexpected consequences. 
Kuran points out that we can find the example of unexpected consequences in falls 
of communist regimes. People in former communist regimes continued falsifying 
their intrinsic preference as they could not believe that it was possible to act against 
prevailed rules because of their lack of information. They carried on hiding 
preferences against public preference, expecting that they, at least, did not lose by 
doing so. They did not notice that as they hid their preferences, leaders in their 
countries were misinformed regarding the status quo and believed it was still 
functioning when it was actually malfunctioning. This also applies to leaders in 
former communist regimes; they were unlikely to see that their restriction of 
information had encouraged people to falsify their preferences until this caused the 
fall of the regime. Through this process, preference falsification, and the lack of 
awareness of it, can have unintended outcomes.
Kuran’s theory is insightful in analysing the elements within exposed 
preferences and why these may bring about unintended consequences. His account
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of preference formation is particularly useful in decomposing the element within 
exposed preferences and in grasping the mechanisms of interactive preferences and 
social norms and values. Kuran (1995) argues that preference falsification 
encourage people to support socialist systems in the former Soviet Union, caste 
systems in India, and racism in the United States.
4 Conclusion
Folbre’s theory is highly applicable to the Japanese puzzles; the tendency, for 
example, for wives with higher qualifications to specialise in unpaid care work at 
home, while wives with lower qualifications return to part-time paid work; and the 
rapid decline in fertility from the late 1980s onwards. These puzzling trends have 
been presented as the outcome of women’s preferences, having little to do with 
other social arrangements. Folbre’s theory, by contrast, links the process of 
preference formation with social norms, exploring the way individuals form their 
preferences within cultural values and norms that associate, for example, femininity 
with altruism and masculinity with individual self-interest. Folbre enables us to see 
that some of the satisfaction or stability of the traditional family relies on a 
patriarchal coercion of women to provide unpaid care work; and that gender 
inequality and fertility decisions are shaped by individual preferences interacting 
with cultural values and norms. This goes a long way towards explaining the 
Japanese puzzles.
However, the approach is not applicable in a straightforward manner to the 
Japanese case. Folbre’s theory is rich in its study of Western industrial countries,
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but there are features specific to the Japanese experience that are less fully taken 
into account. Societies in Western industrial countries differ from one another, but 
their differences may be less than the differences between the Western industrial 
countries as a whole and Japan, particularly in relation to cultural values and norms 
of femininity and masculinity. Among many others, Lincoln and Kalleburg (1990) 
argue that the cultural evaluation of work is distinctively different in Japan. Before 
applying Folbre’s model to the Japanese case, we therefore have to explore the 
specific cultural values and norms associated with femininity and masculinity in the 
Japanese context.
It is partly on account of this that Kuran’s notion of preference falsification 
is so helpful. First, the notion of the status quo is highly pertinent to the Japanese 
context. Second, Kuran helps explain why a particular set of cultural norms might 
remain in place, even if they have been economically inefficient. Third, Kuran’s 
explanation of preference formation is particularly useful in clarifying the way that 
people take account of others in forming preferences when they perform care 
services for the mixture of motives that Folbre and Weisskopf (1998) dexcribe.
This thesis therefore develops Folbre’s account of preference formation by 
taking advantage of Kuran’s account of preference falsification. In the next chapter, 
I start with some of the historical context of this, looking at impact of traditional 
gender and class values in the post-war keiretsu.
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Part III Explaining the Japanese Experience
Chapter Five
Gender and Class Values in Keiretsu in Post-war Japan 
1 Introduction
Gender issues relating to the status quo are central to the Confucian element of 
Bushido (the ethics of the Samurai warrior), in which the samurai is associated 
with ideals of loyalty such as ‘male’ seniority and selfless devotion to the male 
head of society or family. Bushido is derived from three traditions: Shinto (the 
oldest religious traditions in Japan in which Sharman, represented by the Emperor, 
ruled society and was worshipped as the son of the God); the Zen sect of 
Buddhism (a religious tradition stressing loyalty, filial piety and obedience to the 
authority figure, courtesy or decency, an ascetic style of life, and high regard for 
learning); and Confucianism (imported from ancient China, modified to match 
with Zen, teaching that immutable natural principles create and justify a social 
hierarchy with sharp class divisions, and established in the Tokugawa era) (Yabuki 
1905; Hagen 1962).
I argue that gender elements in Bushido still exist in keiretsu as a part of 
the status quo following on from zaibatsu (the primary social organisation in 
Japan) in the Meiji era. Mito (1991), Morikawa (1992), Woodiwiss (1992), and 
Kensy (2000) have found that many of the older values of Bushido were carried 
over from zaibatsu to keiretsu firms. However, they primarily focus on changes in 
social values that have helped created a new social elite, and say little about the
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role of female workers on gender roles in zaibatsu.
Meanwhile, while some of literature notes that women are positioned 
differently from men in either zaibatsu or keiretsu, little of this work explores the 
connection between zaibatsu and keiretsu. Hosoi (1980), Hunter (1993), and 
Garon (1997) argue that from the early stages of modernisation in the late 
nineteenth century, the values and norms associated with women were markedly 
different from those attached to men. Hosoi and Hunter focus on young women 
working in factories under the umbrella of zaibatsu at the lowest rank with very 
poor working conditions that often harmed their health, and contrast this with 
male domination of the higher positions. Garon argues that women drew on new 
values from the West that favoured a clear gender division of work within the 
couple. Brinton suggests that gender differences in educational institutions can be 
rooted in the values and norms of parents in the keiretsu economy. Nonetheless, 
because the central focus of their study of gender values is to illustrate the values 
associated with women in the Tokugawa and the Meiji era, they have less to say 
about modem Japan as their main concern is history rather than contemporary 
economy in Japan.
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2 Bushido and iIe> System
Before discussing the continuity of the status quo, I explain the gendered elements, 
such as men’s selfless devotion to the firm and women’s to the family, derived 
from the Bushido and ‘Ie’ systems of the Tokugawa era.
Bushido is the code of moral principles that the samurai warriors were 
required or instructed to observe; its code consists of virtues such as justice, 
courage, benevolence, politeness, veracity and sincerity, honour, the duty of 
loyalty and filial duty (Nitobe 2001 [1905]; Yabuki 1905).
Bushido provided the meaning of life in a stable feudal society where 
samurai warriors were no longer faced with war (Hagen 1962: 340). In this society, 
the code of Bushido emphasised the duty of loyalty above all and filial duty. 
Samurai were to devote themselves selflessly to the lord, even at the cost of their 
lives, and were given the highest honours in exchange for their loyalty. It is 
important to note that a part of ‘honour’ involves reputation (Nitobe 2001 [1905]: 
72).
Bushido is a mixture of Shinto, the Zen sect of Buddhism and 
Confucianism shaped to fit to the status quo of the Tokugawa era. First, Shinto 
encouraged people to worship a ruler, such as the Emperor, as if  they were 
worshipping their own ancestors. The influence of Shinto in Bushido was not as 
significant as Zen Buddhism and Confucianism in most of the Tokugawa era, but 
was strengthened in the Meiji era when the Emperor replaced the Shogun as ruler 
of the country (Yabuki 1905; Garon 1997).
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Second, Zen Buddhism provided the core of virtues and ideas within 
Bushido (Nitobe 2001 [1905]; Yabuki 1905). The precepts encouraged samurai to 
act for rights, honour and duty, and not for financial rewards. Hagen (1962) cites 
the writing of the vice Shogun, 1628-1700, as follows.
What then the use of samurai class? Its only business is to preserve, or maintain, giri 
[right, honour, duty]. The people of the other classes deal with visible things, while the 
samurai deals with invisible, colourless, and unsustainable things...if there were no 
samurai, right (giri) would disappear from human society, the sense of shame would be 
lost, and wrong and injustices would prevail (Hagen 1962: 340; Clement 1889: 90). 
Third, Confucianism revived Zen Buddhism and established the Bushido 
code; it encourages everyone to accept and perform the duties within his social 
position as a natural place in society. The Confucian doctrine of occupation and 
focused with the Zen teaching of the virtue of work; many merchants also stressed 
the Zen virtue of simplicity, frugality, and diligence in work as a part of one’s 
filial duty to family (Hagen 1962: 341).
It is also important to note that while Bushido stresses duties (i.e. 
emotions such as sense of responsibility), it also authorises samurai to use a sword 
and encourages them to fight if it is justified by the code (Yabuki 1912; Sugano 
2003). The sword (katana) of the samurai symbolises their power, as they are the 
only class in society allowed to possess it (Nitobe 1905; Benedict 1946). It is, 
however, an honour to win against an opponent without using the sword (Nitobe 
2001 [1905]; 131-137). Following the Bushido code, samurai first attempt to 
defeat opponents without the sword but if this is not successful, they can justify 
their use of the sword (Nitobe 2001 [1905]). Samurai, however, are praised most
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for using the sword while performing acts of loyalty; Hagen tells an anecdote of 
forty seven highly reputable samurai who lost their lord and then revenged the 
villain in an act of loyalty even when they knew they would have to kill 
themselves after his death.
The duty of loyalty developed in Bushido was useful in preserving the 
7e’ system. Ie is a family based group that owned land in the feudal era and aimed 
to maintain and expand their land. While clans in China are strongly based on 
blood ties and heads of the family are chosen from within family members, ‘ie’ is 
a large family-based unit which will adopt successors from outside the direct 
blood family members if they are more efficiently operate the land than a son of 
the 7e’ head (Yabushi 1912; Kensy 2000). As the He9, and not the individual 
functions as the smallest social unit, each individual within the ‘ie9 is expected to 
serve to maintain the land, sometimes at the expense of ignoring blood ties. As 
genetic ties are weak in the He9 system, the landlord and samurai stress the duty of 
loyalty to the He9. Not only landlords but also samurai formed the He9 and 
constructed a clear hierarchy where the He9 of the lord is at the top and the He9 of 
samurai are located underneath it.
The duty of loyalty further developed as conformity to group consensus, 
and prevailed over classes. People believed that if members in the He9 acted along 
Confucian moral codes, everyone should conform to group consensus that 
generates group interest. When member conformed to group consensus, this was 
considered to fulfil the duty of loyalty and rewarded (Miyasaka 1999). The duty 
of loyalty fostered the attitude of acting collectively within the community as well
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as the He' (Smith 1996: 155-74). During the Tokugawa feudal era, peasants 
worked as a group of five who collaborated to complete tasks and monitored each 
other; all five members were rewarded or punished as a collective group (Mito 
1991). This work style fostered Japanese people to tie firmly to the others outside 
the family, i.e. they developed interdependent personal preferences within a 
non-family group (Fukuyama 1995).
Bushido encouraged women, particularly women in the samurai class, to 
take responsibilities in their own He' and obey senior men in the ‘z'e’ ( Y a b u k i  1912). 
By the mid-Tokugawa era, the difference in gender roles formed the basis for 
subservience in the middle and upper classes and had been rigidly codified within 
the Neo-Confucian-based official orthodoxy (Hagen 1962: 343-46; Goran 1997: 
60-87; Woodiwiss 1992: 21-66).
This means that due to Bushido, women in the upper and middle class 
were more restricted in their activities than before the twelfth century, women 
were still able to communicate with people outside the family. The position of the 
samurai woman was based on the principle of respect for men and contempt for 
women (Garon 1997: 119; Sekiguchi, Hattori, Nagashima, Hayakawa, and Asano. 
1998: 102-4) and a strict division between the functional roles of men and women, 
where the woman’s place and role was exclusively within the household as wife 
and mother. Nitobe (2001 [1905]) illustrates the position of ideal women within 
the Bushido system as follows.
The accomplishments of our women were not acquired for show or social ascendancy.
They were a home diversion; and if they shone in social parties, it was as the attributes
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of hostess - in other words, as a part of the household contrivance for hospitality. 
Domesticity guided their education. It may be said that the accomplishments of the 
women of Old Japan, be they might roam, they never lost sight of the hearth as the 
centre. It was to maintain its honour and integrity that they slaved, and drudged, and 
gave up their lives. Night and day, in tones at once firm and tender, brave and plaintive, 
they sang to their little nests. As daughter, woman sacrificed herself for her father, as 
wife for her husband, and as mother for her son. Thus, from earliest youth she was 
taught to deny herself...Man’s helpmeet, if her presence is helpful she stays on the 
stage with him: if it hinders his work, she retires behind the curtain. Not infrequently 
does it happen that a youth becomes enamoured of a maiden who return his love with 
equal ardour, but, when she realises his interest in her makes him forgetful of his duties, 
she disfigures her person that her attraction may cease (Nitobe 2001 [1905]: 144-5).
During the course of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1600-1867) the social 
values stressed by the ruling class filtered downwards to the other classes of 
society (Hunter 1988: 138; Hagen 1962: 341-43). Among all classes, samurai 
women in the Tokugawa era (1600-1867) were subject to the strongest gender and 
age prescriptions (Garon 1997: 119; Sekiguchi, Hattori, Nagashima; Hayakawa, 
and Asano 1998). Even among the peasantry, where women’s contribution to 
agricultural labour was crucially important, women could not totally prevent the 
imposition of inferior status in a rigid family and community hierarchy (Hunter 
1989; Sekiguchi, Hattori, Nagashima, Hayakawa and Asano 1998: 94-137). 
Women were subordinate within the domestic sphere, with the senior male head of 
the household making decisions on behalf of the other family members. Decisions 
of senior male head were regarded as group consensus women should conform to
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in order to fulfil the duty of loyalty.
3 Impact of Bushido and the (/e ’ System on Contemporary Japanese Firms
Some scholars argue that the He' system has profoundly shaped the work ethic in 
keiretsu firms (Nakane 1970; Mito 1991; Garon 1997; Williams 1997). They 
argue that the relationship between employers and employees and between senior 
and junior employees is not based on ‘modem’ ideas of contract but rather on 
principles of Bushido thought prevailing in the feudal era. According to these 
principles, subordinates will devote themselves to He' and He' like group. These 
scholars argue that ‘devotion’ persisted in zaibatsu firms in the pre-war era, and 
continued in keiretsu firms in the post-war era (Mito 1991, 1994; Woodiwiss 
1992; Williams 1997). According to them, it is this employer-employee and 
junior-senior relationship that supports lifetime employment for most men in large 
keiretsu firms.
Woodiwiss (1992) argues as follows: ‘the veneration once reserved for 
the ancestral spirits and the emperor and the duties consequently owed to them 
was in large part transferred to social institutions in post-WWII Japan as the ‘ie 
(household)’ clan, or more substantively following the legal demise of the He', to 
the institutions and especially the ‘kaisha’ (large companies) which supposedly 
embody the He' essence’ (1992: 86). Keiretsu is the group of ‘kaisha’, in which 
the pre-war Confucian values and norms are most clearly sustained (Woodiwiss 
1992: 86-7; Kensy 2000; Williams 1997: 71-100). Richter (2000) and Kensy
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(2000) argue that employees establish networking through senior alumni of elite 
universities and the networks connect junior and senior male alumni within firms, 
between firms and between the firm and the government. Kensy as well as 
Bennett and Ishino (1963) argue that Japanese society and its thinking is 
intuitively and emotionally based on the principle of overall understanding of the 
group, the family, the He' and the nation. According to Kensy, this work ethic is 
functional: he argues that Japanese do not spontaneously form groups or 
associations but indeed form them on the basis of a pragmatic give and take 
relationship. Through this relationship, Japanese workers achieve security via the 
horizontal link with their peers and vertical links with the leaders of keiretsu and 
the government. In return, the individual is completely loyal and self-sacrificing 
(Hayashi 1988). Although the system is beneficial in the contemporary economy, 
its origins lie in Bushido in the feudal era.
Against this picture of continuity, some scholars argue that the Japanese 
work ethic was more deliberately constructed to achieve the best possible 
outcome for Japanese firms; i.e. the work ethic has been fostered and maintained 
for functional purposes (Dore 1973, 1994; Koike 1994; Cole 1994). Dore (1994: 
1-9) argues that Koike (1994) and Cole (1994) who analyse the organisation of 
innovation or keiretsu ties see the horizontal and vertical links in Japanese firms 
as a simply effective function. In contrast with Kensy and other scholars, these 
economists rarely question the origins of the Japanese way of networking in the 
firm.
Koike has argued that as experienced workers establish their connection
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to colleagues and managers by male socialisation in the workplace, they only act 
together with other workers of their private network in dealing with usual tasks 
(Koike 1988). What appears to be teamwork or group-oriented behaviour in a 
factory that uses horizontal links is simply that experienced workers perform the 
non-routine tasks without requiring consent of their managers. This is efficient for 
the firm as it shortens problem-solving time (Koike 1994; Cole 1994: 3). Like 
Dore (1973), who stresses the similarity between British and Japanese factories, 
Koike notes a similarity between Japanese and Swedish factories. Cole further 
argues that firms may learn by identifying the best operational practices, 
standardising these practices, and diffusing them throughout the organisation as 
routines that guide individual behaviour. Despite laying more stress on the 
organisational setting than Koike, Cole agrees that the current work ethic in 
Japanese firms was deliberately constructed for a functional purpose.
For these scholars, it was possible to adapt a management style from 
Anglo-American firms, while retaining many features in common, such as profit 
maximising (Dore 1973, 1994; Koike 1990, 1994; Cole 1994). For example, the 
present networking through employer-employee and junior-senior relationships 
has proved a particularly useful way of minimising costs (Ouchi 1981; Johnson 
1982; Schonberger 1982; Monden 1983). This links closely to Koike’s efficiency 
wage theory. As Koike’s work increasingly attracted the attention of an 
international audience in the early 1980s, it was suggested that a Japanese style of 
work ethic could be profitably applied to companies outside Japan.1
1 After 1990s, this trend changed as Japanese firms were encouraged to adopt Anglo-American
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My argument here is not that the work ethos in contemporary Japanese 
firms simply continues practices and values traced down in the feudal era. 
However, I hope to demonstrate that the persistence of certain gender norms is not 
driven by consideration of efficiency alone. It is necessary also to understand the 
power of the ‘status quo’ in sustaining certain values, even when these may 
conflict with long term efficiency.
4 Rapid Transition to Industrial Economy: The Emergence of Zaibatsu
Japanese social organisations emerged as ‘zaibatsu’ and the rapid expansion of 
zaibatsu left little time for people to modify the values they inherited from the 
development of the zaibatsu. Zaibatsu were the group of firms linked to each other 
by a common main bank and brand name. They originated from family owned 
business that started from the feudal Tokugawa era (1600-1867). Zaibatsu tend to 
oligopolise the market, particularly the domestic market.
The pre-war (WWII) state of the Meiji era made use of the existing work 
ethic of zaibatsu business for a number of reasons. One was to minimise the time 
for transition from a feudal to an advanced industrial economy (Morikawa 1992). 
In the late nineteen century quest for economic modernisation that pointed 
towards the export economy, zaibatsu were seen as the most fitting form of 
business organisation (Morikawa 1992).
corporate governance in which employers will no longer provide lifetime employment to most 
men (Akio Morita, President of Sony then 1992; Kimoto 1998; Yoshida 1996). However, this may 
increase wage differentials between workers and proportion of workers with unstable employment
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Industrialisation in Western industrial counties proceeded gradually. In 
contrast, Japan underwent a rapid transition to an industrial economy from the late 
nineteenth century, in order to keep its economic and political independence from 
the threat of the West. Japan had sustained a feudal style planned economy system 
under a policy of no contact with foreign countries from the eleventh century to 
the mid-nineteenth century. But, in the course of less than two decades from the 
1840s, Japan had been made abundantly aware of its own inadequacies in the face 
of Western pressure (Hunter 1989). It saw other nations in Asia being subjected to 
political subjugation, colonisation and economic exploitation. According to 
Hunter, this was the main driving force behind Japan’s industrialisation.
In the mid-nineteenth century, American battle ships visited Japan and 
demanded that the Tokugawa Shogunate open the country to trade with the 
Western countries. This created tension between two groups of powers: one 
supported the emperor as monarch while the other group defended Tokugawa 
Shogun. After a few years of political upheaval, including civil war, the emperor’s 
supporters finally won and governed the country from 1868 under the Meiji 
emperor (Jansen 2002: 333-70).
In its determination to avoid colonisation, the Meiji Restoration 
government (1868-1911) employed very strong leverage in economic policies. For 
example, it launched the imperial universities in order to increase the educated 
male elite familiar with western technology. The Meiji government also invested 
heavily from its already scarce resources in industrial development; by the 1880s
(Hayashi 1999: 3).
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it launched state-owned export firms such as silk reeling, cotton, ironworks, 
munitions plants, and shipbuilding (Morikawa 1992; Jansen 2000; 374). These 
state factories imported the methods of production (machines, managers and 
engineers) from Western industrial countries and made Japanese managers and 
workers familiar with factory methods and standardised export products (Jansen 
2000; 374).
Faced, however, with a limited supply of entrepreneurs with capital and 
management skills, the government made considerable use of a small number of 
merchant families from the previous period (Morikawa 1992). These families 
therefore played a significant part in, and profited from, the government’s initial 
efforts in industrialisation. Morikawa (1992) has outlined the active role played by 
merchant companies, such as the Mitsui, Yasuda, Okura, Fujita, Mitsubishi, 
Sumitomo, Furukawa and Asano Zaibatsu. The family origin of zaibatsu 
encouraged a specifically Japanese form of business, where companies organised 
in family organisations without subsidiaries.
Although zaibatsu thereafter transformed into multi-subsidiaries, and 
control by the founding family was eventually lost, the form of business 
connection these instituted largely remained in place until their abolition by the 
occupying forces of the United States (Morikawa 1992).
The speed of the industrialisation process meant that many of the values 
and practices from the Tokugawa feudal era were carried over in the organisation 
of zaibatsu. Some were modified, others were dropped, and a new emphasis on 
educational qualifications emerged. However, there is a striking continuity.
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5 Emergence of Standard Work Patterns and Changes in Norms and Values
5.1 Values associated with Working Life in Zaibatsu
A major modification to Confucian thought in Bushido occurred with the 
transition to the zaibatsu economy.2 First, the worship of classical Chinese culture 
was modified while the ‘ie9 system remained. The Meiji State placed the emperor 
at the head of the state, and strengthened the social position of a newly emerging 
elite class, including merchants and politicians (Woodiwiss 1992; Williams 1997; 
Morikawa 1992). There had been two schools of Confucianism in the Tokugawa 
Shogun’s government: one supported by the ‘ie9, Satsuma the South West of Japan 
and attaching higher value to classical Chinese culture; the other such as Chochu 
in the West of Japan, supported by the Meiji Restoration government with the 
Emperor, rejecting Chinese culture, and fostering intense nationalism with a 
powerful emotional and mythical devotion to the emperor (Hagen 1962: 342-43; 
Woodiwiss 1992: 41-66). Eventually, the latter school won the Civil War in the 
late 1880s and parts of Bushido such as wearing a sword, moral codes based on 
Zen Buddhism and classical Chinese Confucianism disappeared (Nitobe 2001 
[1905]). The modified Bushido encouraged people to devote themselves to the 
Emperor as the head of national ‘ie9 system and maintain ‘ie9 system in the family 
by devoting themselves to a senior male head.
Three new values emerged in the zaibatsu economy; first, that the
2 As a Confucian element strengthened, Nitobe 2001 [1905]) argues that the authentic form of
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government and zaibatsu were united by national interest and identity, second, that 
high importance was to be attached to Western knowledge of advanced technology, 
and third, that society accepted seeking self-interest. It became important for 
employees to demonstrate this through educational qualifications from authorised 
educational institutions.
On the first point, political leaders in the government and merchant 
companies were educated in similar Confucian codes and collaborated to avoid 
Western colonisation. According to Goran (1997), the keiretsu elite and the 
leaders in the government shared a common identity and ideals. Although the 
head of the state changed from Shogun to the Emperor, members of zaibatsu and 
the government were accustomed to conform to group consensus for ‘/e’-like 
group such as zaibatsu, following Confucian codes (Hagen 1962; Mito 1991; 
Miyawaka 1999). This made it easier for the government to guide the zaibatsu in 
the development of the export industry (Morikawa 1992; Roberts 1973).
Secondly, the zaibatsu economy stressed the importance of educational 
qualifications and Western knowledge. However, zaibatsu also limited the use of 
Western knowledge, preferring to adopt Western technology without what they 
saw as the ideology associated with it. For example, they were suspicious of a 
relationship between employers and employees based on formal contract, seeing 
this as competing with Confucian ideas based on informal and emotional ties 
between employers and employees (Garon 1997: 118-20; Woodiwiss 1992: 85-95). 
Social values and norms embedded in Confucianism therefore continued to mark
‘Bushido’ died in the Meiji era when samurai class abandoned.
199
the higher educational qualifications from the imperial universities; the graduates 
from these formed a new elite class, and obtained high social positions in the 
government and zaibatsu businesses.
Zaibatsu followed two strategies in employment to satisfy both old and 
new values. First, they preferred their workers, and particularly their managers, to 
be able to take up tasks in the multiple fields of business under its umbrella. As 
zaibatsu covered not only various types of industry but also finance and needed 
mangers trained by Western instructors, they wanted university graduates. 
However, the number of graduates then was so limited that zaibatsu used the same 
university educated managers in various types of tasks (Morikawa 1992). 
Secondly, they preferred those willing to sacrifice their own interests and define 
their identities in relation to the firm and nation (Roberts 1973; Woodiwiss 1992: 
21-40). In return for this selfless devotion via conforming to group consensus, but 
also reflecting the shortage of graduates, the elite managers received lifetime 
employment and progressive wages by age from the early twentieth century 
onwards (Mito 1991; Economics Planning Agency 1992; Morikawa 1992).
5.2 Values Associated with Family Life
The values associated with the standard work life pattern in zaibatsu form a 
dovetailed pair with the values of family life. In both cases we can see a 
modification of old values in Bushido by new.
In the Meiji era, members of the family were subordinate to the head of
200
the family ‘ze’ and were expected almost to worship him as the benevolent 
patriarch. This was similar to the Tokugawa era. The relationship between the 
head of the family and family members resembled that between feudal lord and 
subordinate; in both cases, the person in authority valued members willing to 
sacrifice themselves to the ‘ie \  The responsibilities of the authority to the 
members, however, were not clearly defined in these relationships, and certainly 
not as compared with Western ideas of a relationship based on well-defined 
contract. Indeed, the Meiji government even expanded this in the ‘Kyoiku 
Chokugo’ (Educational Code of the Emperor) in 1890 (165-66). The Meiji 
Constitution also emphasised strict gender norms (Sekiguchi, Hattori, Nagashima, 
Hayakawa, and Asano 1998; 165-66; Woodiwiss 1992: 19-67). Both penal and 
civil codes clarified the rights of the male head of the family giving him further 
control over the children as well as over the wife. This included the right of 
inheritance prioritising down from the oldest lawful sons to lawful daughters 
(article 970); establishing that the head of the 'ie' could decide the place to live 
and the person to marry for daughters under 25 years old and sons under 30 years 
old (article 749, 750); that the husband could control the wife’s assets; and that the 
wife should carry out the daily family responsibilities on behalf of the husband 
(article 801, 804) (Sekiguchi, Hattori, Nagashima, Hayakawa, and Asano 1998; 
164).
New gender values from the West were subsequently incorporated into 
this. The Meiji government increasingly subscribed to ‘modem’ education for 
women, although still on the basis of the old Bushido perception of a woman’s
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role (Hunter 1989; Garon 1997: 118-20). The law on women’s higher education in 
1899 declared that the wife should obey the husband rather than the clan; 
attachment to her husband rather than the clan ‘ie’ was therefore stressed 
(Sekiguchi, Hattori, Nagashima, Hayakawa, and Asano 1998: 166-67). This 
encouraged wives in the middle class to become full-time housewives and wives 
in the working class to work only in family owned businesses as women in the 
middle class are affected by the ideal of the “good wife and wise mother” that 
represented a new construction of the 1890s.
Some intellectuals educated abroad, such as the Home Ministry’s 
Kiyoura and Yukichi Fukuzawa, condemned the servile position accorded to 
women in the text o f Confucianism, in which women would perceived as so 
dull-witted and temperamental that they would spoil their children and hinder 
their development (Garon 1997: 119-20). As Japanese intellectuals were 
influenced by the protestant women, the state promoted monogamy (Garon 1997: 
100). A few intellectual such as Tokoku Kitamura, Shizuko Wakamatsu and 
Yoshiharu Iwamoto, further develop the ideal of marriage by their romantic 
marriage in the early Meiji era. Although romantic marriage was rare, it was 
idealised as progressive form of marriage amongst intellectuals who acquired 
Western knowledge (Sekiguchi, Hattori, Nagashima, Hayakawa, and Asano 1998: 
148-49). With the strong influence from the West, the Minister of Education then, 
Dairoku Kikuchi and Yoshiharu Iwamoto stressed that the role model of ‘modem’ 
women should be taken from the West (Sekiguchi, Hattori, Nagashima, Hayakawa, 
and Asano 1998: 166-67).
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Ironically, this gender discourse strengthened the strict gender division of 
work between the husband and wife (Sekiguchi, Hattori, Nagashima, Hayakawa, 
and Asano 1998: 166-67). Although wives had often worked outside the home 
with family members before this, after the Meiji government emerged, the State 
encouraged women to stay at home:
“women [in Japan] have always ruled inside the home. They are the ones who must attend 
to family education and other matters. ... If they are allowed to join political associations, 
they will neglect their duties as women. Such a situation would greatly disturb household 
management, as well as harm family education... Such a provision would produce 
grievous results for the future of the State” (Statement of Keigo Kiyoura, chief Ministry of 
Home Ministry of Police Bureau, later Prime Minister at Diet (Japanese Parliament) Lower 
House 1 March 1890).
The new version of gender norms affected all women, but also linked 
women’s work status to class. Working class mothers were encouraged to work 
for pay as well as be ‘good’ wife and ‘wise’ mother (Garon 1997: 128); and one of 
the main effects of the new norms was that women became less likely to work in 
zaibatsu factories and more likely to work in family-owned businesses (Mode 
Column April 2003: 4). This trend continued: although in 1920, 15.2 per cent of 
female workers participated in manufacturing, in 1930, this had declined to 13.6 
per cent; in 1920, 8.1 per cent of female workers worked in family owned retails 
and wholesale and in 1930, this had increased to 11.6 per cent (Showa Dojinkai 
1957: 30, 33; Takenaka 1989: 177).
Mothers in the middle class, meanwhile, tended to take up sole childcare
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responsibilities. In the earlier versions of Bushido, mothers could rely on other 
women for child rearing. Among poorer families during the Meiji era, young girls 
or ‘komori’ (child minder) were commonly hired to care for children, whilst 
mothers engaged in productive labour (Tamanoi 1991; Garon 1997: 120). Not 
until the late nineteenth century did the political elite and middle-class Japanese 
start to play the central role in child rearing, stimulated by the “social hygiene” 
drives and pronatalism of the nation’s Western rivals (Tamanoi 1991; 803; Pivar 
1973: 170; Garon 1997: 120). Once influenced by Western norms, however, 
Bushido values and norms tied mothers to childcare services; because of the 
image of the ‘good’ wife and ‘wise’ mother, mothers had difficulties getting 
support for childcare services (Sekiguchi, Hattori, Nagashima, Hayakawa, and 
Asano 1991998: 167).
From approximately 1900, the wives of elite managers took on stricter 
gender roles and, in the 1910s and 20s, this form of family became common in 
middle class households (Sekiguchi, Hattori, Nagashima, Hayakawa, and Asano 
1998: 142). In contrast, mothers in the working class tended to share childcare 
responsibilities with other women in the family. As a large size family is 
convenient for family owned businesses, the working class family contained 
elderly parents (often the husband’s parents), young couples with children and 
other kin of the husband (Sekiguchi, Hattori, Nagashima, Hayakawa, and Asano 
1998:169-76; Garon 1997; 127-29).
One impact of Western gender norms was women’s education. Parents in 
the middle class encouraged their daughters to enter newly established educational
204
institutions where they were taught how to deal with the household and take care 
of the family as future wives of ‘elite’ managers in zaibatsu (see the details in 
Chapter Six).
Accordingly, the rapid transition to zaibatsu economy carried over 
Confucian traditions of obedience to the husband, and encouraged wives to take 
up even heavier household responsibilities. Zaibatsu firms expected male 
members of the elite to have wives to support them, while expecting female 
workers to be from the working class.
Since the zaibatsu became the prototype for social organisations in Japan, 
the government and zaibatsu successfully transformed the social structure in Japan. 
Zaibatsu even used their ample funds for educational institutions to ensure a 
supply of educated managers, launching higher educational organisations to 
increase the number of managers familiar with knowledge from the West. As a 
result, the government and zaibatsu were interlocked in seeking the national goal 
of Japan becoming the top exporter in the world economy.
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6 Keiretsu as the Successor of Zaibatsu
6.1 Keiretsu as the Revival of Zaibatsu
Zaibatsu were dismantled immediately after World War II through anti-trust 
initiatives, but have been reintegrated as Keiretsu. Allen (1981: 15) defines 
keiretsu as ‘a close knit, vertical hierarchy of undertakings centred on a large 
concern which organises and in part finances a population of associated firms and 
their contractors’. Some of these groupings are based on the old zaibatsu, but they 
are more informally constructed. Examples of these new groupings are Toyota and 
Toshiba. Keiretsu succeeded zaibatsu, not only through corporate names such as 
Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo, but also through the way they connected with 
the government and in the form of their hierarchy (Richter 2000; Roberts 1973). 
Thus, many of the large-scale Japanese companies that today wield enormous 
influence over the contemporary world economy had their origins in the zaibatsu 
(Morikawa 1992: xv: Kensy 2000; Williams 1997: 71-84; Woodiwiss 1992: 
69-154).
It has been argued that zaibatsu revived as keiretsu as a result of the 
Korean War but even before 1950, the five largest firms in their respective fields 
accounted for all of Japan’s plate glass, photographic film, aluminium, beer, 
automobiles and tyres (Roberts 1973: 415). Roberts argues that this striking 
restoration of the pre-war order was no accident, but was the result of plans laid 
out in some unknown sanctum of Japan’s power elite. A less dramatic hypothesis
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is that the zaibatsu combines were never really broken up, and that sifter the 
American anti-trust zealots departed, all the social and economic factors at work 
in Japan favoured a revival of the system that had proved so successful in the past 
(Roberts 1973: 415). Thus, in spite of the anti-monopoly law passed in 1947, the 
concentration of industrial production was also pronounced.
Some zaibatsu survived the dismantling process and recreated their group 
networks as Keiretsu. By law, keiretsu cannot be family-owned or hold 
shareholdings of subsidiaries, but they can still act together as a group, sharing the 
same interests and identity. Former zaibatsu, such as Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Sumitomo, Yasuda, Okura and Fujita, reformed as keiretsu in the post-war era. 
Fuyou, Daiichi Kangin (Kangyo Bank) and Sanwa emerged as new keiretsu, and 
developed a similar pattern of association as the former zaibatsu. As Table 1-7-1 
in Chapter One indicates, many of the large-scale firms in the later 1990s had their 
roots in former zaibatsu.
6.2 Values Associated with Work Life in Keiretsu
Many of the values and norms in zaibatsu were carried over to keiretsu, in 
particular, those of selfless devotion to the firm. Male employees identify strongly 
with the prevalent social opinions that are formed from the social organisations 
they work for (Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990; Roberson 1998; Kensy 2000). 
Woodiwiss (1992: 87). Mari Osawa (1993) calls this identification ‘kigyoshugi’ 
(selfless devotion to the firm and prioritising corporate interest above self and
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family interest).
As will be demonstrated in Chapter Eight, keiretsu appreciate similar 
values to the zaibatsu. Keiretsu regard those selflessly devoting to the firm via 
conforming to group consensus as ‘good’ (Williams 1997: 73; Dore 1971; Befu 
1974; De Vos 1973; Miyasaka 1999). Not only ‘/e’-like group in the Tokugawa 
era and zaibatsu but also keiretsu make decision according to group consensus 
(Mirai-city 2003). As this saves time of decision making if employees conform to 
group consensus imposed by senior men, this persists in keiretsu (Miyasaka 1999). 
For example, employees in keiretsu accept a job requiring them to live away from 
the family. In return for this level of commitment, the employer is provided with a 
good salary (seniority wage) and job security (Clark 1975; John C. Beck and 
Martha Beck 1994). He is also provided with possible job satisfaction, subsidised 
accommodation, health care insurance, pensions, the use of holiday resorts, and 
frequent company outings. This employment also brings with it social status 
(Williams 1997: Roberson 1998; Dore 1973). Japanese companies have promised 
their workers secure and continuous employment, even when the need for labour 
diminishes, but the other side of the coin is that employees are expected to give 
freely of their time when the demand for their labour is high (Lincoln and 
Kallegerg 1990: 144: Williams 1997: 73; Befu 1989).
Significantly, membership of keiretsu became even more important to 
men than membership of the previous zaibatsu because the keiretsu offered the 
majority of their male workers security of employment and higher than market 
level wages. Historically, employers had offered a seniority wage and lifetime
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employment only to male workers with high qualifications that were in short 
supply. After the 1970s, however, the keiretsu provided these benefits to a 
majority of their white-collar and a selection of their blue-collar workers 
(Futamura 1987; Ono 1989; Nomura 1992; Mari Osawa 1993).3 Many blue-collar 
workers were less fortunate, and were made redundant after the first oil crisis in 
1973.
6.3 Values Associated with Family Life
A new Constitution from 11 February 1946 ended the rights of the male household 
head to control property and regulate the marriage of other members of the family. 
As a result, the iie’> system has been legally abandoned. Penal and civil codes also 
ended the control of the male head of the family over children and wife, and 
emphasised the equality of the sexes. The individual was now supposed to be free 
to choose his or her occupation, where to live, and whom to marry. However, laws 
relating to employment and the family were affected on the surface only, because 
social and cultural values fostered by the pre-war government still prevailed 
(Nishihara 1981; Ida 1993; Sekiguchi, Hattori, Nagashima, Hayakawa, and Asano 
1998).
The gender norms in the post-war era associated married women with
3 Firm trade union means a trade union organised within an individual firm which solely bargains 
with the employer. This is a common form of trade union in Japan; trade unions in Japanese firms 
are organised within individual firms rather than organised according to occupation in industry, as 
in Western industrial countries. In some cases, firm trade unions form the association of 
industry-based trade union. Its tie is, however, relatively loose.
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domestic and childcare responsibilities, and perpetuate much of the thinking about 
‘romantic’ marriage from the Meiji Era. Idealised romantic marriage, however, 
encourage married couples to adhere to strict gender divisions of work at the 
home (Garon 1997: 166-67). In 1995, it was reported that a majority of men and 
women today prefer romantic over arranged marriage (Prime Minister’s Office 
1996: 27). In 1995, 87.1 per cent of those interviewed said they choose their 
marriage partner while only 9.9 per cent entered an arranged marriage (Inoue and 
Ehara 1999: l l) .4 This contrasts with 1957-62, when 52.5 per cent of marriages 
were arranged (Prime Minister’s Office 1996: 27; Ministry of Health and Welfare 
1998: 56). The increase in the proportion of romantic marriages has, however, 
coincided with an increase in the proportion of couples with a strict gender 
division of work between the husband and wife.
As will be shown in Chapter Nine, this is largely because adult children 
now work apart from elderly parents, and parents are less likely to be financially 
dependent on their grown up children. Before the 1970s, parents and family 
members pressured children to get married because they saw this as the crucial 
means to security in old age. For this purpose, they often arranged marriage for 
single grown up children. However, now that adult children and elderly are more 
likely to live independently, the pressure to get married in order to produce 
children who will support one in later life became weaker (Retherford, Ogawa and 
Matesukura 2001).
While relations between elderly parents and adult children were
4 This excludes couples married by other than arranged and romantic marriage.
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weakened, relations between mother and young children were strengthened after 
the 1970s. Social norms did not favour working mothers, prizing instead the 
‘professional’ housewife who takes up the role of Ryosai Kenbo (the ‘good wife 
and wise mother’), and is willing to accept her subordinate role to her husband 
and, indirectly, to her husband’s employer (Hamabata 1990; Hendry 1993: 227).
And, interestingly, the role of ‘good’ wife and ‘wise’ mother is similar to 
that of ‘good’ workers in keiretsu. In the workplace, the man who follows the 
ideal image of a ‘good’ worker will be rewarded highly and allowed some limited 
autonomy (Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990; Aoki 1988). This is mirrored in the 
position of the wife at home. The husband will retain control over the large 
financial decisions, but will ‘reward’ his wife with considerable discretion over 
smaller scale household spending.
As will be demonstrated in Chapter Nine, the role of women as daughter 
or mother has changed. Young people have migrated to urban areas for paid 
employment, and young women, in particular, are more likely to work for pay 
while they are single. In zaibatsu factories, it was mainly daughters of the working 
class who worked for pay before marriage. In keiretsu firms, however, daughters 
of the middle class also participate in paid employment; typically in white-collar 
rather than blue-collar jobs (Roberson 1998) and mainly before marriage or 
having children.
Before marriage, single women are less restricted than married women. 
Increased opportunities for paid employment enable them to enjoy financial 
independence; this is particularly so for single working women with higher
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educational qualifications. However, as will be shown in Chapter Seven and Eight, 
such women have difficulty staying employment after marriage. Post-war changes 
in gender norms have largely affected single women; they have much less impact 
on the lives of married women.
7 Conclusion
Although many elements of Bushido were modified in the Meiji era, a few were 
carried over from zaibatsu to keiretsu. The Bushido ideals regarding the senior 
male head of He\ single daughters and elderly parents, were modified through the 
development of the economy. However, it maintains the ideal of clear gender 
division of work between the husband and wife. As keiretsu expanded lifetime 
employment to blue-collar workers who survived lay-offs in the early 1970s, this 
trend prevailed. Furthermore, it maintained attitudes such as conforming to group 
consensus from the Tokugawa feudal era, through pre-war zaibatsu to the post-war 
era (Miyasaka 1999). The attitudes are rewarded as selfless devotion to the 
employer which follows the footstep of Bushido.
The gendered status quo of the keiretsu economy persists, partly because 
of the importance attached to group consensus. People believe that if they act 
according to the appropriate social norms (devotion to the firm for men, devotion 
to the family for women), the others will recognise them as virtuous and reward 
them accordingly.
According to Kuran’s account of preference formation, people tend to
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shape their preferences according to others’ perceptions of what is ‘good’; this 
perception becomes the status quo. What people regard as ‘good’ changes over 
time, but people typically look to the near past in the formation of their 
preferences. In this process, their preferences are influenced by what other people 
perceive as ‘good’; this enables them to achieve what Kuran calls a high level of 
‘reputational utility’. As noted in Chapter Four, if reputational utility has a 
significant weight in the sum of utilities, people will tend to act according social 
norms because they will gain from good reputation.
Reputational utility is particularly important in Japanese society. Men 
tend to group consensus as their decision (Mirai-city 2003; Kensy 2000). If they 
conform to group consensus, they have good reputation as they are considered as 
acting selflessly for the employer’s interest. This encourages men to conform to 
the standard work pattern for good reputation as they believe good reputation 
secure their jobs. Husbands with the standard work pattern need wives 
specialising in care work in the home. If their wives do so, they believe they will 
secure their family life by good reputation. Husbands and wives may conform to 
the clear gender division of work if they anticipate the loss of reputation. This 
further encourages men and women to voluntarily maintain a clear gender 
division of labour as ‘good’.
The suggestion here is that Japan maintains its current status quo, 
because of processes similar to those outlined by Kuran. Modified Bushido values 
and norms may sometimes come into contradiction with Western values and 
norms; for example, seniority and sexism may not always be efficient. Normally,
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one would expect such contradictions to act as a pressure for change. However, in 
the Japanese context, the strict gender division of work between husband and wife 
has proved remarkably slow to change: not, I suggest, because it has proved 
particularly efficient, but rather because of the processes that can modify 
individuals’ preferences and thereby sustain the status quo.
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Chapter Six
Household Reproduction of Cultural Capital through Education 
1 Gender Differences in Education
Levels of education for young Japanese women are now much higher than before 
the 1970s. In 1975, only 18.2 per cent of university graduates were female.1 The 
proportion of female students in universities was 22.1 per cent in universities 
students in 1980 and increased to 38 per cent in 2001 (Ministry of Education 
1985; Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology 2003). 
Women are now as likely as men to continue into higher education, at least when 
we count the number of women who are educated in junior colleges (Table 
6-2-1). Despite the high level of participation in higher education by women, 
there is, however, a marked gender pattern; first, there are fewer women than men 
in four-year university education, as young women tend to attain their educational 
qualifications from junior college (2 years) instead of university (4 years) as 
shown in Table 6-1-1; second, even within university education, men and women 
tend to study different subjects at differently ranked universities, with some 
women preferring women-only universities, and most men preferring prestigious 
mixed-sex universities.
1 Calculated by the data from Prime Minister’s Office (1996: 237).
2 Boys and girls aged 15-19 are educated in high school, which provides three-year education after 
nine-year compulsory education.
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Table 6-1-1: The Percentage of Male and Female Students Taking a Higher Degree,
1965-1998
Going to High School
(%)
Female Male
Going to University 
(%)
Female Male
Going to Junior College
(%)
Female Male
1965 69.6 71.7 4.6 20.7 6.7 1.7
1970 82.7 81.6 6.5 17.3 11.2 2.0
1975 93.0 91.0 12.5 40.4 19.9 2.6
1980 95.4 93.1 12.3 39.3 21.0 2.0
1985 94.9 92.8 13.7 38.6 20.8 2.0
1990 95.6 93.2 15.2 33.4 22.2 1.7
1991 95.8 93.5 16.1 34.5 23.1 1.8
1992 96.2 93.9 17.3 35.2 23.5 1.8
1993 96.5 94.2 19.0 36.6 24.4 1.9
1994 96.8 94.6 21.0 38.9 24.9 2.0
1995 97.0 94.7 22.9 40.7 24.6 2.1
1996 97.1 94.8 24.6 41.9 23.7 2.3
1997 97.0 94.8 26.0 43.4 22.9 2.3
1998 97.0 94.8 27.5 44.9 21.9 2.2
Source: Ministry of Labour (1999a), Appendix 54.
Note: The percentage of those going to High School is given by (the numbers of those 
going to High School full-time and those going to High School part-time)* 100/(the 
number of those who graduated from Secondary High School).
The Percentage of those going to Junior College or University is calculated by (the 
number of those going to Junior College or University)* 100/(the number of 
students who graduated from High School three years ago)
Gender differentiation is reflected in not only in the length of time in 
higher education, but also in the type of university. In the first place, men are 
more likely to study in elite mixed-sex universities than women; women make up 
18.8 per cent on the average on the same degree course at the top ranking 
universities in Japan (Table 6-1-2). Tokyo University and Kyoto University are 
respectively ranked first and second among the public universities. At both, the 
proportion of female students is just 14 percent. At other public universities in the
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top ranks the proportion of women is between 16 and 25 percent. The top private 
universities have a gender imbalance as well. At both Waseda and Keio 
universities, women constitute approximately 20 percent of the students. Thus, the 
more highly ranked the university, the smaller the proportion of women.
Table 6-1-2: The Proportion of Female Students in the Top Ranked Universities, 
in 1994
Men Women Ratio o f Women Relative to Men (%)
Public University (formerly imperial)
Tokyo University 14,002 2,351 14.4
Kyoto University 11,650 1,919 14.1
Hokkaido University 8,808 2,510 22.2
Tohoku University 9,777 1,867 16.0
Nagoya University 7,514 2,062 21.5
Osaka University 10,112 2,299 18.5
Kobe University 9,005 3,012 25.1
Kyushu University 8,939 2,426 21.3
Private University
Waseda University 40,285 8,446 17.3
Keio University 27,629 6,901 20.0
Total 147,721 33,793 18.6
Unit: Figures are the proportion o f (Number of Male Students: Number o f Female Students)
Date Source: Asahi Original (1995) 
Note: Table Created by the Author.
The other point to note is that there are quite a few female-only 
universities in Japan: 89 out of the total of 561 universities in 1995 (Asahi 
Original 1995). Amongst 89 colleges, 41 are located in Tokyo and Osaka, the two 
biggest cities, whilst the other half are located in provincial cities. These 
universities are popular choices for degree courses in the humanities, home 
economics, art, education and medical care. Although some of the female 
universities are ranked highly, they are limited in that they do not offer courses in
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business skills.
One result is that even when both men and women study at university, 
there is gender segregation by subject. The courses in the female-only schools and 
the junior colleges emphasise subjects such as education for children and home 
economics; Brinton (1993) points out that home economics, education, and 
humanities reigned supreme at junior colleges with about 65 percent of the student 
population in these three fields.
The female students who do make it to the top universities tend to take 
courses in humanities and law (Table 6-1-3) The B.Sc. in Law, a popular course at 
all the universities, is the second most popular choice for women. The students 
who study law are recruited as civil servants and white-collar workers in major 
private enterprises. Women make up from 11 to 31 percent of all law students at 
the ten prestigious universities.
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Table 6-1-3: The Proportion of Male and Female Students by Subject in the Top 
Universities, in 1994
Humanities Law Natural Science Engineering
Tokyo University 70:30 89:11 88:12 95:5
Kyoto University 66:34 81:19 94:6 96:4
Hokkaido University 57:43 78:22 83:17 94:6
Tohoku University 63:37 81:19 88:12 96:4
Nagoya University 39:61 69:31 83:17 94:6
Osaka University 50:50 70:30 85:15 94:6
Kobe University 46:54 71:29 80:20 93:7
Kyushu University 42:58 71:29 80:20 95:5
Waseda University 48:52 82:18 - 94:6
Keio University 44:56 70:30 89:11 -
Unit: Figures are the proportion of (Number of Male Students: Number of Female
Students)
Date Source: Asahi Original (1995) 
Note: Table Created by the Author.
It is important to note that the roots of gender differences in higher 
education lie in the pre-war era in Japan. In the pre-war ear, the policy in public 
universities was to accept only male students in seven universities, run by the 
Imperial State, which were founded to provide technocrats for the government and 
elite white-collar workers for zaibatsu. Every university had a school-specific 
entrance examination, and generally employers saw passing these examinations as 
a sign that a person would be a productive worker. It was more important which 
university someone went to than what he studied and what skills he might have 
gained there. In contrast, the main purpose of schooling for girls was to prepare 
them to be “good wives and wise mothers” (Ryosai Kenbo) (Cummings 1980; 
Machiko Osawa 1988).
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Even after World War Two, the gender features of pre-war schooling 
remained, despite the fact that after the war the leader of the Occupational Forces 
reformed the school system towards a more American style, aiming to abolish 
sex-segregated schooling (Brinton 1993). Many universities began to accept 
female students. However, some male and female-only high schools, junior 
colleges and universities continue to exist today. After the war, an educational 
track for girls was established which offered two-year courses after high school. 
During this period, various state and private universities and ‘female-only’ 
colleges emerged, and these remain the core institutions of higher education today.
2 Returns from Educational Qualifications by Gender
This gender differentiation has a marked effect in terms of employment prospect 
particularly in keiretsu.
Men set a good return from their educational qualifications in elite 
universities to paid employment. Not only elite employees in keiretsu, but also 
civil servants, elite bureaucrats and members of the Diet (the House of Commons 
in Japan) are most likely to be graduates from Tokyo University. It is reported that 
between 1985 and 1994, Tokyo University graduates were more likely to serve in 
the highest ranked civil servant group in the central government. The central 
government employed 5,151 Tokyo University graduates as compared to 2,107 
Kyoto University graduates, the second most popular group (Asahi Original 
1995:155). Between 1947-94, 2008 members of the Diet had graduated from 
Tokyo University; this compares with 1019 members from Waseda University,
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and 544 members from Chuo University (Asahi Original 1995: 153).3
Even though the government eased regulations to allow for the 
establishment of new universities after the war, employers within keiretsu and the 
government itself have continued to employ men from elite universities, believing 
that the best employees are to be found there (Brinton 1993). Even in 1957, over 
80 percent of corporations within the Japanese Federation of Employers (JFE) 
hired graduates from a selected group of universities as white-collar workers and 
the civil service hired more than half of its new employees from Tokyo University 
alone (Cumming 1980). This trend continued to the 1990s.
However, this preference for graduates from elite universities only 
applies to men, not women. In contrast to their male counterparts, female Tokyo 
University graduates tend to obtain few paid positions in a keiretsu. Despite the 
fact that since 1975 the proportion of women with high qualifications has 
increased, female students are less likely to obtain highly paid jobs in larger firms 
such as the keiretsu.
Human capital theorists argue it is because women have lesser 
qualifications that they have less opportunities of high paid jobs. Though there is 
some element of this in contemporary Japan, the evidence suggests that some 
other factors are affecting women’s educational qualifications and employment. 
Gender differentiation is particularly wide in some keiretsu firms where 
employers favour male graduates from Tokyo University. Table 6-2-1 shows that
3 In 2000, the proportion of professional civil servants from elite private universities (i.e. former 
Imperial universities such as Tokyo University) had record high of 23 per cent pass rate for the 
entrance examination. The trend to select graduates of Tokyo University for high ranked 
bureaucrats is weakening (Nikkei Hourly News 2002b 19 August 2002).
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male graduates from Tokyo University are more likely to have a Director or 
President position in a keiretsu; in 1996, amongst 244 manufacturing firms in 
heavy industry, banks and international trading companies, 63 firms tend to offer 
the Director positions and above to male graduates of Tokyo University.
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There is a wide gap between the proportion of female graduates and of 
male graduates from elite universities who are employed in keiretsu and an even 
wider gap if we look at the proportions of female and male directors. One survey 
showed that 60 percent of directors came from Tokyo University in Shinnittetsu 
(New Nippon Steel), the highest proportion, while the lowest was 13.2 per cent, 
found in Mitsubishi Jidosha Kogyo (Mitsubishi Automobile). The major city 
banks, often founded in the pre-war era, and the international trading companies 
show the same trend. In 1996, 11 city banks offered between 12.8 per cent and 
66.7 per cent of their Director positions and above to male Tokyo University 
graduates. In 1996, 6 trading companies provided between 13.5 per cent and 38.5 
per cent of their Director positions and above to male graduates from Tokyo 
University.
If human capital theorists are right, one would expect these firms to be 
equally likely to hire female graduates of elite universities such as Tokyo. Table 
6-2-2 shows that the relative proportion of female to male graduates was 18.6 per 
cent in elite universities in 1995. We might then expect the keiretsu that favour 
these universities to hire the same proportion, 18.6 per cent, of female to male 
graduates. The same point would apply to university graduates in general; as the 
proportion of female students in all universities was 32.3 per cent in 1995 
(Ministry of Labour 1999a: 244), in theory, female university graduates should be
32.3 per cent of newly employed university graduates in this year.
In fact, in 1996, most firms hired a significantly smaller number of 
female university graduates. In manufacturing, only in Fujikura did women 
comprise 47.8 per cent of the graduates hired in 1996. As many as 13 firms hired
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no female university graduates in 1996. And where women graduates were hired, 
they were very few compared with male graduates; in 19 manufacturing firms, the 
proportion of female graduates was less than or equal to 10 per cent, far below the 
proportion of female university students, in 1996.
In contrast, two of the major banks, Tokyo Ginko (53.2 per cent) and 
Tokai Ginko (40 per cent), hired a significantly high proportion of female 
university graduates. In international trading companies, half of the six keiretsu 
firms hired more than 32. 3 per cent of female university graduates in 1996. This 
presumably reflects the gender differentiation in degree subjects: manufacturing 
firms are more likely to prefer male university graduates, who are more likely to 
have taken science degrees.
One particularly interesting feature is that the keiretsu seem less likely to 
employ female graduates from the elite universities such as Tokyo University than 
female graduates from female-only universities or junior colleges (see Table 
6-2-1). Female graduates from female-only universities and colleges, where the 
female motto is creating ‘Ryosai Kenbo’ (good wife and wise mother), are more 
popular in keiretsus than female graduates from Tokyo University (Brinton 1993). 
During 1997-1999, only seven manufacturing firms hired female Tokyo graduates 
(Table 6-2-1). Sixteen manufacturing firms and two international trading 
companies hired no female Tokyo graduates. As many as 35 firms refused to open 
their data on female employment..
In contrast to female graduates from Tokyo University, graduates of 
female-only universities do seem to find employment in keiretsu. During the same 
period, 19 manufacturing firms employed graduates of female universities; those
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in positive figures indicate the minimum number of graduates from female 
university. The positive figures are calculated from cases where firms hired one 
person from each female university listed in female-only university graduate 
employment lists. This trend is the same in the city banks and the international 
trading companies.
Most of the preferred female-only universities were established in the 
late nineteenth or early twentieth century and teach subjects not directly related to 
business (Table 6-2-2). Although some female students in elite universities also 
take humanities and home sciences, others study the same subjects as their male 
counterparts, such as law, natural science and engineering. This suggests that 
female students in female-only universities possess different types of skills from 
female students in mixed-sex universities.
Table 6-2-2: Popular Female Universities in Keiretsu, 1997-1999
Name Degree of 
Popularity
Year of foundation Departments Religion Ownership Location
Tokyo Female University 14 1918 Humanities Christian Private Tokyo
Tudajuku University 9 1901 Home science Private Tokyo
Nippon Female University 8 1902 Humanities, home science Private Tokyo
Felith University 5 1871 Humanities Christian Private Tokyo
Shirayuri University 5 1979 Humanities Private Tokyo
Seishin University 5 1915 Humanities Private Tokyo
Jissen University 5 1900 Home science Private Tokyo
Ochanomizu University 4 1876 Humanities, home science State Tokyo
Kyoritsu University 4 1887 Humanities, home science Private Tokyo
Tokyo Home Science 
University
2 1882 Home science Private Tokyo
Ohtsuma University 2 1908 Humanities, home science Private Tokyo
Atomo University 2 Ansei16th year, 
before 1867
Humanities, home science Confiician Private Tokyo
Unit: Degree of popularity = number of firms that employed graduates of the university
Source: Raw data from Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha (1999). Data processed by the author.
The other characteristic of keiretsu is that keiretsu banks tend to prefer 
female junior college graduates over female university graduates. More than half
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of the firms hired a larger number of female junior college graduates than female 
university graduates. In 1996, fifteen out of 63 (excluding firms that responded 
‘n.a.’ for number of female junior college graduates they hired) firms were twice 
or more likely to hire female junior college university than female university 
graduate. In seven manufacturing firms and eight banks, the number of female 
junior college graduates is more than 200 per cent of the number of female 
university graduates. This suggests that keiretsu tend to prefer female junior 
college graduates to female university graduates and that this trend is particularly 
strong in banks.
The above findings suggest that the gender gap in employment in 
keiretsu cannot be attributed simply to a gender gap in qualifications, and supports 
the argument of this thesis, that social values and norms have a significant impact. 
Human capital theory can explain why keiretsu employ female junior college 
graduates for the less responsible positions. However, it cannot fully explain why 
keiretsu are unlikely to hire female graduates of the elite universities such as 
Tokyo. The women employed in keiretsu are more likely to have been educated to 
follow a traditional form of social norms, and are more likely to take up assistant 
jobs. Lam (1993) argues that female university graduates are over-employed in 
assistant and dead-end career paths in banks (see the details in Chapter Seven). 
This further confirms that education in female-only universities or junior colleges 
better matches the demand from keiretsu.
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3 Higher Educational Qualifications for Employment
Following the main hypothesis in Chapter One, I argue that men and women in 
Japan choose their level and type of education and the subject of study with a 
view to expected future returns.
Survey results show that people anticipate the difficulties they will face 
because of a lack of adequate education. In 1997, 18.5 percent of men and 14.6 
percent of women wished that they had much higher educational qualifications 
when working in a company; 11.6 percent of men and 7.1 percent of women 
wished they had better educational qualifications in order to achieve a higher 
income; 7.3 percent of men and 1.5 percent of women wished so due to a delay in 
promotion (Economic Planning Agency 1997; Ministry o f Health and Welfare 
1998: 185).
This suggests that, men are more likely than women to regret the lack of 
educational qualifications as they help them get high paid positions. The fear of 
losing out on good paid employment pressures both men and women -  but 
particularly men - to obtain higher educational qualifications. The Ministry of 
Health and Welfare (1998: 177) suggests that men may study subjects they do not 
necessarily wish to study, and may not choose the university they really want to 
go to because they can only expect keiretsu employment if they graduate from a 
prestigious university. This relates to the fact that it is difficult for men to move 
into a high paid job if they start out in a lower paid position; they need to ensure 
that their qualifications will propel them immediately into high paid career tracks 
(Ministry of Health and Welfare 1998: 177). Due to this, seek educational
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qualifications from a prestigious university because of the future reward of being 
able to work in a keiretsu. This discourages them from choosing less prestigious 
universities, or subjects other than those valued by the keiretsu.
Surveys indicate that people want the highest possible qualifications not 
only for purposes of employment but also for their socialisation inside and outside 
the workplace. In 1997, for example, 14.8 percent of men and 18.2 percent of 
women said they experienced difficulties in socialising with others when they felt 
their educational qualifications were not good enough (Economic Planning 
Agency 1997). It was reported that 72.1 per cent of people felt that without high 
educational qualifications, there was less opportunity to become successful 
(Economic Planning Agency 1997).
People also indicate that they attach a high value to job satisfaction. In 
1995, for example, 66.7 percent of workers in full-time employment agreed that 
they would be satisfied with their position if they enjoyed the work (Economic 
Planning Agency 1995). In the same year, 80.6 percent of workers in full-time 
employment said that they would prefer a job with relatively lower social status if 
it brought job satisfaction (Economic Planning Agency 1995).
These results suggest that people would like to be employed in work that 
gives them intrinsic satisfaction, but at the same time, believe they need high 
educational qualifications in order to be successful. In light of this, it is reasonable 
to postulate that people invest in their education and skills with an anticipated 
future goal in mind. Accordingly, social values and norms affect people in their 
choices regarding the level, type, and subject of higher education.
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4 Women’s Educational Qualifications and Marriage Arrangements
It is important to note that as men and women can expect different returns from 
education, they may have different purposes in investing in education. Even if 
women choose the same level and business-related type of education as men, few 
of them will get the same rewards in employment. For keiretsu employment, 
women need a different level and type of education from men. As keiretsu prefer 
female graduates from female-only universities or junior colleges, women are 
encouraged to select these schools. To some extent, it seems irrational for any 
women to apply to the elite, four-year universities.
Taking account of this, I suggest that women make their choices 
regarding education in the expectation of return in both employment and finding a 
marriage partner; second, the return from education does not simply rely on the 
length of time in education and the type and subject of study, but also on other 
elements such as gender. The key additional elements are selfless devotion to the 
firm for men and to the family for women.
I hypothesise, that is, that women form their educational preferences in 
ways that reflect their more complicated gender identities. In their life-course, 
most women expect to be a wife and later, a mother. When making decisions on 
their education, they therefore need to take into account what level of education 
will be best for them for the purposes of marriage, mothering, and employment. 
Women as well as men often accept the status quo as given and constant and may 
then prioritise their womanly roles above their employment ones, particularly 
when they cannot expect to get paid as well as men or continue working after
230
having children (see the details in Chapter Eight and Nine).
Changes in gender roles during a woman’s life course can make it 
difficult for women to pursue the same role consistently. Women’s work patterns 
are thus a consequence of choices made with multiple and conflicting gender 
identities. Marriage arrangements in Japan have much importance (Ministry of 
Labour 1998: 57) and most women make choices regarding paid employment 
within these marriage arrangements in mind.
While attitudes towards marriage arrangements have changed since the 
1970s, most men and women still expect to marry. Although they now delay the 
age of marriage, men and women still prefer to get married when they find an 
appropriate partner. In 1997, 85.9 percent of single men and 89.1 percent of 
women said they would like to get married, once they found the right partner 
(Inoue and Ehara 1999: 14).
However, in contrast with men and women before the 1970s, they prefer 
a late marriage (Retherford, Ogawa, and Matsukura 2001). The main reason men 
and women in age group 25-34 gave for remaining single in 1997 is that they had 
not met the right person; the second biggest reason is that they wished to enjoy 
their single lifestyle (Inoue and Ehara 1999: 15).4 Although changes in social 
values and norms enable women to stay single, a large percentage of women get 
married by the age of 35; it is reported that 92 percent of women were married by 
the age of 35 in 1990 (Table 6-4-1).
4 Multiple answers are made for this question.
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Table 6-4-1: The Proportion of Single Women in the Total Number of Women in Age
Group, 1950-1990
Age Group 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
15-19 96.5 98.2 98.6 97.5 97.8 98.6 99.0 98.9 98.2
20-24 55.2 66.4 68.3 68.1 71.6 69.2 77.7 81.4 85.0
25-29 15.2 20.6 21.7 19.0 18.1 20.9 24.0 30.6 40.2
30-34 5.7 7.9 9.4 9.0 7.2 7.7 9.1 10.4 13.9
35-39 3.0 3.9 5.4 6.8 5.8 5.3 5.5 6.6 7.5
40-44 2.0 2.3 3.1 4.7 5.3 5.0 4.4 4.9 5.8
45-49 1.5 1.7 2.1 3.0 4.0 4.9 4.4 4.3 4.6
50-54 1.2 1.2 1.6 2.1 2.7 3.8 4.4 4.4 4.1
55-59 1.2 1.0 1.3 1.7 2.0 2.6 4.4 4.4 4.2
Unit: percentage
Source: Japan Statistic Bureau Management and Coordination Agency (1995).
Note: Figures calculated as (a number of single women in age group/ the total number of women
in age group).
This suggests that women’s preferences regarding marriage are, at least, 
ambivalent. Women today may prefer to stay single and in employment (Inoue 
and Ehara 1999: 14). Most of them, however, still prefer marriage and having 
children over paid employment and single life. One of the major reasons why 
women prefer marriage to paid employment is, of course, financial security 
(National Institute of Research Advancement 1993b).
It is, therefore, likely that women take account of not only employment 
prospects but also marriage in choosing their level and type of education. And if 
we look at the attributes men and women seek in marriage partners, we can 
additionally see that while some education is beneficial to women in seeking a 
husband, high qualifications are not crucial concern.
Men and women prioritise different attributes when making choices 
regarding their marriage partner. Certain attributes are used to “screen” potential
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partners; for example, women in the 1990s still wanted that their marriage partner 
to be a little older (Inoue and Ehara 1999:10), have better educational 
qualifications, and earn more than they did. Even as recently as the late 1990s, 
women find their partners’ educational qualifications important. In a 1997 survey 
in which respondents are allowed to give multiple answers, men and women alike 
regarded personal character as the overwhelming consideration, and neither sex 
regarded a partner’s educational qualifications as very important (National 
Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR)1997; Ministry of 
Health and Welfare 1998: 59). However, while merely 50 per cent of single 
women regard qualifications as either important or very important, nearly 75 per 
cent of single men were indifferent to their partner’s qualifications. Men are also 
relatively indifferent to a partner’s occupation or income. They are slightly more 
likely than women to rate personal appearance as very important (Table 6-4-2)
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Table 6-4-2: The Proportion of Single Men and Women who give importance to a
Marriage Partner’s  Attributes, in 1997
Partner's Attributes Very Important Important Indifferent I  do no know
Personal Character (%) (%) (%) (%)
Single Men 82.9 12.3 2.6 2.2
Single Women 99.2 5.6 1.0 1.1
Partner's Educational Qualifications
Single Men 2.2 21.3 74.3 1.1
Single Women 7.7 42.0 49.2 2.4
Partner's Occupation
Single Men 3.0 32.8 61.8 2.4
Single Women 21.6 56.1 20.9 1.3
Partner's Income
Single Men 2.8 32.8 61.8 2.4
Single Women 21.6 56.1 20.9 1.3
Partner's Appearance
Single Men 19.8 54.3 23.3 2.7
Single Women 12.8 54.4 31.4 1.3
Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR) 1997.
Note: Single men and women are in the age group of 18-35, who intend to get married in the 
future.
If women’s educational qualification is not as important as men’s in 
terms of screening in paid employment and marriage, why do women even bother 
to obtain higher educational qualifications?
Men’s attitudes seem at odds with practice; men say they do not care 
about a partner’s educational qualifications, but in fact most people marry partners 
with similar qualifications. Wakisaka (1990) argues that women look for a man 
who is taller, older, and has the same educational qualifications, but educated in 
the higher ranked schools or universities, when selecting a marriage partner. Men 
on the average score more highly than women in all three attributes. While height 
and age are given attributes, a person’s educational qualifications are a matter of 
choice, at least to some extent (Wakisaka 1990: 125).
234
Some studies have shown that educational qualifications play an important 
role in matching marriage partners. The Ministry of Health and Welfare (1987) 
found the following in its survey on marriage couples (Table 6-4-3). First, men 
and women tend to choose a partner with the same educational background. 
Second, the educational superiority of husbands is stronger for men with higher 
education. The probability of university-educated men marrying a 
university-educated woman is 3.5 times larger than if coupling were random. 
Similarly, men with a university degree are 2.4 times more likely to have a wife 
with a junior college degree. In contrast, these men are less likely to seek wives 
educated to high school-level. The probability of this is 0.8 times what it would be 
if matches took place at random.
Table 6-4-3: The Combination of Education of Husband and Wife, in 1987
Wife/Husband Secondary
School
High High School Vocational
College
Junior College University
Secondary High 
School
2.78 0.69 0.83 0.40 0.09
High School 0.66 1.32 1.02 1.10 0.78
Vocational College 0.53 1.00 2.03 1.11 1.09
Junior College 0.14 0.54 0.96 1.92 2.39
University 0.04 0.22 0.20 0.27 3.49
Unit: Figures = Ratios
X axis = Husband’s Final Education. Y axis = Wife’s Final Education.
Data Source: The Ministry of Health and Welfare (1987). Source: Wakisaka (1990), p. 126 
Note: If all men and women are indifferent to education when they get married, all figures in the 
table become 1.00. If the figure is smaller than 1.00, the combination is less favoured. If the 
figure is larger than 1.00, then the combination is favoured.
Married women with university degrees are likely to have husbands with 
university degrees, and the more prestigious a university the women graduated
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from, the stronger this tendency becomes. It was reported that wives with a degree 
from Tokyo University had husbands with university degrees (Satsuki Kai 1983). 
As many as 99 percent of these women have partners in the same schooling group, 
while just 1 percent chose someone from a lower schooling group. Eighty percent 
of them had partners with degrees from Tokyo University.
As age and educational qualifications for men are such an important part 
of the cultural capital of the keiretsu economy, it is rational for single women to 
select men of the appropriate age and qualifications as marriage partners. 
Marriage perceptions have been changing as single women have increased their 
opportunities in paid employment (Inoue and Ehara 1999: 10). For the most part, 
however, it remains ‘rational’ for women to follow a selflessly devoted wife and 
mother role, because that clear gender division of work at home is still perceived 
as the best possible route to success. So long as educational qualifications help 
both marriage prospects and paid employment, it may be ‘rational’ for women to 
invest in higher educational qualifications even if they eventually anticipate life as 
a wife and mother.
Moreover, education can empower women during marriage, by increasing 
their bargaining power (Blair and Lichter 1991; Strober and Kaneko-Chan 1998), 
and it is notable that married women often wish they were better qualified -  but 
for domestic rather than employment reasons. Once married, women are more 
likely than men to feel that their educational qualifications are inadequate for 
marital life: in 1997, 4.1 percent of women wished to have higher educational 
qualifications for family life whilst only 1.2 percent of men wished so (Ministry 
of Health and Welfare 1998: 185). This suggests that the return from educational
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investment is understood in the Japanese context not solely in terms of future 
earnings or employment, but also in terms of marital satisfaction.
Social values and norms help men and women shape their preferences 
regarding education by taking men’s paid employment and women’s marriage into 
account. Accordingly, the present form of gender difference in education and 
marriage arrangements is not only a consequence of women simply preferring the 
‘traditional’ marriage arrangement and child rearing to paid employment. Women 
may modify their preferences to fit socially given values and norms. The more 
they believe that the status quo is constant over time, the more likely women are 
to shape their preferences to fit social values and norms. This applies to the 
Japanese case where a large proportion of people tend to believe the status quo is 
constant over time in a keiretsu economy.
5 Parents’ Preferences on the Education of Sons and Daughters
Parents’ views of the traditional gender division of work in Japan are also 
reflected in the way they invest in the education of their sons and daughters. 
Funds for schooling are a major issue for parents. The US Department of 
Education (1987) found that half of American students in higher education receive 
state-sponsored loans. However, in contrast, Nakata and Mosak (1987) found that, 
on average, parents in Japan pay 80 percent of the costs of higher education for 
their children. Due to limited public assistance, boys and girls are dependent on 
their parents’ sponsorship, and thus not always free to undertake the schooling of 
their choice. This means that the present generation of adults controls the choices
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of the next generation in Japan.
It is reported that 64 percent of parents in 1973 and 70 per cent of parents 
in 1993 wanted their sons to go to university (Nihon Hoso Kyokai 1998: 54). 
Highly educated parents are more likely than less educated parents to want their 
sons to have a higher education. Indeed, it is reported that 80 per cent of parents 
with educational qualifications higher than junior college wanted their sons to be 
educated at university (Nihon Hoso Kyokai 1998: 53-4). Parents’ aspiration that 
their sons receive higher education has been stable for twenty years.
In contrast, between 1973-93, parents have become more concerned that 
their daughters should also have higher educational qualifications. In 1973, 42 
percent of parents preferred daughters to have education up to high school level, 
but in 1993, only 19 percent of parents preferred so (Nihon Hoso Kyokai 1998: 
55). Parents in 1993 were more likely to want their daughters to have higher 
education than in 1973. In 1973, 22 percent of parents preferred daughters to go to 
a university, whereas in 1997, 40.5 percent of them preferred so (Nihon Hoso 
Kyokai 1998: 54). This trend is the same for junior college education. In 1993, 40 
percent of parents wanted their daughters to go to a junior college while 30 
percent of them wanted this in 1973. As is the case with sons, parents with higher 
educational qualifications are more likely to want their daughters to be educated at 
university. Indeed, it is estimated that 67 percent of highly educated parents 
wanted daughters to have university education (Nihon Hoso Kyokai 1998: 56). 
However, when comparisons are made between son’s and daughter’s levels of 
education, parents are twice as likely to prefer sons to receive a university 
education (Nihon Hoso Kyokai 1998: 55).
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Between parents, mothers are keener than fathers on their children’s 
higher educational qualifications. In particular, mothers are more likely to prefer 
their sons to go into higher education than fathers. It is estimated that in 1997, 
73.9 percent of mothers and 68.9 percent of fathers wanted their sons to have a 
university education (Inoue and Ehara 1999: 141).
The most frequently cited reason why parents wanted their children to go 
into higher education is that they will have wider general knowledge. Indeed, in 
1997, 48.5 percent of parents who wanted daughters to university, 38.6 percent of 
parents who wanted daughters to go to junior college, and 34 percent of parents 
who wanted sons to go to university agreed with this (Inoue and Ehara 1999: 
141).
The second most popular reason is that parents want children to achieve 
knowledge and skills that are useful in society. In 1999, 24.6 percent of parents 
who wanted daughters to go to junior college, 28.3 percent of parents wanting 
daughters to go to university, and 30.9 percent of them wanting sons to go to 
university agreed with this (Inoue and Ehara 1999: 141).
The third most popular reason is that parents want to protect their sons 
from being disadvantaged in the work place. Again in 1997, 17.8 per cent of 
parents who wanted their son to go to university agreed with this, whilst only 4.3 
per cent of parents wanting daughters to be educated at university and 4.1 per cent 
of those wanting daughters to be educated at junior college cited this as a reason 
(Inoue and Ehara 1999: 141). By contrast, 8.8 per cent parents say they want their 
daughters to attend junior college because they want them to have a happy marital 
life. Only 0.7 percent of parents mention a happy marital life as a reason for sons
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to have a university education (Inoue and Ehara 1999: 141). This suggests that 
parents tend to invest in their son’s education more for reasons of paid 
employment, and their daughter’s education more for their marital life.
Parental preferences regarding children’s education reflect gender 
differences, and this in turns helps sustain gender differences in education. But the 
preferences do not arise from nowhere for they are clearly consistent with the 
realities of the Japanese economy. As discussed in Chapter Five, keiretsu as well 
as the central government will employ male students from elite universities such 
as Tokyo University since they expect them to have the necessary cultural capital.
If the present status quo is taken as given and constant, it is rational for 
parents to encourage sons rather than daughters to receive educational 
qualifications from a highly ranked university.
Parental preferences on children’s education matter in Japan. Because 
parents bear the financial responsibilities for their children’s education, it is 
difficult for sons and daughters to disagree. If children wish to act against the 
status quo, parents may opt not to finance their child’s education.
A perception gap between generations suggests that when children 
disagree with parents regarding their own education, they ultimately follow 
parental choices. Inoue and Ehara (1999: 36) argue that the younger generation is 
less likely than their parents’ generation to hold on to prevailing gender 
perceptions, and this generation gap is significantly wide. Only 22 per cent of the 
people under 45 years old agreed with a traditional gender division of work at 
home, as compared with 32 per cent of those in age group 46-55 and 54 per cent 
in age group 56-65. Given, however, the financial control of parents over
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educational choices, this growing generational differences may have little impact 
on young people’s lives.
6 Conclusion
Women and men in Japan follow different educational paths; a significant 
proportion of women study non-business subjects at female-only universities or 
junior colleges, while men tend to study business related subjects, and prefer elite 
universities such as Tokyo. This inevitably means that they have different 
employment prospects.
This pattern cannot be explained just in terms of human capital theory 
because if so, women graduating from elite universities would also get jobs in 
keiretsu. It seems that keiretsu prefer female graduates from female-only 
universities or junior colleges to those who have followed a more ‘male path. The 
crucial point in understanding the mismatch between educational aspirations and 
employment prospects is that education in Japan is considered a matter of both 
employment and marriage.
This is particularly so for women. As argued in Chapter One, men’s and 
women’s work in the workplace and home form a dovetailed pair: male elite 
workers and female assistant worker; breadwinner husband and supportive wife. 
Elite female workers fit neither of these relations. As a result, they tend to be 
excluded from elite male career path. The power of these dovetailed pair works as 
what Kuran calls the status quo. Men and women form their preferences regarding 
educational investment with reference to the status quo, which they believe to be
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unchangeable.
Social values and norms in the post war era have eased single women’s 
gender roles as daughters, and have made it easier for them to obtain higher 
educational qualifications and to be in paid employment. Married women’s gender 
roles, however, have changed little and, in many ways, their responsibilities have 
become heavier. This situation is reflected in choices regarding a daughter’s 
education. Parents choose to invest in their son’s education because they expect 
their sons to be socially successful by attaining the necessary cultural capital in 
elite universities. By contrast, daughters and their parents make choices about 
education, not only in relation to the prospect of paid employment but also in 
relation to marriage. Because sons and daughters get little financial support for 
their education from the government, parental control over education is significant. 
Even when sons and daughters favour an equal division of work in the family and 
would like to invest in education accordingly, they may not be able to do so.
It is not, I argue, appropriate to take the present gender differentiation in 
education simply as a reflection of a gender difference in educational preferences, 
because these preferences are formed in a ‘rational’ response to the realities of 
both marriage and the labour market. Men and women alike may be said to distort 
their pure preferences to bring them in line with the status quo, and this is further 
reinforced by parents’ decisions on where and how to invest in education.
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Chapter Seven
The Status Quo and Vertical Gender Segregation 
1 Introduction
Gender wage differentials in Japan cannot be fully explained simply by reference 
to educational qualifications. They are to some extent explained by length of time 
in paid employment in keiretsu, according to the standard explanations for the 
gender pay gap in Japan which rely on a combination of human capital theory, 
statistical discrimination theory and Koike’s efficiency wage theory. But while 
this analysis explains some of the pay gap and gender segregation, it does not, as I 
have argued, provide a full explanation for the prevalent Japanese form of gender 
inequality at work. For example, industrial tribunals show that some women in 
keiretsu have worked for over 30 years - as long as or longer than male 
counterparts with the same level of educational qualifications - but have remained 
in low paid positions while their male counterparts earn twice as much. The 
standard explanation is not sufficient to explain why this is ‘reasonable’.
This chapter attempts to provide an alternative explanation as follows. 
The attribute that brings high paid positions in keiretsu is not simply educational 
qualifications or the length of time in employment; although the extra element is 
not always clear to female employees, the firm unions and the court seem to agree 
that it is reasonable for an employer to pay less to women, even after long service 
in employment, because they are missing some attribute that their male 
counterparts have.
As I suggested Chapter Five, the missing attribute is conformity with the
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standard ‘male’ work pattern: selfless devotion to the firm in exchange for lifetime 
employment and seniority wages, and a strict gender division of work at home. By 
taking the status quo as ‘natural’, employers and courts rationalise ‘gender 
discrimination’ as ‘unfortunate segregation’.
In order to demonstrate the shortcomings of the standard explanation, this 
chapter argues that the gender pay gap within the Japanese keiretsu firms exists 
because employers and courts pursue social norms that reinforce the subordination 
of women. Keiretsu employers, in particular, tend to segregate most women from 
their male counterparts’ career path. I draw on data from industrial tribunals to 
illustrate this.
2 Gender Wage Differentials and Vertical Gender Job Segregation:
Wage Differentials by Gender and Age
Gender wage differentials reflect a wage structure that is ordered by gender and age, 
and this tendency is clear in the wage structure in Japan. Wage differentials in Japan 
are structured by a progressive wage by age which is termed the ‘seniority wage’; as 
already noted, this is paid only to men in large keiretsu firms. Men and women with 
the same high educational qualifications have significantly different wage curves 
throughout their time in paid employment (Figure 7-2-1). In 1994, this gender 
pattern remained the same at all levels of educational qualification.
Higher educational qualifications simply differentiate pay amongst women; 
women with higher educational qualifications are paid more than women with lower 
educational qualifications, but even women with higher educational qualifications 
are paid less than men with lower educational qualifications after their thirties
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(Figure 7-2-1: Ministry of Labour 1999a: 23). Although highly educated women are 
paid more than men with lower educational qualifications at the beginning of 
employment, after twenty years in employment these men with lower educational 
qualifications are paid more than highly educated women (Figure 7-2-1). Thus, in 
the long run, women in employment are unlikely to get returns from educational 
qualifications.
Figure 7-2-1: Wage structure by gender, age group and educational qualifications, 
in 1994
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Source: Japan Labour Research Institute (1995).
Vertical gender segregation is not a characteristic unique to Japan, but its
degree is considerably larger in Japan. In Japan, vertical gender segregation takes
place in the following two ways: first, gender job segregation by firm size (Figure
7-2-2); secondly, gender job segregation within the firm.
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Figure 7-2-2: Wage structure by gender, age group and firm size, in 1997
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Hataraku Josei no Jitsujo
In the first place, male and female workers in Japan typically work for 
different sized firms even when they work in the same industry. Although men and 
women alike work in the smallest sized firms, men tend to work as employees in the 
formal sector while women tend to work in family businesses as informal family 
workers (Higuchi 1991; Ministry of Labour 1999a: appendix table 14). Women are 
more likely to work in the smallest sized firms such as the family firms with 1-4 
employees (Mari Osawa 1993: 93). Being more formal and slightly larger, the small 
firms where men work typically pay more than family-run firms. As a result, male 
and female workers even in the smallest sized firms tend to have a different work 
status; women may not earn as much as their male counterparts, and may not 
identify themselves as ‘workers’ because of the informality of family businesses.
It should be stressed that women work as informal family workers in family 
businesses in the smallest firms with 1-4 employees even in manufacturing (Mari 
Osawa 1993: 98-9). Mari Osawa points out that female family owned business 
workers in manufacturing in Japan experience less horizontal gender segregation 
than in Anglo-American societies. The distribution of family workers has a 
significant gender impact: in 1997, female workers in family businesses (less than 5
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employee-firms) made up 8 per cent of all female workers while male workers in 
family businesses made up only 1.3 per cent of all male workers (Ministry of Labour 
1999a; appendix 16 table 6).
This trend is the same even if we focus on 5-29 employee firms and on 
young highly educated women. Newly graduated women tend to work in smaller 
firms than their male counterparts: in 1997, firms that employ 5-29 employees hired 
25.3 percent of recent female graduates from universities amongst all newly 
graduated women, while these firms employed only 8.2 per cent of recently 
graduated men. In contrast, in over 1,000-employee firms, which are likely to be 
keiretsu firms, newly graduated men made up 33 per cent of all male university 
graduates, while newly graduated women constituted 20.2 per cent, in 1997 
(Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2004 : table 38).
Large firms in the manufacturing sector have short contracts with numerous 
numbers of very small sized firms with 1-4 employees in the rural areas via their 
linked medium-sized firms. The very small sized firms here are basically family 
workers, who often engage in agricultural as well as manufacturing; these workers 
spend less demanding time for agriculture than in paid work in manufacturing. More 
women than men in the rural areas engage in low-paid but demanding work in 
manufacturing (Mari Osawa 1993: 98).
Because international competition is getting stronger, manufacturing, as a 
whole, is pressured to cut production costs (Chuo University Economic Institute 
1985). Labour costs for male full-time workers in large firms were fixed in the 
mid-1970s, the 1980s and the early 1990s (Mari Osawa 1993; Futamura 1987). As 
a result, the pressure of cost reduction was concentrated on the smaller sized firms. 
To pay off expensive machines for production and to meet supply deadlines,
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family businesses in manufacturing needed to work for very long hours, 
sometimes until midnight. According to a study done at Chuo University Economic 
Institute (1985), female family workers in the smallest sized manufacturing firms 
worked longer than formal employees in larger sized firms.
Gender job segregation by firm size is further linked to age segregation 
amongst women. Women tend to work in large firms when they are young, and are 
more likely to work in small firms with 1-29 employees after 24 years of age 
(Takenaka 1989: 294). The reason for this pattern is obvious: women move from 
large firms to smaller firms as they get older and start a family. Young single women 
in large sized firms may leave a job to begin a family, and married middle age 
women resume working in smaller firms (Takenaka 1989; Hashimoto 1996).
The second key element in gender job segregation in Japan is the vertical 
segregation within the firm. For example, in 1996, women in Japan occupied 8.2 per 
cent of managerial positions, compared with 42.7 per cent in the US, 33 per cent in 
the UK, 25.6 per cent in Germany, and 18.7 per cent in Hong Kong (International 
Labour Office 1997; Inoue and Ehara 1999; 115).1 In Japan, in 1999, only 1.6 per 
cent of women held departmental managerial posts, 2.6 per cent sectional managerial 
posts, and 7.7 per cent chief posts (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2001b).
Amongst the 8.2 per cent of female managers, most have the lowest 
managerial position and this trend is relatively strong in manufacturing (Inouen and 
Ehara 1999: 114). As women are less likely to become managers, this means that 
they are likely to earn less than men. In clerical jobs, the average clerk was paid 41 
per cent of the earnings paid to a department manager; 50 per cent of those paid to
1 Interestingly, Brinton (2001) shows that women in Taiwan are more likely to work in a 
managerial position than women in Japan.
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section managers; and 63 per cent of those paid to the chief (Ministry of Labour 
1999b).2 Among the few female managers, most occupy lower posts, frequently in 
sales and service divisions (Barbezat 1993: 24; Inoue and Ehara 1999: 114).
These two forms of gender segregation suggest that only a few single 
women can work in keiretsu until marriage or children and that a very few 
married women continue working in keiretsu, but work at lower paid positions. 
Those excluded from keiretsu employment follow two ways; one is that once 
women leave a job in keiretsu, they are unlikely to return, and will either work in 
small/medium firms or stay as full-time housewives. The other way is that as 
keiretsu tend prefer younger single women to experienced married women, 
women with experience working in small/medium firms are also unlikely to work 
in keiretsu. The average woman in the 61 keiretsu firms preferring top managers 
from Tokyo University was 28.3 years old in 1995; the average women in 
employment in general was 36.5 years old according to the Basic Survey on Wage 
Structure (Ministry of Labour 1996).3
Human capital theory alone cannot explain why the first and second types 
of vertical gender job segregation occur. In human capital theory, the greater the 
number of women with higher educational qualifications, the more chances they 
will have of high paid jobs, because the service sector makes jobs available for 
women who are equally skilled with men (Easterlin 1980; Goldin 1988). Women 
with high educational qualifications in Japan, however, have fewer high paid jobs
2 Using data from table 3-34 (Ministry of Labour 1999b), the author calculated these figures.
3 The average age of female worker in keiretsu manufacturing is calculated by the author. Forty 
five firms out of sixty one firms (excluding Nissan Jidosha and Sakura Bank) in Table 6-3-1. Data 
is from Toyo Keisai shinposha. The average age of female workers in Nissan Jidosha and Sakura 
bank in 1995 is not available.
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available to them than women in the US, UK, Germany, Hong Kong and Taiwan 
(Ushioki 2002; Brinton 2001). This suggests that women in Japan do not gain 
from their educational qualifications as much as women in the Western OECD 
countries, Hong Kong and Taiwan. As already noted in Chapter Six, this implies 
that not only educational qualifications but also some other factors associated with 
gender affect mobility within paid employment in Japan.
Japanese neoclassical economists have tried to overcome the 
shortcomings of human capital theory by stressing that the most important 
element in Japanese firms is the length of time in paid employment. They argue 
that as most women leave a job to have children, it is reasonable for employers to 
expect women to work for shorter periods of time than men and to allocate most 
women to low paid jobs. However, their explanation does not fully fit the 
following cases of industrial tribunals of Sumitomo keiretsu, because the 
discrimination in these cases cannot be explained by the length of time in 
employment.
This chapter then demonstrates that the duration of time in paid 
employment does not simply mean the length of time as Japanese neoclassical 
economists argue, but implicitly involves gender roles that can change 
dramatically due to marriage. It is these that explain why married women find it 
difficult to get high paid positions within keiretsu.
3 Gender Wage Differentials in Large Keiretsu Firms
Due to vertical gender segregation within keiretsu, women’s wage relative to 
men’s is not as high as that of women as a whole; in 1994, women in large sized
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firms earned 55.1 per cent of male salaries in the same firm whilst women in 
general earned 62 per cent of male salaries.4 The 2000 study of keiretsu firms by 
the citizen’s group Corporate Onbusman in Osaka shows that only 0.1 per cent of 
directors were women (Nikkei Hourly News 14 June 2001 01:00AM). This 
suggests that gender wage disparities within large keiretsu firms are particularly 
strong.
According to the standard explanation, this suggests either that women 
are less educated than their male counterparts or that they need to stay in 
employment for longer in order to catch up with the men’s wage trajectory. 
However, this does not precisely capture the reality of employment in keiretsu, for 
the average age of women in keiretsu is lower than that of men and most women 
leave a job while their wage is still on the rising part of the trajectory (Figure 
7-2-2). These women are said to leave a job because they “prefer” marriage and 
having children to paid employment.
This is, however, not sufficient. Firstly, as discussed in Chapter Three, 
women may leave a job for marriage or children because they cannot hope to 
achieve high paid positions. Men in keiretsu, by contrast, tend to stay in 
employment until they retire. Secondly and more importantly, it does not provide 
a clear explanation of why vertical gender segregation continued even after 
legislation in 1986 prohibited employers from treating men and women with the 
same qualifications and experience differently.
4 The figures are the author’s calculation. Large firms here are 579 firms that exchange the stock 
certificates in Tokyo stock market in 1994, and the original data are on monthly wages from the 
security reports of individual companies in 1995, and men’s and women’s monthly wage in Toyo 
Keizai Shinpo Sha (1996b). The hourly wage is calculated from men’s and women’s hourly wage
in Ministry of Labour’s (1995) Basic Survey on Wage Structure.
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The second raises a key question: why are women in keiretsu paid less 
even after the anti-discrimination legislation? In order to reduce the demand side 
of gender differentials, the government introduced the EEO Law in 1986, which 
has restricted employers from assigning male and female employers with the same 
qualification in the same career path to different jobs. This, however, has had little 
effects on women’s employment within keiretsu. The EEO Law has had only a 
marginal effect on women’s relative pay, as seen in Chapter One, and where there 
have been improvements, these may owe as much to labour market pressures as to 
legislation. Lam (1993: 199) argues that the growing shortage of skilled labour, 
particularly in the rapidly-expanding high-technology industries, has caused 
companies to look for ways of using more women. She argues that shortages in 
skilled labour have been particularly acute in information technology, especially 
software engineers; and major electronics firms such as Fujitsu, Nihon Electrical 
Company (NEC), Toshiba, and Matsushita started to recruit female university 
graduates and train them as software engineers in the early 1980s. Labour market 
pressure alone can change some part of the vertical gender segregation between 
large keiretsu and smaller firms, but not, it seems, a large part of that within large 
keiretsu firms.
The side effects of the EEO Law are important to note. Since the 
promulgation of the EEO Law, an increasing number of major firms have introduced 
a new selection system -  the ‘career tracking system’. Over 20 per cent of the firms 
that had no formal distinctions for career tracks adopted such a system after the 
legislation was introduced (Japan Institute of Women’s Employment (JIWE) 1986). 
As noted in Chapter Three, firms tend to provide assistant dead-end career paths to 
female university graduates and junior college graduates, while providing elite career
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paths to male university graduates. Only a very limited number of female elite 
university graduates have been able to join the second track.
The number of firms introducing the new selection system had been rising up 
till 2000 (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2001b). In 2000,7.1 per cent of all 
firms in Japan still assigned women with high qualifications into two career paths, 
one for female only assistant jobs, and the other for high paid jobs open to both 
women and men (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2001b). Career tracking is 
primarily a ‘big firm phenomenon’: 42.3 per cent of firms with 5000 or more 
employees have introduced the system compared to 11.4 per cent of firms with 
300-900 employees (Ministry of Labour 1990). The Japan Institute of Women’s 
Employment (1990:20) illustrates a dramatic gender segregation of employees by 
career track. Using a survey of forty firms with a career tracking system, it showed 
that 99 per cent of men were in the managerial career track compared with only 1.3 
per cent of women (Table 7-3-1: Lam 1993: 215).
Table 7-3-1: Distribution of Male and Female Employees by Career Tracks, in 1990
Male (%) Female (%)
Managerical (Sogoshoku) 99.0 1.3
Clerical (Ippanshoku) 0.8 96.2
Midway' (Chukanshoku) 0.0 2.4
Specialist (Senmonshoku) 0.2 0.1
Total 100.0 100.0
No. of Employees 82,049 55,615
Source: JIWE (1990:26), Lam (1993:215 table 9.2)
Note: 'Mid-way' is a kind of 'middle-of -the -road career track recently introduced by some 
companies to enable some selected women to take up more responsible jobs, but unlike those 
in the managerial track, there is no requirement for geographical mobility.
This new system helps maintain the favouritism towards male employees in
the appointments to managerial posts. Even employers who open high paid positions
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to female graduates operate gender segregation in their recruitment practices, one 
common practice being to set aside different dates for accepting applications from 
men and women. Companies will normally finish the interviews for male job 
applicants first before starting to interview female applicants (Lam 1993: 211).
As a result, even after the EEO Law, vertical gender segregation continues 
through the first job assignment and subsequent promotions. Firms tend to hire male 
graduates with high qualifications, and while 43.8 per cent of employers made the 
high paid career path available to both male and female graduates in 2000 (Ministry 
of Health, Labour, and Welfare 2001b), only 38 per cent of these employers actually 
hired women. This male favouritism was stronger for technical jobs where 64.6 per 
cent of employers hired only male graduates. As already noted, some large sized 
firms have established two career paths for female graduates; most of these are in 
insurance and finance where women constituted half of those employed by 1990 
(Barbezat 1993:24).
Even if they break through the barrier of the first job assignment, female staff 
are likely to lose out in advancing to managerial positions, because they are less 
likely to be trained for managerial posts. Those hired on the assistant career track 
cannot switch to the managerial career track if they were hired before the 
introduction of the EEO law. Though the conversion of assistant career path to male 
career path is now possible for later employees, the fact that they started on a 
different track significantly delays women’s promotion prospects. It is reported that 
in 1989, forty per cent of the women surveyed responded that it took more than 20 
years before they were appointed to a first managerial post (Ministry of Labour 
1990; Barbezat 1993; Omori 1993:95). All the men with higher educational 
qualifications, by contrast, were appointed to their first managerial position within
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10-15 years (Tachibanaki 1995).
The formal classification of employees into different career tracks is in effect 
the institutionalisation of past informal practices that segregated women in inferior 
dead-end jobs. In practice, this career tracking system preserves the ‘male-oriented’ 
core personnel system even more effectively, for it ensures that equal opportunities 
will only be offered to a limited number of ‘male women’: those with the ‘right 
ability and motivation’ (Lam 1993: 215). This implies that women will only be able 
to advance if they conform to the existing organisational rules and work practices of 
their male counterparts. The career tracking system works to selectively offer 
managerial jobs to those who share maleness rather than those who complete 
considerable tasks.
Thus, gender wage differentials can result from employers segregating 
women from male career path, particularly after the EEO Law. This trend is 
particularly strong in keiretsu firms.
4 Industrial Tribunals of Female Workers in Sumitomo Keiretsu and Other 
Firms
4.1 Exclusion of Elite Career Paths in Keiretsu
What prevents women from joining the elite career path in keiretsu is 
controversial. Two attributes such as educational qualifications and long period of 
time in paid employment are said to be important but most women are unlikely to 
have satisfactory levels of educational qualifications and length of time in 
employment (Koike 1988; Wakisaka 1990). In this standard explanation, gender
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differentiation in length of time in employment is said to cause gender wage 
differentials. This is, however, inappropriate in sufficiently explaining gender 
wage differentiations, because evidences below indicate women’s lower pay is 
socially determined, not determined simply by length of time in employment. In 
keiretsu, women with long period of time employment but paid less than their 
male counterparts who have the same educational qualifications. This does not 
sufficiently fit the standard explanation. This suggests that employers in keiretsu 
do not only by educational qualifications and length of time in employment, but 
also by an additional element.
Regarding existing female employees with a long period of time in paid 
employment, keiretsu claim that it is reasonable to pay them considerably less 
than their male counterparts because the employer could not reasonably predict 
these women would choose to work as long as the men. Accordingly, both at the 
entrance and in the middle of employment in keiretsu, what matters most are 
gender perceptions regarding how long men and women will continue working. 
This chapter examines how the gender perceptions link to the status quo.
I turn here to industrial tribunal cases from keiretsu in the 1990s to 
explore these perceptions.
4.2 Industrial Tribunals in the 1990s
The following cases show that the length of time in employment is not the reason 
behind why women who have served for longer than 20 years have failed to 
achieve highly paid positions in keiretsu. They suggest that their employers not 
only value the length of time in employment but also other factors closely related
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to gender. Courts accepted with the employer’s explanation as ‘rational’, and 
decided that employers did not breach the EEO Law.
Case o f  Sumitomo Steel in 1994
In 1994, seven female employees in Sumitomo Steel Co. appealed to the Ministry 
of Labour to arrange a settlement for their delayed promotion as compared to men 
with the same qualifications and duration of employment in the same firm (Miyaji 
1996: 68). Though the women had worked for the company for periods ranging 
from 20 to 35 years, they remained in the position achieved by men with 
university education after 4 years of employment (Miyaji 1996: 66). The average 
man at Sumitomo Steel served for 21.4 years in 1995 (Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha 
1996b: 219), these women already served as long as their male counterparts. 
However, the women were located at far lower positions than the men.
This came about because of the way the employer assessed workers. 
Employers assess workers annually and provide them a mark ranging from A 
(excellent), B (good), C (average) to D (poor). On average, men have a B point 
every year, married women with children a C point, and single women and 
married women without children a B point (Miyaji 1996: 70).5 This seems to 
apply regardless of the tasks undertaken, so even the women who had worked for 
35 years remained on point C if they were working mothers, despite carrying out 
much the same tasks as a male co-worker with only 27 years in employment. The 
man eamt 2 million yen more (£ 10, 000) a year (Miyaji 1996: 70). The 
employers argued that the other six women were just assigned to routine work and, 
as a result, were rightly assessed at point C.
5 The highest point is A, the average B, and C is the below average point.
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In this case, both the court and the firm union accepted the employer’s 
explanation; the firm union argued that there was no gender discrimination in the 
firm, but rather that women were treated differently because they rear children and 
will not accept job rotation accompanied with either shift work or living away 
from husband and children (Miyaji 1996: 66). In 1994, following the EEO Law, 
the Ministry of Labour arranged a negotiation between the employer and female 
workers, but simply restated that the employment practice before 1986 was 
equivalent to gender career tracking. As a result, it confirmed that gender career 
tracking both before and after the introduction of the EEO Law in 1986 was 
‘reasonable’.
Case o f  Sumitomo Electrical Manufacturing in 1995
In a similar case, a female worker who had worked for 32 years in Sumitomo 
Electrical Manufacturing appealed to the Osaka regional court in 1995 (Shirafuji 
2001). The average man at Sumitomo Electrical Manufacturing worked for 16 
years in 1995 (Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha 1996b: 228). She had then served longer 
than the average man.
Her main claim was that the employer had not provided her equal access 
to high paid position with men with the same educational qualifications and 
duration of time in employment. She argued that in 1987, male co-workers with 
the same educational qualifications were paid by as much more as 240, 000 yen 
(X 1,200) a month; this was despite the fact that she had worked as long for the 
company (Shirafuji 2001: 74).
The employer of Sumitomo Electrical Manufacturing argued that when 
this woman was hired in the 1960s, it was normal for employers to expect all
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female workers to leave a job after a few years. As a result, it was ‘rational’ for 
employers to assign female workers hired before 1986 to different career paths 
from their male counterparts (Harano 2001: Ikeda 2000: 3). In 2000, the Osaka 
regional court rejected the woman’s appeal on the grounds that employers had a 
rationale for segregating women from men, and that it was not the employer’s 
fault that he was unable to predict that this particular woman wished to remain in 
employment (Harano 2001).
Case o f  Sumitomo Chemical in 1995
The case of Sumitomo Chemical provides a further example of gender disparity in 
keiretsu. In 1995, three female employees of Sumitomo Chemical Co. appealed to 
the Osaka regional court that the employer had unreasonably assigned them to low 
paid positions for longer than 30 years. The average man at Sumitomo Chemical 
served for 17.9 years in 1995 (Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha 1996b: 156). One of these 
women had worked for 39 years at the same position, but was given no 
opportunity for promotion (Ishida 2001: 69). In contrast, her male counterparts 
had achieved managerial positions after 21 years in employment, even though 
they had similar educational qualifications.
The employer had provided female employees with access to higher paid 
male jobs from the 1970s, and there should not have been such a wide gender 
disparity between male and female positions; yet in fact, the woman who had 
served for 39 years was paid less than her male counterparts by 220, 000 yen (£ 
1,100) a month in 2001 (Ishida 2001: 69). The employer made no effort to address 
this gender gap because it would be costly to do so; and the court accepted this as 
reasonable.
259
The employer argued that gender differentials in job assignment were 
‘rational’: the average women in the 1960s left work on marriage, according to 
governmental publications in the 1960s and 1970s (Hirano 2001: 69). The 
employer argued that it would be more costly for the company to hire women for 
male jobs even where they had the same educational qualifications, abilities, and 
skills as men; if there were women in the male career path, the firm would have to 
invest in female toilets and bathrooms, and provide women with the time off work 
required by the article of female worker’s protection in the Labour Standard Law 
(1947; revised 1985) (Hirano 2001:69).6
Again, the Osaka court accepted this explanation as reasonable; it 
accepted that most women spend a shorter period in paid employment than men, 
as a statement of ‘common’ sense (Hirano 2001: 61).
These cases suggest that what matters for highly paid positions, what 
matters is not simply the length of time in employment but also perceptions 
regarding gender roles. The Sumitomo Metal case, in particular, shows that as 
employers allocate men alone to a job that requires them to live away from their 
family, men and women differ even when they are employed for the same length 
of time in a firm.
6 The Labour Standard Law revised the agenda of women’s protection when the EEO Law was
introduced. The law abandoned the prohibition regarding women’s late night work, extra work
hours (up to two extra work hours a day) and paid leave for sickness such as menstrual pain
(Hashimoto.1996:48). This revision forced women to work as long as men who has no prohibition
on work hours (Ida 1994:53; Lam 1992: 89-95).
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4.3 Gender Perceptions in Sumitomo Keiretsu
Whether male and female workers accept a job that requires them to live away 
from their family is up to the employee. However, the above cases demonstrate 
that it is ‘rational’ for employers to predetermine the employee’s choice on the 
basis of gender. In examining this more carefully, it is useful to look at how 
keiretsu employers perceive gender differences.
Case o f  Sumitomo Steel
In the later 1960s and 1970s, Sumitomo Steel Co. operated on the basis that 
women should leave their work after marriage. This is reflected in a comment by a 
manager in 1968 to the oldest of the female employees in the Sumitomo Steel case. 
On her return from maternity leave, he shouted to her; “even when female dogs 
and cats rear their children, you leave your child in the nursery school. You are 
inferior to dogs and cats, and are the same as the (heartless) robot that reproduces 
human beings” (Miyaji 1996: 294). The woman responded that this was up to her 
and her husband, and nothing to do with the manager.
As this suggests, managers in the 1960s believed that the company had a 
right to shape worker’s private life style, thought it seems that the worker and her 
family adopted a more individualistic view. When we review the comments by the 
firm union and employers in 1994, it seems that managers and male peers today 
continue to adopt much the same gender norms and values as in the 1960s. The 
norm is still that male workers should selflessly devote their time to the employer, 
where necessary sacrificing private time with the family by extra work and 
‘Tanshin-funirC (living apart from the family for a job), while women workers
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should choose between family and employment.
Case o f Sumitomo Electrical Manufacturing
The woman in Sumitomo Electrical Manufacturing provided a number of 
examples of gender discrimination: thus, though she requested her managers to 
give her the opportunity for the on-the-job training to boost her career, no 
managers did so; although she attempted to know when the important business 
meetings to which even the first year junior men were invited were held, she was 
not informed; her daily tasks were strenuous, but were treated as simply routine 
low paid work; and even when she took up the tasks carried out by men, the 
assessment of her work remained low.
Although the oldest woman prosecuting her employer of Sumitomo 
Manufacturing stayed in employment, she claims that she was discouraged by her 
employer’s treatment. Because of similar treatments, a number of her fellow 
female employees left the job. She reported hearing that former female fellow 
workers would have liked to stay in employment even after marriage (Shirafuji 
2001). When female colleagues attempted to continue working after marriage, the 
employer told them that women should seek happiness at home, and asked if  their 
husband agreed with their continuing their career (Shirafuji 2001).
In the 1960s and 1970s, these women were more likely to be coerced to 
leave a job than women today. Social norms then were strongly against working 
women; in particular, social values and norms enforced the role of the housewife 
in the 1970s (Ministry of Heath and Welfare 1998: 26-7, 50). When we simply 
look at the preferences exposed by action, women in Sumitomo Manufacturing 
who left a job for marriage look as if they ‘happily’ choose marriage and child
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rearing over paid employment.
The court agreed with the employer’s explanation. Article 14 in the 
Constitution prohibits discrimination by sex, and it might well seem that 
Sumitomo Electrical Manufacturing was discriminating against these employees, 
especially it judges them by today’s values and norms (Working Women’s 
Network 2001: 1; Ikeda 2000: 3). The court argued, however, that it was not fair 
to apply contemporary social norms and values to career decisions made in the 
1960s and 1970s, because the current law should not be applied retrospectively to 
incidents that took place before the law became valid.
The Case o f Sumitomo Chemical
In Sumitomo Chemical, the employer had allowed women to transfer from the 
female only career path to the standard ‘male’ career path after 1970 (Working 
Women’s Network 2001: 6). If the woman who appealed to the court had been 
successfully transferred to this career path, she might have had as high a position 
as male counterparts. However, a manager in Sumitomo Chemical refused this 
transfer and told a female employee who requested a job including decision 
making as follows; ‘ you should have known that men and women are hired for 
different career path from the beginning of employment. Men have to accept job 
rotations that require them to live apart from the family. Men are ready to take 
‘final’ responsibility when first employed. Do women have such determination? 
. . .’ (Ikeda 2000: 1).
The women in Sumitomo Chemical not only claimed this but also argued 
that the pre-war values and norms of 7e’ system lay behind this gender vertical 
job segregation; for example, married women were entitled to take up paid leave
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in order to participate in the funeral of their husband’s parents of the husband, but 
were not for the funeral of their own parents (Harano 2001: 190).
In response to her claims, the employer argued that women in the 1960s 
and 1970s were satisfied with ‘female’ jobs, most of which are low paid routine 
work, and that since it is the man who should be the primary breadwinner, it was 
impossible to predict that some of these would continue working after marriage 
(Hirano 2001: 69). Thus, by reference to those social norms, it was reasonable for 
the employer both not to transfer women to a standard ‘male’ career path and 
expect them to follow social norms.
The cases of the industrial tribunals suggest that there are two reasons 
why employers and courts defend the employers’ explanation as ‘reasonable’. One 
reason is that employers judge that married women are not as suitable as men for 
‘ Tanshin-funin ', a job that requires living away from husband and children; the 
other is that it was hard for the employer to predict, when hiring women, if  they 
would continue working after marriage and having children, going against the 
prevailing social norms.
5 Gender Difference in Career Paths
5.1 Overwork and Tanshin-funin is for Men, not for Married Women
The women in Sumitomo keiretsu show that employers may not assign women to 
jobs in a standard career path and may regard women as unsuitable for the job 
because they are not allowed to be in a standard career path (Working Women’s 
Network 2001: 22; see the related exploration in Chapter Three). Figure 7-5-1
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shows that the explanations employers in general give for failing to assign women 
to the elite career path.
Figure 7-5-1: The reasons why employers do not assign women to elite career 
path, in 1992
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Source: Ministry o f  Labour (1992). Note: multiple answer questions.
The question here is what makes employers perceive male employees
more appropriate. As illustrated in Figure 7-5-1, employers find male workers will 
work more flexibly according to their request; over 20 per cent of employers said 
that women were not suitable for overwork and would not apply for the job in 
1992. This suggests that men follow a work pattern in which overwork is taken for 
granted and that this work pattern is avoided by women
One aspect that takes women away from the elite career path is ‘Karoshi’ 
(death by overwork) including extra work hours and refusing to take paid time off,
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and ‘ Tanshin-funin’ (living apart from his family for a job) (Hosokawa, Uehara, 
and Tajiri 1982; Okamura 1990).
Statistics show that the Japanese work longer work hours than their 
counterparts in the Western OECD countries. The Japanese worker undertakes a 
great deal of overtime, but is also expected to maintain a low rate of absenteeism 
(Japan Times 1989 7 October). One of most striking examples of the ostensible 
work commitment of the Japanese is their tendency to take less of their allotted 
holidays and leave time than their entitlement (Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990: 144; 
Sengoku 1995; Williams 1997: 76). Karoshi befalls directors and employees alike, 
and arises from the fact that the individual member is often expected to place the 
interests of the company above his own interests (Kawahito 1991; Yomiuri 
Shinbun 1991 1 May; Daily Yomiuri 1996 29 March).
It is interesting to note that socialisation with co-workers and managers is 
counted as a part of extra work in Japanese firms. By spending most their daily 
time with managers and co-workers, workers tend to establish personal ties with 
them. As a result, they are less likely to refuse a request for overtime because they 
do not wish to turn down a person with whom they form a family-like relationship 
(Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990).
Tanshin-funin refers to the practice of sending a director or employee, 
usually of middle rank or higher in the corporate hierarchy, to work either at a 
branch office in another part of Japan or, as is increasingly common, abroad. He 
may be sent for a few months, or many years (Williams 1997: 76). In contrast 
with the British employee ‘sent away’, the Japanese often leave their wife and 
family at home. Often the family is unable -  or unwilling -  to accompany the 
husband, for the children’s education is seen as a primary concern, and a move is
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perceived as jeopardising the child’s progress at school (Owaki, Nakano and 
Hayashi 1996: 96-113). Those children who do manage to accompany the father 
often have difficulty adjusting to the academic pace of their Japanese counterparts 
when they do eventually return (Goodman 1990). Furthermore, as Table 7-5-2 
indicates, it is the large keiretsu firms that are most likely to request workers to 
taken up posts that involve living separately from the family.
7 Imperial Organ (Teikoku Zoki) Medical Appliance Co.had an appeal from a male employee in
1975, who was ordered to live separately from the family. As a consequence, his working wife
became ill because of overwork. The male employee claimed that his separation for the job caused
this family problem and his wife’s ill health. In 1993, the Tokyo High Court rejected the claim that
the employer was unreasonalbe, arguing that it was the employee and his wife who accepted the
order and decided to live apart, not the employer (Owaki, Nakano, and Hayashi 1996: 108-13).
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Figure 7-5-2: Proportion of the firms with em ployees accepted Tanshin-funin,
in 1993
Percentage
inn ft
□  Percentage
Total over 5000 1000-4999 300-999 100-299 30-99
employees employees employees employees employees
Source: Ministry o f  Health and Welfare (1998), p. 182 figure 4-16.
In cases of both Karoshi and Tanshin-funin, the worker’s first loyalty and 
responsibility is to the welfare of his company; loyalty to himself and to his 
family takes second place (Williams 1997: 74-5). This is a standard ‘male’ pattern 
of work life in Japan, and one that it is particularly difficult for married women 
workers to follow.
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5.2 The Prevailing Social Norms (the Status Quo)
In the status quo, a standard career path is for men with a fulltime housewife who 
devote their time to the firm at the expense of their private time for the family. As 
employers believe that this strict gender division at home is the best, they will not 
accept most female workers, particularly married women, onto the standard career 
path.
Instead of directly arguing this, most employers justify their gender 
segregation by emphasising that female workers agree with the prevailing gender 
norms. The courts accepted this justification in the industrial tribunals of the firms 
in Sumitomo keiretsu. Interestingly, this contradicts decisions of the courts in the 
1960s and 1970s, which had interpreted social values and norms in the opposite 
way. In 1966, for example, the Tokyo Regional Court accepted the former female 
employee’s claim that her employer in Sumitomo Cement Corporation, forced her 
to leave a job on marriage. The court decided that the employer had discriminated 
against this woman, breaching article 90 in the civil code stating that all men and 
women should be treated equal (Harano 2001: 64; Ministry of Labour 1994: 
appendix 114). Such cases suggest that in the 1960s, the courts did not take social 
norms as they were, but encouraged social values and norms to adapt to the basic 
principles of the civil code (Harano 2001: 64).
Working Women’s Network (2001: 12-6) and Ikeda (2000) argue that the 
court decision in the case of Nissan Automobile in 1969 expressed the view that 
‘social norms’ should be virtues for both individuals and firms to follow, and that 
such ‘norms’ should be guidelines for the society. In this case, the Tokyo Hugh 
Court demanded that Nissan Automobile keiretsu set the same retirement age for
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owomen as men, on the basis of human rights and moral codes.
The contemporary Sumitomo cases suggest, by contrast, that employers 
and courts now reinforce the perception that fits ‘the status quo’ and encourage 
people to accept it. Employers perceive gender roles as fixed, even when women 
do not necessarily conform to their expectations regarding gender role; for 
example, several women in the court cases of Sumitomo keiretsu firms in the 
1990s. In contrast with court decisions in the 1960s and 1970s, the court decision 
on Sumitomo in the 1990s supported keiretsu employers.
This may be because employers and judges perceive the status quo as 
more solid than judges in the 1960s and 1970s. The current status quo has 
strengthened after the oil crises in the 1970s, such that even judges are less likely 
to view it as changeable.
6 Preference Falsification regarding Overwork and Tanshin-funin
The reasons given in cases discussed above can be ‘reasonable’ only if  people 
fully accept the idea that a mainstream (i.e. majority) preference rightly dominates 
other preferences and forms social norms. If as many preferences as possible are 
expressed, people can establish whether the status quo still functions or not. 
However, if many preferences are suppressed, people are less likely to become 
aware of problems in the status quo (Kuran 1995). In Japan, one of the problems
8 Ishida (2001: 73) showed that the lawer for the woman of Sumitomo Chemical Co. cited a 
similar court case; in the court case of Mitubuchi in the 1960s, the first primary judge of the 
Supreme Court stated that social values and norms employers apply for treatment of their 
workers should follow moral codes however differently they are percieved bya majoiry of 
people.
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is that it is difficult for married women to continue working and rearing children; 
the other problem is overwork and Tanshin-funin for men.
In fact, people in Japan may not express all possible preferences because 
they shape these preferences to the status quo. Due to affection, for example, 
employees may not take up time off work because they worry that taking holidays 
would damage the company’s financial position; moreover, many of those 
interviewed in a survey in 1989 of Fukoku Mutual Life Insurance company were 
conscious of the trouble such action would cause their colleagues, for it would 
necessarily involve colleagues in extra work (Japan Times 1989 7 October; Japan 
Times 1990 16 June). Workers know that conforming to the standard ‘male’ life 
style harms their health and family life, but they conform nonetheless. One reason 
cited is ‘tacit pressure’ to refuse holidays, workers feeling ‘uncomfortable’ taking 
a holiday when no one else did (International Federation of Chemical, Energy, and 
General Workers’ Unions, Japanese Affiliated Federation (ICEF-JAF) 1984; 
Williams 1997: 140).
Although the resulting action -  conformity to the group -  is the same, 
people may be motivated differently. As men foster affection by socialising with 
co-workers and managers in Japanese firms, the motivation of affection is also 
socially fostered. But this motivation may be linked to further motivation by fear. 
Tanshin-funin provides a particularly good example of motivation by fear. 
Employees may feel they cannot refuse Tanshin-funin even if they know the risks 
to family life, and detrimental effects on both the worker and his family 
(Kinoshita 1983; Saito 1982; Takahashi 1991; Owaki, Nakano and Hayashi 1996; 
108-13). As senior managers and co-workers tend to feel that those who reject 
Tanshin-funin are selfish, young workers may feel pressurised when they refuse
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Tanshin-funin (Figure 7-6-1). Workers are likely to fear losing a job because of the 
keiretsu dominated economy and the relatively low unemployment benefits noted 
Chapter One. If workers refuse Tanshin-funin, they lose their reputation in the 
eyes of senior workers and managers. This reduces a worker’s chance for 
promotion and increases the chances of becoming redundant.
Figure 7-6-1: The proportion of men who feel the refusal of Tanshin-funin is selfish, 
in 1991
Refusing tanshin-funin = selfish
cent actually reduced work hours in 2003 (Nikkei Hourly News 2003 1 March 
01:00 AM). This is suggests that fathers too mould their preferences in order to fit 
the status quo; men may not express preferences that do not fit to social norms on 
care service provision.
It appears that many employees are aware of the detrimental 
consequences of a company-first work style, but still conform to it for fear of 
losing a job, through concern over burdening co-workers, and concern over the 
loss of reputation. All these strengthened after the oil crisis in the 1980s. Men 
have sacrificed their private time with the family for socialisation with male peers 
and supervisors, in order to ensure seniority wages and lifetime employment.
Men with higher educational qualifications are particularly coerced to 
follow a standard ‘male’ work style in which they need to spend extra time on 
socialisation at work. Employers do not assign posts simply according to the 
assessment of the worker’s skills (Yashiro 1995; Tachibanaki 1992, 1995), 
preferring to encourage competition between employees over a number of years. 
They perceive this as efficient as it maintains high incentives to work amongst 
white-collar male workers. The implication, however, is that family life may be at 
risk for long periods of time.
Men view Tanshin-funin differently not only by firm size but also by age group. 
As Figure 7-6-1 shows, men aged 25-29 those (most likely to be single) and those 
aged 35-39 (most likely to have young children) are much less likely to think it 
selfish for a worker to refuse Tanshin-funin. This suggests that senior men’s 
preferences dominate; the others may fear losing their job if  they express a 
preference that differs from the dominant norms.
Kuran argues that preference falsification makes it difficult for people to
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recognize the problems in the status quo. Although the status quo may be 
problematic, preference falsification makes the problems less visible. As Kuran 
explains, people often overlook the problems associated with the status quo in 
calculating its costs and benefits. As people rarely express their preferences if they 
are differ significantly from the dominant preferences, the fallacy of the status quo 
does not come to surface. Preference falsification makes it more difficult for 
people to admit potential problems in the status quo, and they underestimate its 
costs. As a result, people may not gain as much as they expect.
Overwork and Tanshin-funin are motivated by either affection for 
co-workers and managers or fear of losing a job. This results in the maintenance 
of the status quo. The status quo has its problems; in this case, clear problems 
associated with overwork and Tanshin-funin, such as ill-health and loss of family 
life. The further problem is the exclusion of married women from elite career 
paths in keiretsu.
7 Conclusions:
Married Women’s Exclusion as Systematic Problems of the Status Quo
Because women are unlikely to accept overwork and Tanshin-funin, married 
women are said to be excluded from elite career paths. In one sense, these women 
have fewer problems with the status quo; their work patterns provoke fewer risks 
to their health and family lives. This pattern is not only good for women but also 
for men. Though their work and family lives suffer more directly, most men 
follow the status quo, practicing preference falsification regarding overwork and 
Tanshin-funin even if doing so may bring risks to themselves and their family life.
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It is not then surprising that the managers in Sumitomo keiretsu firms 
seem to believe that women prosecuting their employers for discrimination are 
challenging the status quo. Married women are excluded from the elite career 
paths in keiretsu not simply because they are less likely to overwork and accept 
Tanshin-funin, but because they demonstrate the problems with the status quo 
men in keiretsu rather would not face.
Because of the problem of preference falsification, court judgments may 
be misled if  they use the status quo as a reference point in judging whether 
employers reasonably exclude married women from elite career paths in keiretsu. 
The courts in the 1990s used the prevailing values and norms of the 1960s and 
1970s in order to judge if married women’s exclusion from elite career path was 
reasonable. It was interesting that the courts in the 1960s did not use the status 
quo forjudging cases of women’s exclusion.
Married women cannot attain high paid jobs in keiretsu not simply 
because they tend to work for a shorter period of time in employment than men, 
but also because most men, particularly, men in keiretsu, tend to maintain the 
status quo even at the expense of falsifying their preferences regarding overwork 
and Tanshin-funin. They simultaneously know and deny the problems associated 
with these practices. Employers, for their part, value the workers who falsify their 
preferences regarding overwork and Tanshin-funin, taking it as a token of selfless 
devotion to the employer.
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Chapter Eight
Time-off Work for Childcare: Double Pressure for Working Mothers 
1 Introduction
This chapter demonstrates that the status quo decreases the effect of legislation on time 
off work for childcare, as it reduces the effect of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Law, as noted in Chapter Seven. The chapter focuses on time off work for childcare not 
only because parenting is the most preferred childcare style, but also because gender 
imbalances in take up rates of time off helps maintain and reinforce the status quo 
regarding gender inequalities at work.
This chapter examines the following hypothesis; even though the legislation for 
time off work for childcare gives all fathers and mothers the entitlement to take time off 
for childcare, the status quo off sets the effect of the law and makes most fathers and 
mothers in keiretsu fail to use their entitlement to take time off while very few mothers in 
non-keiretsu firms use their entitlement.
If the status quo affects those who use the entitlement to take time off, the 
following will occur. As already noted in Chapter Seven, in keiretsu, the employer tends 
to exclude married female workers from high paid career paths, because he believes that 
women are unlikely to overwork and to accept Tanshin-funin; he believes that this 
indicates most women lack the most important elements of the status quo, selfless 
devotion to the employer and cooperation with colleagues. He expects all men to 
conform to this work pattern by overworking and accepting Tanshin-funin. If both 
parents fear they would lose out by confronting their employers, they will not take leave 
for childcare. This is more likely the case for fathers than mothers. In contrast, in
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non-keiretsu firms where the status quo is not as firmly maintained as in keiretsu, 
working mothers are more likely to take time off. If it is the status quo that prevents 
most fathers and mothers from using their entitlement, only a limited number of mothers 
in non-keiretsu firms would access their entitlement of time off.
This chapter explores how parents take time off work for childcare in order to 
examine this hypothesis.
Before this examination, it illustrates how important time off work for children 
is for the family. In order to balance childcare and paid employment, the family needs 
one of the following arrangements: first, an increase in the public provision of childcare; 
second, better arrangements for working parents to take time off work for childcare; 
third, an equitable division of childcare tasks between men and women that enables both 
of them to balance family life with work responsibilities. The first is poorly provided for 
in Japan, where only 17 per cent of children under the age of two have access to public 
nursery schools (Ministry of Education 1997). The third is a very distant prospect, in 
Japan as elsewhere. Then, time off work for children is a key solution.
Because fertility rates continue declining and married women tend to leave 
employment for children, it is important to learn why working parents do not take time 
off work for childcare.
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2 Childcare Provision from Public Source and Fathers
2.1 Heavy Responsibility of the Family
This chapter starts with a review of childcare provision, then considers the evidence 
about men’s participation in childcare, before going on to focus on time off work for 
childcare as one of the crucial issues in Japan.
Mothers, in general, specialise in the care of children under three years old. In 
1997, 74.8 per cent of mothers did not participate in the labour force when their first 
child was under one year old (Ministry of Health and Welfare 1998:41). This is not only 
because mothers choose to look after children by themselves, but also because there are 
few carers to share the responsibility of rearing children within and outside the family. 
As will be further developed in Chapter Nine, people perceive mothers as responsible for 
rearing their own children below three years old, mothers are pressurised to choose 
childcare over paid employment.
Few public facilities are available for children under three years old. In 1997, 
82.9 per cent of children in the age group 1-2 years were cared for by the family and 
unauthorised nursery schools, while 17.1 per cent of them were cared for at public nursery 
schools (Ministry of Education 1997; Ministry of Health and Welfare 1998:155). Mothers 
can share childcare with grandparents and a few mothers can afford private nurseries: 
Together the family and private nurseries provide practically all childcare services for 
children below three years old. In 1997, 95.3 per cent of children aged below one year old 
were cared for by family members and unauthorised nursery schools, while only 4.7 per 
cent of them were cared for at public nursery schools (Ministry of Education 1997; 
Ministry of Health and Welfare 1998: 155). Even including children aged from 3 to 4,
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mothering and grand parenting are the main sources of childcare in the family. 
Grandparents and other kin play an active role when the children are younger than 4 years 
old (Table 8-2-1).
Table 8-2-1: Types of Alternative Childcare, by Children’s  Age, in 1993
Age of Children Nursery School Private Nursery Kindergarten Grandparents or 
Kin
1-1.5 years old 20.5 21.4 0.3 47.4
1.5 -  2years old 29.5 24.9 N/A 38.6
2 year old 31.6 16.3 0.3 45.2
3 year old 34.1 17.6 3.3 40.7
4 year old 46.3 23.9 8.2 18.7
5 year old 42.6 21.8 12.9 20.8
6 year old 38.1 6.4 14.3 38.1
Unit: Figures in Percentage. (N/A = not available).
Data Source: Ministry of Labour (1994), appendix 86.
Note: Nursery schools, which the Ministry of Health and Welfare run, are designed for children with 
working mothers. Kindergartens are run by the Ministry of Education and are designed for children with 
jobless mothers.
Table 8-2-2 shows mothers with children below 1 year old vary in choosing 
their alternative carers by the type of labour force participation. Wives in full-time or 
part-time employment need their own or their husband’s parents to share childcare; 
wives were more likely to rely on parents than on husbands in 1997. This is the same for 
mothers working in family owned businesses, but their husbands are more actively 
involved in childcare than grandparents living nearby the couple. Oddly, husbands with 
full-time housewives are more likely to provide childcare than husbands with wives in 
full-time employment. However, their wives are less likely to rely on their parents to 
share childcare than working wives.
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Table 8-2-2: Alternative Carers to  M others for the First Child under 1 Year Old, in 1997
(multiple answers question; unit: %)
Carers Total Full-time
Housewives
Wife Full-time 
Employed
Wife Working in
Family Own
.Businesses
Wife Part-Time 
Employed
Husband 33.9 36.7 20.8 37.6 22.0
Grandparents Living with family 19.2 12.1 44.0 38.1 28.6
Husband 14.8 9.2 33.3 30 25
Wife 4.4 2.9 10.7 8.1 3.6
Grandparents Living Nearby 16.7 14.4 26.0 17.7 28.5
Husband 4.1 3 8.4 5.7 7.7
Wife 12.6 11.4 17.6 12 20.8
Other Kin 2.5 1.7 4.6 5.7 4.2
Authorised Nurseries 2.8 0.5 12.7 3.4 8.3
Nurseries Within Firms 0.6 0 3 0.2 1.2
Other Nurseries 0.9 0.3 4.1 0.7 3
Private Nurseries and Nannies 1.1 0.2 4.2 1.7 7.7
Unit: total percentage is not 100 %.
Source: National Institute o f  Population and Social Security Research (N1PSSR) (1997), The 
Ministry o f  Health and Welfare (1998), p.41.
problem seems to have hit hardest for wives in employment living away from their 
parents.
2.2 Care Provision by Husbands
Fathers do look after their own children, but tend to practice less time consuming 
childcare tasks. Instead of spending time with children, many fathers perform their role 
by paying the expenses for child-rearing, as shown in Figure 8-2-1. Mothers take 
responsibility for routine childcare while fathers participate in special events; mothers 
feed, bathe, nurse and change nappies and fathers play with and discipline the children. 
Otherwise, they do not take part in childcare on a daily basis. Women spend 7 hours and 
31 minutes on domestic work, including childcare per day (Table 8-2-3). This contrasts 
with fathers’ contribution in paying living costs (Figure 8-2-1).
Table 8-2-3: Time Allocation for Childcare per day in Households with children
under 6 Years Old, in 1996
Tasks Task Taker Weekly Average Weekday Average Saturday Sunday
Time spent on Childcare Husband 00:17 00:10 00:29 00:38
Wife 02:39 02:47 02:29 02:09
Domestic Work Husband 00:37 00:20 01:02 01:32
Wife 07:31 07:41 07:28 06:46
Unit: Figure = Hours: Minutes
Source: The Statistic Bureau of Management and Coordination Agency (1996), the Ministry of Health and
Welfare (1998), p.83.
Note: Domestic Work includes 'Domestic Tasks', Nursing and Caring for the Elderly', 'Childcare' and 
'Shopping'.
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Figure 8-2-1: Household division of childcare, in 1997
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Data Source: Nomura Research Institute (1997), Ministry o f  Health and Welfare (1998), p.90, Table 2-77.
Husbands rarely change their working time to account for care service work 
needed at home even when the wife is working outside the home. The husbands with a 
part-time working wife are less supportive than those with a full-time working wife in the 
1990s; husbands do increase time spent on care service work for the family when the 
wife is in paid employment. But the Bureau of Women’s Union (1995: 69) reported that 
even when both the husband and wife work full-time, there is a large disparity in time 
spent on care services for the family. It reported that female union members spent 3 
hours and 10 minutes on unpaid care services for the family on an average weekday 
whilst their partners spent only 34 minutes on the same work in 1993 (Rengo 1995). This 
pattern is confirmed by the 1998 study by the Ministry of Health and Welfare.
The evidence above indicates that husbands are unlikely to change their lifestyle 
to enable a wife to work and have children. Husbands tend to perceive their role as father 
as paying the expenses for child-rearing as main breadwinner.
3 Time off Work for Childcare in Theory and Practice
3.1 Legal Background and Practice of Time off Work for Childcare
In legislation, Japan has well developed time off work for childcare, as compared with 
other OECD countries. In Japan, time off work for childcare has been legislated since the 
1960s and the length of time allowed to working mothers is relatively long (Table 8-3-1). 
There are four types of time off work for childcare: 1) maternity leave for mothers, 2) 
paternity leave for fathers, 3) parental leave for both parents and 4) flexible working 
hours for parenting for both parents. Time off work for children began in 1963 when the 
law regarding maternity leave came into effect, and it has expanded since to include 
parental leave (Table 8-3-2). After 1992, the legislation on paid parental leave targeted 
all employees working full-time (Ministry of Health and Welfare 1998: 201). In 2001, it 
was amended to prohibit employers from laying off workers who have taken up parental 
leave and assigning to them posts requiring Tanshin-funin, or in other ways making it 
difficult for them to combine work with childcare. When employers assign parents with 
young children a post requiring Tanshin-funin, they must now ask workers if they are 
willing (Working Parents’ Homepage 2003; Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 
2001b).
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Table 8-3-1: Parental Leave Regulations in Japan, Norway and the EU
Right Paid Maximum
duration
Part-time Spread Age o f  
child
Japan - 25 % o f  wages 3 years No No 0-3®
Belgium None - - - - -
Denmark Individual USD 1120 26 weeks® No No 0-9
Germany Family DM600® 34 months Yes Yes 0-3
Finland Family® 66 % o f  wages 158 days No No 0-2
(2 different policies)
Family
®
None 2 years Yes Yes® 1-3
France Family None® 3years Yes Yes 0-3
Greece Individual None 3 1/2 years No No 0-4
Ireland None - - - - -
Italy Family 30 % o f wages 6mths No No 0-2
Luxembourg None - - - - -
Netherlands Individual None 6mths® Yes No 0-8
Norway Mixed® 100 % or 80% 42 or 52 wks® Yes No 0-2
Austria Family
o f  wages 
OS 5565® 24mths® Yes No 0-2
Portugal Family None 24mths No No 0-2
Spain Family None 36mths No No 0-3
United Kingdom None - - - - -
Sweden Mixed® Variable® 450days Yes Yes 0-8
Source: Bruning and Plantenga (1999), p. 197 table 1.European C om m ission (1997). d . 64.
NOTES
®  After parental leave has expired, Finnish parents are entitled to child-care leave.
(2) In Norway, the father has an individual entitlement to 4 weeks’ leave and the mother has an individual 
right to 9 weeks’ leave, of which six are taken at the time of the birth of the child. The remaining days can 
be taken by either parent.
(3) Sweden gives both fathers and mothers individual rights to 1 month of leave. The remaining days can 
be taken by either parent.
©  In Germany, during the first 6 months following the birth of a child, families can claim 
‘Erziehungsgeld’ of DM 600 per month unless both parents are doing 20 or more hours of paid work per 
week or have a family income above DM 100,000 (single parents DM 75,000) per year. After the first 6 
months, parents can only claim Erziehungsgeld if the family income is less than DM 29,400 (single 
parents DM 23,700) per year.
(5) In Finland, 66% of wages are paid on condition that no use is made of subsidised child care.
©  In France, although no payment is made, a right to unpaid parental leave applies to the first child. From 
the second child, parental leave-related benefits apply up to a maximum of FF2,929.
©  In Norway, parents can choose between 42 weeks of leave paid 100 % of income, or 52 weeks of leave 
paid at 80 % of income.
(8) In Austria, supplementary benefit of OS2, 500 is paid per month to single parents and low-income 
families.
©  Payment in Sweden is ‘variable’ in that the father and the mother are paid at 85 % of normal income for 
a month. Remaining days are paid at 75 %of income, apart from the final 90 days in which leave is paid at 
a fixed amount of SEK 60 per day.
©  In Denmark, parents have an individual right to 26 weeks of parental leave if the leave is taken before 
the child reaches the age of 1 year. In other cases, parents have a legal entitlement to 13 weeks’ leave. If 
the employer gives permission, leave can be extended to a maximum of 1 year.
©  In the Netherlands, the standard regulation provides for a 6-month entitlement to (part-time) leave. 
Since 1 July 1997,3 months’ full-time leave can be taken or the leave can be spread over a period of more 
than 6 months if the employer agrees.
©  Regarding the maximum duration of 24 months leave in Austria, the final 6 months can only be taken if 
parents take 3 months’ parental leave each.
©  In Finland, each parent can take up to a maximum of 4 periods of leave per child.
©  In Japan, maternity leave allows mothers to take up to 6-week pre-natal leave and 8-week post-natal 
leave with approximately 60 per cent of their salary. The parental leave law encourages employers to 
provide parents with children aged 1-6 with the same work arrangements as parents with children under 1 
year old entitled to take parental leave and flexible work hour arrangement. Twenty five per cent of salary 
is paid from health insurance; worker pays its premium.
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Table 8 -3 -2 : History of the Law on Maternity Leave and Parental Leave
1963
L *"  ................................... H I
the Law on Maternity Leave
D etails .....................
The maternity Leave for women employed in public sector started.
The length is 180 days.
1972 the Law on Maternity Leave The State passed maternity leave for women.
This law, however, lacked a penalty on employers when they breach the law.
1975 the Law on Parental Leave for Mothers For Limit Target the State passed a law for parental leave for mothers employed by the State. 
The law mainly covered women in the public sector and working with special skills. .
Females employed as teachers at all levels, nurses at hospital and public nursery schools.
The length of the Leave is 240 days.
1992 the Law on Parental Leave for Both Parents The State asked employers to provide parental leave for both Parents.
However, employers employing less than 30 persons full-time could neglect the duty until 1995.
1995 the 1 st Revision of the Law on Parental Leave for Both Parents After the revision, all employers had to offer parental leave for up to 1 year for both parents with a child aged under 1 year old. . 
Leavers are relieved from payments for health insurance and social secuiry during leave 
The unemployed benefit wouldl guarantee leavers 25 per cent of the pre-leave pay.
1998 the 2nd Revision of the Law on Parental Leave for Both Parents The new law added the flexible working hours for both parents.
The other agendas are the same as in 1995.
Leavers are relieved from payments for health insurance and social secuiry during leave 
The unemployment benefit will guarantee leavers 25 per cent of the pre-leave pay. 
However, the laws lacks enforcement powers on firms.
1975 from Hashimoto (1996), p.58.
1995’s revision: This payment is guaranteed by ‘the law on employment insurance’
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Time off leave for childcare, particularly for mothers in Japan, is relatively long. 
Maternity legislation guarantees pregnant women leave for 6 weeks before and 8 weeks 
after birth. Fathers can take 10 days of paternity leave (Ministry of Health and Welfare 
1998: 122-123). Parental leave allows parents with children under 1 year old to choose 
between taking a one-year leave immediately after maternity leave or several- months 
leave plus flexible working hours; parents with children from 1 year to 3 years old are 
entitled to access to flexible working hours (Table 8-3-2).2 Employers are encouraged to 
provide parents with children aged from 3 to 6 years old access to flexible working hours 
(Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2001b; Working Parent’s Homepage 2003).
There is an important difference, however in the use of parental leave between 
the public and private sectors. As the laws were established first in the public sector, 
employees hired by the state take the leave more easily. Within the private sector, there 
are significant differences in pay and the use of parental leave by firms (Social 
Development Research Institute 1996: 116). Some firms offer generous parental leave, 
with full payment of salary and 3-years’ leave for childcare; other firms pay from 10 to 
60 per cent of pay for a year.
Access to parental leave has been limited in practice to mothers in large firms, 
even though legislation from 1992 guarantees it to all mothers and fathers.
There are two points to note: first, time off work for childcare is more likely for 
large keiretsu firms than small/medium firms; second, time off work for childcare is not 
fully paid in Japan. Firstly, the larger the size of the firm, the higher the provision for 
maternity or parental leave in Japan. The Ministry of Health and Welfare (1998: 201)
2 In the public sector, employees can access parental leave until their children reach 3 years old. In private 
sector, if the employer applies parental leave to parents with children up to aged 3 years old, parents can 
access parental leave until their children reach 3 years old.
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reported that by 1996, 60.8 per cent of enterprises had introduced parental leave. In this 
survey, parental leave was found to be provided by 97.1 per cent of firms with over 500 
full-time workers. In middle-sized firms with 100-499 full-time workers, the figure was 
81.4 per cent, while parental leave was available only in 55.4 per cent of firms with 
30-99 full-time workers. Yet, the smaller the firm, the larger the percentage of female 
workers. This means that mothers working in small firms are more likely to be excluded 
from the benefits of parental leave. Those with higher educational attainment tend to 
work in the large firms while those with lower or no qualifications work in small or 
middle-sized firms, where they cannot take parental leave.3
Secondly, these laws have guaranteed a certain period of time for leavers to take 
up time off, but provided little remunerative support until 1995. In 1995, the law on 
parental leave was introduced whereby leavers get paid 25 per cent of their salary during 
the leave (Ministry of Health and Welfare 1998: 202). Persons on leave are paid not by 
the employer, but by unemployment insurance, the premium of which employees 
themselves pay before the leave. During the leave, employers rather than employees are 
responsible for paying the monthly premium for unemployment insurance and health 
insurance (Ministry of Health and Welfare 1998: 202). The law on time off for childcare 
was combined with the law on time off for care of the elderly in 1992 and became 
effective from 1999 (Ministry of Labour 1999a: 115). The 1992 law permitted smaller 
sized firms with less than 30 employees to delay the introduction of time off for family 
care until 1998 (Ministry of Labour 1994). This law, however, has no enforcement 
power; the government simply makes efforts to inform employers that they are
3 By taking financial difficulties into account, the government delayed this provision for small sized firms 
until 1998 because of the higher financial costs for smaller employers (Ministry of Labour 1994).
288
responsible for paying the employee-on-leave’s unemployment and heath insurance 
premiums (Ministry of Labour 1999a: 115).
The government pays subsidies if employers pay allowances to working parents 
who use childminders and care takers for children or elderly parents; the government 
pays two thirds of the allowance for employers in smaller-sized firms with less than
1.000 employees and half of the allowance for employers in large size firms with over
1.000 employees (Ministry of Labour 1999a: 116-17). However, the allowance from the 
government is set out at a low upper limit: a maximum of 300,000 yen (1,500 pounds 
sterling) a year per employee for a maximum of 12 employees (3.6 million yen a year) in 
the same branch of the firm. As this support from the government does not fully cover 
the costs of leave, employers, particularly employers in smaller size firms, are not 
willing to offer time off work for childcare (Hashimoto 1996).
Consequently, in Japan, from a legal standpoint, time off for childcare lacks 
adequate payment and a sufficient amount of subsidies for employers in smaller sized 
firms.
3.2 Gap in Take up Rate of Time off Work for Children in General
The above problems reflect a gap between the legal position and the actual practice of 
time off work for childcare. Mothers in Japan are more likely to take maternity leave 
than parental leave. Amongst mothers in employment who gave birth in 1996, only 44.5 
per cent of them took parental leave (Ministry of Labour 1997; Ministry of Health and 
Welfare 1998: 201). Although the legislation on parental leave allows mothers to leave 
one year after a birth, most working mothers in maternity leave return to work within 8 
weeks; as many as 76.1 per cent of mothers in firms with over 5 employees returned to
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work within 8 weeks (Table 8-3-3).4 A sizable minority of working women return to 
work before their 8 week entitlement is used.
Table 8-3-3: The Percentage of Women Who Took Post-natal Leave, in 1998
Size o f  Enterprise Within 8 weeks Over 8 weeks
(%) (%)
Over 5 employees 76.1 16.6
Over 30 employees 87.5 12.0
Note: Ministry o f  Labour (1999a), appendix 69. Originally from Ministry o f  Labour (1998).
Those concerned about a lack of finance during lengthy time off work for childcare are 
less likely to take up parental leave. It is reported, moreover, that firms that pay the full 
cost of parental leave customarily pressurise leavers to retire after the leave ends (Toyo 
Keizai Shinpou Sha 1996a: 49-50). If mothers take full parental leave in the private 
sector, it is not only costly for the employer but also costly for the mothers. This is partly
1______________________   1    •  J  _ „  ^ 1 -  -  a  a 1 .  .  x l ___________   1 __________  _ * *
rilling to re-employ what they regard as ‘deskilled’ 
If the leave is not paid, parents are less likely to access 
lpou Sha 1996a: 49-50).
the only reason why women do not take up their full 
'ental leave. In 1998, in firms with over 5 employees,
! employees left the job because of difficulties with the 
child. This trend is stronger in larger firms, where 
►aid a part of salary; in the same year, 19 per cent of
period of absence and are unv 
workers in the same level of job. 
parental leave (Toyo Keizai Shir 
However, this may not 
entitlement to maternity and pai
15.3 per cent of pregnant female 
pregnancy or preparing for the 
workers are more likely to be f
pregnant female employees in firms with over 30 employees left a job for the same 
reason (Ministry of Labour 1999a: appendix 68; Ministry of Labour 1998).
As parental leave is particularly difficult to access, there is a wide gender 
disparity in time off for childcare, for maternity leave applies to mothers alone, not 
fathers. But take up rates for parental leave also indicate a significant gender bias. In 
Japan, three per cent of working parents were eligible for parental leave in 1996, and 
amongst the three per cent of working mothers, 44.5 per cent took time off leave for 
childcare.5 Fathers, on the other hand, did not take up parental leave; only 0.16 per cent 
of fathers took up parental leave (Ministry of Health and Welfare 1998: 201). Mothers 
thus accounted for 99.2 per cent of parental leave, while fathers represented only 0.8 per 
cent.
This suggests that, in Japan, the lack of payment and other elements in large 
firms discourages parents, particularly fathers, from taking up leave. As workers in large 
keiretsu firms are more likely to have access to parental leave than in small/medium 
firms, the status quo has a significant impact here. Chapters Five to Seven show that 
large keiretsu firms remain firmly within the status quo (male selfless devotion to the 
firm for lifetime employment on the basis of gender division of work between the 
husband and wife). This chapter further examines keiretsu employees’ perception of the 
gender division of work at home via an analysis of time off work for childcare.
5 Working mothers in 1993 took up made more use of parental leave than working mothers in 1996; take 
up rate in 1993 for mothers was 48.1 per cent while it was 44.5 per cent in 1996. This suggests that 
working women may not be able to take up the leave for anticipating losing a job in the downturn of 
economy.
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4 Analysis of Time off Work for Childcare
As maternity and parental leave are in greater use in large-sized firms, and smaller firms 
are not obliged to reveal their business information, this chapter uses a sample of large­
sized firms. The total number of firms in the sample is 616 of which 394 conformed to 
the average monthly pay for men and women in the international level markets in 
the1994-95 fiscal year.6 The analysis used a sample of firms in which shares are traded 
in the financial markets of Tokyo and Osaka. The data are obtained from the annual 
reports of Tokyo Keizai Shipo Sha (1996a, 1996b, 1999).
The most common features are that the firms have over 500 employees and 
started in business with an initial capital of over half a billion yen; 394 out of the 616 firms 
have this feature. The Ministry of Finance orders these firms to report the average monthly 
income of men and women in their official security reports each year; amongst the sample 
of 616 firms, 394 have an average monthly income for men and women of the firm. The 
income data were collected from the security reports of the firms in 1994-95.7 In the 
sample of 616 firms, there are 9 large categories of industry.8
Maternity Leave
Women are more likely to have access to pre-natal leave today than before but whether 
they can take maternity leave depends on the type of firm they work for. In 1994, 31.6 
percent of working mothers left a job due to pregnancy if they were employed in a firm 
with over 30 employees. In 1998, as few as 1.2 per cent of female workers, including
6 See Appendix Chapter Nine (A).
7 The data were collected from the firms’ security reports (1996 version) at the archive of the Ministry of 
Finance.
8 See Appendix Chapter Nine (B).
292
women in self-employment, family owned business and in firms with over 30 employees, 
gave birth. Nineteen per cent of the pregnant women in firms with more than 30 
employees left their job for pregnancy in 1998 (Ministry of Labour 1997; Ministry of 
Labour 1999a: appendix 68). This change indicates that pregnant women in 1998 than in 
1994 are more likely to stay in employment. From the early 1990s, the Government 
actively promoted policy on childcare as a combined with the reform of the welfare 
policy on elderly. This may encourage young mothers in the late 1990s to stay in paid 
employment after pregnancy as social norms on mothering changed by social 
environments (Roberts 2002). However, this also suggests that although women are 
allowed to take maternity leave and increased their take up rate, one out of five pregnant 
female workers still leave a job for pregnancy.
I hypothesise that the type of firm a women works for is decisive in whether she 
takes maternity leave or leaves her job. In order to find firms where women are more 
likely to enjoy maternity leave, I selected firms where 3 per cent of women used 
maternity leave in 1995; 3 per cent is approximately three times the average use of 
maternity leave in working women, 1.2 per cent in 1998.1 selected firms where as many 
as 5 per cent of women were on maternity leave to further analyse the firmly type of 
industry of the firms.
The findings show that the type of industry affects the use of maternity leave. It 
was found that the 44 firms where over three per cent of women take maternity leave 
were predominantly manufacturing firms; 26 manufacturing firms, 9 wholesaling and 
retailing firms, and 6 finance and insurance firms. The manufacturing firms mainly 
produce machines and chemical products (Table 8-4-1).
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Table 8-4-1: Women's Length of Time in Employment and More than 3 Percent Use of Maternity Leave,
in 1995
Name Length of time 
in employment (199SXyears)
Rate of Use of M aternity Leave
(time off leave taker/all women)
Type of Industry Industry detail
Kasumi 6.3 8.86% Retails
Ryukyu Ginko 11.5 8.33% Finance
Nippon Kemikon 10.3 7.64% Manufacturing Electronics
Tokiko 12.0 7.55% Manufacturing Transport Machine
Shinko denkikogyo 10.4 7.50% Manufactuing Electronics
Moss Foods Service 4.9 7.33% Whole Sale
Shimazu seisakusho 14.7 7.19% Manufacturing Precision Machine
Heiwado 7.4 6.08% Retails
Kemifa 8.0 5.81% Manufacturing Pharmaceutical
Kaou 8.7 5.41% Manufactuing Chemical
Nakabayashi 9.6 5.23% Manufacturing Other Manufacuring
Ushio denki 7.0 5.17% Manufacturing Electronics
Taiyo uden 9.4 5.07% Whole Sale Electronics
Nippon type writer 8.2 5.00% Manufacturing Machine
Kato Spring Seisakusho 6.7 4.93% Manufactuing Metal Product
Nisshin denki 9.1 4.87% Manufacturing Electronics
Aomori Ginko 13.6 4.85% Finance
Koito seisakusho 10.7 4.85% Manufacturing Electronics
NOK 8.4 4.23% Manufactuing Transport Machine
Yaoko 5.2 4.13% Retails
Aines 5.9 4.15% Services
Fukushima Ginko 6.6 4.07% Finance
Yuraku Tochi 10.3 4.04% Real Estate
Nikon 13.0 4.00% Manufacturing Precision Machine
Nihon CMK 4.7 3.88% Manufactuing Electronics
Reon jidoki 6.5 3.75% Manufactuing Machine
Ito Yokado 5.2 3.73% Retails
Dai iChi Seiyaku 9.0 3.66% Manufactuing Pharmaceutical
Mitsuba denki seisakusho 9.9 3.65% Manufactuing Transport Machine
Nittsukou 5.0 3.63% Manufacturing Electronics
SMK 10.1 3.50% Manufacturing Electronics
Fuji Soft 3.1 3.47% Services
Tokimec 12.1 3.44% Manufactuing Precision Machine
Hokuriku Ginko 11.3 3.40% Finance
Teisan 8.5 3.36% Manufactuing Chemical
Zyoyo Ginko 8.7 3.29% Finance
Nanto Ginko 7.7 3.28% Finance
Komatsu 11.9 3.27% Manufactuing Machine
Fujirebio 7.5 32.47% Manufacturing Pharmaceutical
Yokokawa denki 11.3 3.25% Manufactuing Electronics
Senshukai 4.4 3.23% Retails
Nippon Denki Garasu 8.5 3.08% Manufactuing Glass, China
Daiko Denshi Tsushin 5.9 3.05% Whole Sale
KDD 16.7 3.05% Communication Media, Communication
unit: length of time in employment = years
Note: Figures indicate number of firms. Created by the author.
Data Source: The annual report of Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha (1996a, 1996b) 
regarding large-size, over 1000 employee firms, on the Tokyo and Osaka markets.
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However, within this, the wholesale and retail firms tend to be more generous 
towards working mothers than industry and service-related firms, as indicates Table 
8-4-2. In all, 14 firms have over 5 per cent of women taking maternity leave (Table 
8-4-2). Four out of these are in the wholesale and retail industry: they are Kasumi, Moss 
Food Service, Heiwado and Taiyo Uden. The products of the other 10 firms are all 
machines; 4 precision machine firms, 4 electronics firms, 1 firm that produces machines 
for transportation and one firm producing machines for manufacturing.
Table 8-4-2: Firms with more than 5 Per cent Use of Maternity Leave, in 1995
Name Industry Industry details Rate of Use of Maternity Leave
Kasumi Retailing 8.9%
Ryukyu Ginko Finance 8.3%
Nippon Kemikon Manufacturing Electronics 7.6%
Tokiko Manufacturing Transport Machine 7.6%
Shinko denkikogyo Manufacturing Electronics 7.5%
Moss Foods Service Wholesaling 7.3%
Shimazu seisakusho Manufacturing Precision Machine 7.2%
Heiwado Retailing 6.1%
Kemifa Manufacturing Pharmaceutical 5.8%
Kaou Manufacturing Chemical 5.4%
Nakabayashi Manufacturing Other Manufacturing 5.2%
Ushio denki Manufacturing Electronics 5.2%
Taiyo uden Wholesaling Electronics 5.1%
Nippon type writer Manufacturing Machine 5.0%
Note: Figures calculated and table created by the author.
Data Source: The annual report of Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha (1996a, 1996b) regarding large-size, over 1000 
employee firms, on the Tokyo and Osaka markets.
Women working in machine and chemical manufacturing, and those working in 
wholesale and retail, are more likely to take maternity leave than in other type of firms. 
This seems to be partly that in these sectors, working mothers tend to work in jobs
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relating to customer services, marketing or Research and Development (R&D) where 
employers value their experience and educational qualifications. There may also be 
pressure from trade unions in individual manufacturing firms. Finally, firms that want 
their full-time women workers to continue work in employment may provide maternity 
leave where it would cost them more to train new workers than to provide paid leave.
These conditions apply to firms whose production processes are complex, such 
as the high tech manufacturing companies. The type of firm also matters in the use of 
maternity leave and duration of women’s employment. Firms tend to be friendly towards 
women working full-time if their production procedures are complex, such as precision 
machines and electronics.
Parental Leave
The most striking point to emerge from the data is that compared with maternity leave, 
parental leave is not fully taken even in firms with over 500 employees that can normally 
afford to provide it to female workers. According to the Basic Survey of Female 
Employment (Ministry of Labour 1996), only 3.3 per cent of women in full-time 
employment took parental leave in 1996: 44.5 per cent of the mothers entitled to take 
parental leave. A significant number of working women are not therefore taking 
advantage of their parental leave rights. In theory, women in large firms tend to take 
parental leave. In reality, whether women actually take up parental leave depends on the 
type of firm; most keiretsu firms favouring male Tokyo university graduates in Table 
6-2-1 provided one-year parental leave, not two- or three-year parental leave in 2002.9
9 The take up rates of parental leave in keiretsu firms in Table 6-3-1 in 2002 are not available as they did 
not disclose the number of female workers there and the number of workers who took a parental leave in 
2002.
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This suggests that it is not only size but also type of firm affects take up rates of parental 
leave.
Parental leave takes various forms in the private sector; pay during the leave 
ranges from no-pay to full pay; the length of the leave is from 1 year to 3 years. In order 
to find the type of firms favouring working mothers, I select firms providing two- or 
three year-parental leave out of 616 firms from 1995 (before the amendment in 1999).
Among the 616 firms, 11 offer 36 months of parental leave while 12 provide 24 
months of parental leave from 1995 to 2002. Actual take up rates are more likely to be 
high in the firms providing 36-month parental leave; in nine out of 11 firms, more than
3.3 per cent (the average take up rate of parental leave in 2002). Although the number of 
female workers in general and female workers taking up parental leave increased in eight 
firms, only two of them have more than 3.3 per cent take up rates of parental leave 
(Table 8-4-3).
When the firms in Table 8-4-3 are sorted by take up rates of parental leave, we 
find the following. If women work in light manufacturing, such as medicine or in 
electronics, and have 24 months or longer parental leave, then the firms have a 
female-friendly corporate culture (see Table 8-4-3). In contrast, even if there is parental 
leave of 24 months or longer, women are less likely to access parental leave in finance 
and insurance and service sectors. These firms are in keiretsu. In other words, the 
keiretsu may offer good leave provision, but women are less likely to use it.
Not surprisingly, the average length of time in employment for women in 
finance and insurance is shorter than that of women in manufacturing and retail (Table 
8-4-3). The average woman in firms offering 36-month parental leave is likely to stay in 
employment for a longer length of time than in firms offering 24-month parental leave.
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Table 8-4-3: The Firms Providing 36- or 24-Month Parental Leave from 1995 to 2002
N am e A verage  len g th  o f  tim e 
in  em p lo y m en t (2002)
A v e rag e  ag e  
o f  w om en  (2002)
L en g th  o f  tim e  | In d u s try  
o f  P a re n ta l  L eaves (m on ths)
In d u s try  deta ils no . o f  w om en 
in  p a re n ta l  leave (2002)
io. o f  fem ale em ployees (2002 rom en in  p a re n tla  leave/fem ale em ployee
Fujjiko 9.7 36.4 36 M anufacturing Food 3 205 1.5%
Fujisawayaku 15.6 (1999) 3 5 .4 (1 9 9 9 ) 36 M anufacturing Pharm aceutical 51 1114 4.6%
Nihon m usen 12.8 35.6 36 M anufacturing Electronics 20 450 4.4%
SM K 14.3 34.9 36 M anufacturing Electronics 13 301 4.3%
M atsuya 16.3 36.9 36 Retails 11 388 2.8%
Isetan 16.3 36.4 36 Retails 135 2806 4.8%
Hanshin H aykkaten 11 .2 (1999) 3 1 .9 (1 9 9 9 ) 36 Retails n .a 728 (1999) n.a.
Hankyu H yakkaten 11.2 30.7 36 Retails 120 2105 5.7%
C redy Sezon 8.9 31.5 36 W hole Sale 61 1016 6.0%
Izumi 5.1 26.0 36 Retails 55 1028 5.4%
M itsubishi Shintaku G inko 13.4(1995) 37.9 36 Finance n .a 2631
A sahidenka 8.7 30.0 24 M anufacturing Chemical 6 88 6.8%
Fuji denlo 16.1 37.2 24 M anufacturing Electronics n.a 1 5 13(1999)
M eidensha 14.0 33.5 24 M anufacturing Electronics 26 429 6.1%
Okidenki kougyo 13.0 34.5 24 M anufacturing Electronics n.a n.a
R icho 11.7 32.4 24 M anufacturing Precision M achine 82 n.a
Yuni Charm 6 .6 (1 9 9 9 ) 30.8 (1999) 24 M anufacturing Chemical 9 279 3.2%
D aim aru 16.8 31.8 24 Retails 57 3751 1.5%
D aiw a Shoken 7.8 30.1 24 Finance 55 2726 2.0%
N ikko Shoken 7 .7 (1 9 9 9 ) 31.1 (1999) 24 Finance 61 3297 1.9%
N om ura Shoken 8.4 (1999) 29  (1999) 24 Finance n.a 3681
Y am ato Unyu 3 (1 9 9 5 ) 28 .7  (1995) 24 Transportation Rail, Sea Transportation 67 13399 0.5%
Fuji Soft ABC 3.1 28.2 24 Services 24 751 3.2%
N ote: the num ber o f  female em ployees fo r Fujisaw ayaku, Yuni Charm, N ikko Shoken, N om urashoken w as in 1999 and fo r Y am ato Unyu w as in 1995. 
F igure in (  )  is year.
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The evidence above shows that parental leave works only in limited cases; it 
works for manufacturing and retail, but not for the finance and insurance sectors. The 
report by Toyo Keizai Shinpou Sha shows that some employers they interviewed in 1995 
did not expect women to continue working after marriage and child birth. At the same 
time, these employers had corporate regulations that guaranteed working parents access 
to time off leave for childcare in order to attract female students for a female-only career 
path (Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha 1996b).
5 Factors Limiting Time off Work for Childcare
5.1 Preference Falsification as Token of Selfless Devotion to the Firm
The above indicates that working women do not take time off work for childcare, 
particularly for parental leave, partly because of financial difficulties. This, however, 
does not fully explain why women with an entitlement to maternity leave return to work 
before the full length of the leave ends and why women in the keiretsu banks and 
insurance companies are unlikely to take up parental leave while women in 
manufacturing and retail, where payment during leave is lower, are likely to take it up.
We already know that in keiretsu financial and insurance companies, employers 
apply a two track career path for women with higher educational qualifications. In these 
firms, married women are pressurised to leave even though employers provide lengthy 
parental leave with relatively generous payments. This suggests, as noted in Chapter 
Seven, that keiretsu, in particular, keiretsu financial and insurance companies, have 
corporate customs that pressurise women to leave after marriage or pregnancy. I noted 
earlier that employers and senior colleagues in keiretsu value workers who practice
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preference falsification regarding overwork and Tanshin-funin. They also value workers 
who practice preference falsification regarding maternity and parental leave because 
they consider that workers are prioritising time for the firm over time for the family 
when they fail take up the leave.
The status quo in keiretsu negatively affects the take up rates of time off for 
childcare as follows. Employers in keiretsu value male employees who accept overwork 
and Tanshin-funin, because they consider these men are selflessly devoting themselves 
to the employer, even at the expense of their health and family life. In contrast, they 
believe that women are likely to reject overwork and Tanshin-funin because they lack 
this selfless devotion. Along the same lines, employers and male peers view parents who 
take maternity and parental leave as working in their own rather than the corporate 
interest. Thus, parents taking up time off for childcare are viewed as violating the status 
quo. Fathers, in particular, concerned about financial loss due to their role as the main 
breadwinner, are unlikely to claim parental leave. Because Tanshin-funin tends to be a 
custom in keiretsu, this trend is stronger in keiretsu than in small/medium firms.
The status quo affects mothers in two track career paths in different ways. 
Working mothers in elite career paths are expected to accept overwork and 
Tanshin-funin and to give up taking care of their own children unless they have 
marketable specialised skills. In contrast, working mothers in assistant career paths in 
keiretsu are expected to leave a job for pregnancy, to conform to the role of wife and 
mother who selflessly supports the family. Employers do not require these female 
workers to accept overwork and Tanshin-funin. If women in assistant career paths, 
however, take maternity and parental leave in order to keep their jobs after a pregnancy, 
employers and senior colleagues view them as violating the status quo. These women
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lack marketable specialised skills -  the only thing that could exempt them from 
following the status quo.
5.2 Preference Falsification regarding Parental Leave
I consider now whether workers conform to dominant preferences within the status quo 
(i.e. practice preference falsification) because they are concerned about their reputation 
loss in the eyes of their employers and senior male colleagues. The previous chapter 
analysed how senior male colleagues can pressurise junior workers to conform to their 
own preferences regarding Tanshin-funin by preference falsification. This section 
explores whose preferences dominate regarding parental leave, and whether parents 
practice preference falsification regarding parental leave.
Not only mothers but also fathers enjoyed taking care of their own children. In 
2001, the National Personnel Authority carried out a survey regarding male workers 
experienced parental leave in the public sector; 78.6 per cent of the leavers felt intrinsic 
enjoyment in caring for children; 66.7 per cent took leave out of a sense of responsibility 
as parent; 71.4 per cent preferred to share care services at home; 50 per cent stated that 
they would like to recommend taking parental leave to male colleagues (Nikkei Hourly 
New 2002c 28 August 22:00 PM).
Parents particularly favour the short work hour option. For example, 56.2 per 
cent of working mothers said they felt the need for flexible working hours for childcare 
in 1992 (Hashimoto, 1996: 86; Women and Youth Association 1994). In theory, flexible 
working hours are available in 41.2 per cent of all firms, but most employees cannot take 
up this provision. It is worth noticing that even fathers regard flexible work hours as 
important for rearing their own children; approximately 30 per cent of fathers wanted to
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reduce work hours to care for their children but only 6.5 per cent of them could do so 
(Nikkei Hourly News 2003 1 March 01:00 AM). Both parents they enjoy taking care of 
their own children and would like to take up parental leave, but do not do so. The main 
question is why?
Pressure from employers and male peers makes it difficult for parents, 
particularly fathers, to access time off work for children; as a result, parents will not 
access parental leave even though they are legally entitled to it. Evidence indicates that 
employers and colleagues do not welcome people taking up parental leave, and that 
workplace pressure discourages employees from taking time off work for childcare. The 
National Institute of Research Advancement (1992) reports that the corporate culture 
makes it difficult for mothers to take leave for childcare. Indeed, working mothers are 
more likely to give up parental leave due to pressure at the workplace and from workload 
than for financial reasons. The Ministry of Health and Welfare (1998:203) indicates that 
in 1996,48 per cent of working mothers cited pressure at the workplace and the demands 
of the tasks they were engaged in as their main reason for failing to take up parental 
leave (Figure 8-5-1). Mothers feel pressurised by their colleagues both during and after 
parental leave, because their absence means extra work for their colleagues. This is 
because the majority of employers do not hire workers to replace the leavers; only 31.8 
per cent of employers hired workers to replace leavers, in1996 (Ministry of Health and 
Welfare 1998: 202).
302
Figure 8-5-1: The reasons why mothers with less 6-month-old children did not take up 
parental leave, in 1996
E  Pressure at the workplace 
and from workloads
■  Financial reason
□  Desire to return to paid 
employment
□  Others
■  Unknown
Unit: percentage
Source: Minister’s Office o f  Ministry o f  Health and Welfare (1997), Ministry o f  Heath and Welfare 
(1998), p. 203 table 4-50.
Fathers face even greater difficulties in taking time off work for childcare 
because of their concern over their future careers. The significantly low take-up rate 
demonstrates that men cannot and do not leave their jobs (Ministry of Health and
\\/£»1far<=> 1 QQR- 9 0 0 ^  HTV>p> c a m p  ic  tnif> n f  rar>tV>p»re
overwork.
Figure 8-5-2: Employers’ perceptions regarding men’s parental leave, in 1995
(1) Employers who Agree with the statement: *1 feel fine that men take up parental leave’
El I. strongly agree
■  II. agree
□  III. do not know
□  IV. disagree
■  V. strongly disagree
□  VI. No comment
(2) Employers believe how parental leave affects an employee’s future career
Employers were asked if  they agreed with A or B
A: Parental leave is such a short period that it hardly affects the future career o f  employees.
B: Parental leave interrupts such an important part o f  the career that the leaver’s career will be 
negatively affected.
□  I. Strongly Agree with A 
El II. Agree with A
□  III. Agree with B
□  IV. Strongly Agree with B 
■  V. N o comment
Unit: percentage
Source: Nissei Research Institute (1995), Ministry o f  Heath and Welfare (1998), p. 201 table 
4-48.
As Kuran’s analysis of opinion leadership suggests, however, 30 per cent of
keiretsu employers could significantly influence other people’s perceptions. Jobs outside 
keiretsu are not as stable as in keiretsu and are unlikely to pay such high wages. Men in 
keiretsu are already privileged by their financial positions, and are less likely to 
challenge customary work practices such as Tanshin-funin. As long as job changes are 
relatively rare for men in keiretsu and the labour market has largely downward mobility, 
people already hired in large keiretsu firms dare not risk losing their jobs. The same 
holds for men in small/medium sized firms, who are afraid to move down to even 
smaller firms where their salaries will be still lower. Employers in small/medium size 
firms may be less concerned by fathers taking parental leave but they are less likely to 
finance it. Furthermore, when employees do not know employers’ perceptions regarding 
time off work for childcare, it is safer for them to conform to the standard work pattern 
common in keiretsu.
The pressure is even stronger when a father takes parental leave, and his 
employer does not hire a substitute worker; his absence then increases the workload of 
his peers. As noted in Chapter Five, Japanese firms foster and maintain the collective 
identity of the corporation. Workers feel uneasy when they prioritise their personal and 
family needs, and particularly so when their peers make up the workload of those who 
take leave.
It is therefore not only fear of future loss of status, but also altruism and a sense 
of responsibility that makes working fathers reluctant to take leave for childcare. Male 
workers develop ties with their peers as they spend a significant amount of time together 
in socialisation; in line with Folbre’s (2001b: 38-41) argument that people come to feel 
attached to those whom they take care of, male workers will form strong ties with 
managers and work peers through this process. This is reinforced by the values and
norms in the workplace, which make the wife solely responsible for child rearing. Male
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workers taking parental leave are thus considered ‘irresponsible’, since they do not 
devote themselves selflessly to the firm and have little consideration for peer workers 
who have to take up their workload.
6 Conclusion
This chapter argues that even though all parents are entitled to time off work for 
childcare, very few fathers, particularly, those in keiretsu, take a leave for childcare, and 
that most Japanese women are pressurised to choose either children or paid employment, 
as working parents have difficulties accessing time off work for childcare within the 
status quo.
Without time off work for childcare, working parents face difficulties. As the 
status quo also encourages family members to provide childcare to young children aged 
below three years old, there are few private and public childcare facilities available for 
working parents. More importantly, within the status quo, parents themselves prefer not 
to use childcare services which are externally provided. This suggests that parental leave 
is the best solution to encourage people to both stay in employment and rear children.
However, although the legislation permits workers parental leave in Japan, only 
a few working mothers actually take up the time off work. Most parents in Japan tend to 
give up their entitlement to parental leave partly because they fear little financial support 
during the leave, partly because they concern a financial loss in the future, and partly 
because they feel pressurised to choose between either paid employment or caring the 
family.
To sum up, parents in small/medium firms may not take the leave because their 
employers are unlikely to pay a part of salaries during the leave. Furthermore, the
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salaries women in general earn are so small than they cannot support the family if their 
husbands take parental leave. Meanwhile, keiretsu tend to adopt two track career paths: 
the elite career path and assistant career paths. But this makes it difficult for many 
fathers and few mothers in the elite career path to use their parental leave entitlement as 
they fear a financial loss in the future.
Parents in elite career paths rarely take any time off for family reasons. This 
relates to an important element in the status quo regarding men’s selfless devotion to the 
employer. As argued in Chapter Seven, employers in keiretsu reward workers who 
practice preference falsification regarding overwork and Tanshin-funin, taking this 
preference falsification as a sign of selfless devotion to the employer. In the same way, 
employers are unlikely to reward workers who leave a job for health or family reasons.
Managers and senior workers regard highly those who risk their own health and 
the family life for the firm. The opposite applies to those who take up parental leave; 
prioritising the family over firm and fellow workers lessens one’s reputation, and may 
ultimately affect one’s chances of promotion. If parents in the elite paths concern a loss 
of financial security, they are likely to give up their chances of parental leave, and may 
practice preference falsification in order to show that they are conforming to the status 
quo.
As the status quo strongly encourages women to stay at home to take care of 
their own children, working mothers in elite career paths have the most difficulty taking 
leave. Within the status quo, it is ideal for mothers to look after their own children, 
maintaining a strict gender division of work, which give their husbands more time to 
socialise with co-workers and managers and to work extra hours. The cases of industrial 
tribunals in Chapter Seven indicate that working mothers who took time off but then 
returned to work faced particular difficulties in pursuing their careers because they
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violated gender roles in the status quo. The empirical evidence in this chapter shows that 
mothers in elite career paths can ease pressure in the work place and take maternity and 
parental leave only if they possess marketable skills few other workers possess.
Mothers in assistant career paths may attempt to take parental leave, but tend to 
find it difficult to stay in employment after a pregnancy as managers and co-workers 
expect them to leave the job and follow the status quo. These women have fewer 
marketable skills than women in elite career paths in manufacturing and the retail sector. 
Accordingly, most women in both career paths are likely to feel pressurised to choose 
either paid employment or caring for the family.
The status quo not only affects people within keiretsu but also people outside 
keiretsu. As keiretsu act as the opinion leader, a minority of keiretsu employers can 
influence people outside keiretsu. The resulting values and norms generally preclude 
working mothers from staying in their jobs while their husbands take parental leave and 
instead pressure mothers into taking on the child rearing role. The main problem of 
parental leave is that as long as the status quo is sustained, it tends to allow only a few 
mothers with marketable skills in manufacturing and the retail sector to take parental 
leave; most fathers continue practicing preference falsification regarding parental leave; 
and most mothers continue choosing either paid employment or caring for the family.
After the recessions in the 1990s, the status quo weakened a little as keiretsu 
selected fewer men and women for the traditional male career paths while other men 
were chosen for traditionally women’s assistant career paths; the Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare reports that 55. 9 per cent of employers selected fewer men and 
women for the elite career paths in 2002 (Nikkei Hourly New News 2002a 25 June 21:00 
PM). However, this change only emerged recently; Retherford, Ogawa and Matsukura 
(2001) argue that there is a time lag between economic changes and a shift in prevailing
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values and between changes in values and changes in people’s behaviours. More 
importantly, the change may further encourage the selection only of parents with 
marketable skills as appropriate parents to take up parental leave. Thus, it is important to 
view the low take up rates of parental leave in relation to the more fundamental problem 
of the status quo.
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Chapter Nine 
Fertility Decline in Japan
1 Introduction
The final part of the jigsaw puzzle is the declining fertility rates in Japan. I turn now to 
this remaining question about how my analysis of prevailing gender norms helps 
explain the phenomenon of rapidly declining fertility rates.
Human capital theorists expect married women to choose paid employment 
over having children as the costs of raising children increase. To some extent, this 
explanation applies to the Japanese case, in that parents concerned about the 
significantly high costs of child rearing may have a smaller number of children than 
they desire (Retherford, Ogawa, and Sakamoto 1999). However, human capital theory 
provides little explanation for the limited increase in the labour force participation 
rates of married women. It also failed to explain why married women with higher 
educational qualifications are less likely to participate in the labour force than married 
women with lower educational qualifications.
As has been demonstrated, the status quo in Japan stresses maleness and 
having a supportive wife who specialises in unpaid childcare services as an important 
component of membership of social ‘elite’. Good mothers specialise in unpaid 
childcare services while good workers selflessly devote their time to the employer, 
including socialisation with managers and co-workers. Working mothers, however, 
fully follow neither of these patterns. This means that when they choose to be working 
mothers, they have to challenge the deeply entrenched social values and norms of the 
status quo.
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In order to secure a job or married life, most women and men will tend to 
avoid risks when they perceive their probability of winning as small. As long as most 
people regard the status quo as unchangeable, challengers can expect to face heavy 
pressure from others; this is particularly so in keiretsu, as noted in Chapter Seven. 
They will often make choices amongst available options instead of challenging the 
existing norms. In societies where people are encouraged to act as individuals, the 
pressure from others is less. However, in societies such as Japan, where group 
orientation is strong in both the workplace and the home, challengers risk significant 
damage to their reputations as workers and mothers if they do not conform. People in 
group-orientated societies are more concerned about the damage to reputation than 
those in more individualistic societies. As a result, they are less likely to expect to win 
against the existing perceptions when they challenge social norms regarding workers 
and mothers.
Thus, if reputation-sensitive women in Japan prefer to avoid the pressure 
associated with being a ‘good’ mother, there are only two options: first, to follow the 
values of being a ‘good’ worker but have no children; second, to follow the pattern of 
being a ‘good’ mother and not participate in paid employment. In both cases, these 
women dent their reputation less than working mothers. As the status quo persists, 
mothers are more likely to follow the pattern of being a ‘good’ mother. By contrast, 
childless women (both single and married) are likely to follow the pattern of a being a 
‘good’ worker and delay having children. Because working single women tend to 
delay having children, fertility rates continue to decline without being accompanied 
by an increase in married women’s labour force participation.
To explore my hypothesis, I begin with a general model, differentiating four 
responses available to women as they make their choices between paid work, with and
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without children, and then test the validity of these models against survey evidence 
from Japan.
2 Explaining Fertility Decline and Women’s Work Patterns by Qualification
2.1 General Model of Women’s Preference
Assuming that people in Japan believe the status quo to be given and constant over 
time, women can react to the pressures of child rearing in four ways (Table 9-2-1).
Table 9-2-1: Women's Work Pattern and Motives for Providing Care Services at Home
Gender
Role
Marital
Status
Mothering Other Activities Priority Conflict
over
Mothering^
Group I Mother Married Yes None Mothering No Conflict
Group II Mother Married Bargains
with
Husband
Paid Employment 
or Family Worker
Other Activities 
Than mothering
Conflict 
with 
employers 
and within 
the family
Group I I I Mother Married Yes None Other Activities 
than mothering
Inner
Conflict
Group IV Daughter 
or Wife
Single or 
Married
No Paid Employment 
or Family Worker
Other Activities 
than mothering
No Conflict
Note: Table is the author’s creation.
Group I (mothers preferring child rearing and specialising in it) consists o f wives who 
prefer mothering to other activities and hence experience fewer conflicts both within 
themselves and with their husbands. Group II (working mothers) consists of wives 
who prefer not to specialise in mothering, and as a result have to bargain over ways to 
share the costs of children with others. This is often coupled with conflict and the 
persistent financial risks of divorce. Group III (not preferring child rearing but
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specialising in it) is comprised of wives who do not want to specialise in mothering, 
but cannot avoid it due to a lack of personal resources, and so succumb to mothering 
in order to avoid confronting others; these pay the penalty of internal conflict. Group 
IV (single and married childless working women) is those women who simply stay 
single or give up on having children. This allows them to avoid all conflicts of 
negotiation with others regarding children and enables them to place their personal 
preferences above social ones. However, this stance creates external conflicts due to 
role avoidance.
Most importantly, women in two patterns out of four (Groups II and III) are 
not satisfied with the current care work arrangement but nevertheless take up care 
work at home; they have contradictory needs and desires because of multiple 
self-identities. Married women are forced to make choices regarding paid 
employment and family lifestyle under pressures that single women hardly face.
2.2 Increase of Single Women in Paid Employment
As already noted in Chapter One, the average woman under the age of 40 today has 
fewer children than before the 1970s (see Table 1-5-1). Empirical evidence shows that 
as young childless women and women in age group of 40 and over are likely to have 
fewer children than before, fertility rates decline. Table 9-2-2 indicates the average 
number of children mothers had by age group during 1972-1997. In 1997, the average 
mother had 1.84 children while the average woman, including childless women, had 
1.39 children. The gap between these rates was as great as 0.45. In contrast, in 1972, 
the gap was only 0.2; the average mother had 2.13 children while the average woman 
had 1.93 children. By age group, this trend is strongest for mothers in age group of
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45-49 and 25-29. Women in their late 20s and early 30s today are more likely to stay 
childless than women in the same age groups in the 1970s and mothers in their 40s 
and over today are likely to have fewer children than mothers in the same age group in 
the 1970s. As a result, fertility rates decline.
Table 9-2-2: Number of Children per Average Wife, 1972-1997
Year of Survey
No of 
children the 
average 
wife had
No of children the average wife had by age group
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
1972 1.93 0.64 1.41 1.99 2.18 2.35 2.73
1977 1.89 0.73 1.35 1.99 2.15 2.19 2.33
1982 1.93 0.50 1.28 1.99 2.16 2.21 2.21
1987 1.96 0.73 1.31 1.97 2.14 2.18 2.22
1992 1.90 0.69 1.09 1.76 2.15 2.16 2.18
1997 1.84 0.68 0.95 1.61 2.06 2.18 2.13
Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR) (2001).
Note: Wives in the sample are those of the first marriage and below 50 years old
It is interesting to note that it is young childless women rather than mothers 
in age group 40 and over who seem to be responsible for the decline in fertility rates in 
the 1980s and 1990s. As many as 55.5 per cent of the older mothers in 1997 still had 
two children, and though less likely than before to have more than four children, as 
many as 24 per cent still had three children. This suggests that mothers in age group 
45-49 do not contribute significantly to the falling fertility rates during the 1980s and 
1990s. The key change is the increase in the number of young childless women.
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Table 9-2-3: Mothers in Age Group 45-49 by Number of Children, in 1970,1977-1997
Birth Year Mothers age 
group 45-49
Year of 
Survey Proportion of mothers with no. of children (%) Average 
No of Children0 One Two Three Over Four
1921-1925 1970 6.9 9.2 24.5 29.7 29.6 2.86
1928-1932 1977 3.6 11.0 47.0 29.0 9.4 2.33
1933-1937 1982 3.6 10.8 54.2 25.7 5.7 2.21
1938-1942 1987 3.6 10.3 55.0 25.5 5.5 2.22
1943-1947 1992 3.8 8.9 57.0 23.9 5.0 2.18
1948-1952 1997 3.2 12.1 55.5 24.0 3.5 2.13
Note: same as table 9-2-2. The data between 1970 and 1988 are unavailable.
To return to my general model, it appears that the proportion of women in 
Group IV increased as preferences polarise between Groups I and IV. As already 
demonstrated in Chapter One, the responsibility on children to support elderly parents 
has reduced as a result of the introduction of state pensions in the 1950s; this means 
there is less of a pragmatic necessity to have children in order to guarantee support in 
old age. This may make Group IV option more possible for single working women. At 
the same time, changes in the economy have led to a decline in family-owned 
businesses, reducing the proportion of women who take the Group II option of 
working mothers. Before the 1970s, married women could stay at home and work in 
family-owned businesses (Takenaka 1989) but formal employment in firms has 
replaced informal work in family-owned businesses since the 1970s. The Group II 
option (working mother option) is therefore more difficult for women today than 
before the 1970s.
These changes, however, do not necessarily mean that people now prefer to 
remain single. As Figure 9-2-1 indicates, both single and married women are aware of 
the prejudice against remaining single: as many as 62.4 per cent of single women and 
55 per cent of married women cite the negative customs and perceptions regarding
single people as a key problem in remaining single.
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Figure 9-2-1: The perception on the difficulties of staying single, in 1993
□  Single Women
■  Single Men
■  Married Women
Source: National Institute o f  Research Advancement (1993b), P.93
Perceptions regarding marriage play an important role. It is worth noticing 
that people’s perceptions regarding remaining single vary by gender and marital status. 
Although all agreeing that there are difficulties in staying single, single men, single 
women and married women find different aspects of single life troubling. In terms of
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gender differences, single and married women are more likely than single men to feel 
that social customs and perceptions of single people pressure into marriage. Women 
are more likely to be concerned about their lower pay than single men, while single 
men are less likely to find that staying single problematic. In terms of the differences 
in marital status, married women are less likely to feel that the lack of legal support for 
single people is a problem while single men and women are likely to feel it 
problematic. Single men and women are more concerned about the lower social status 
of single men than married women are. Interestingly, married women are most likely 
to feel that loneliness is a problem. Single men also express this concern, while single 
women are the least likely to be concerned about loneliness associated with remaining 
single. The findings suggest that single men and single and married women may seek 
different fulfilments through marriage, and are motivated differently by gender.
Another question arises: why do a larger proportion of women today choose 
the Group IV option even though clearly concerned about the lack of financial and 
legal security and the negative perceptions of single people?
The answer lies in the shifts in gender roles from daughter to wife and mother 
in set out in Introduction. While the self-identity of daughter and worker can readily 
co-exist, the self-identity of mother and worker rarely can. Despite the perceived 
difficulties of remaining single, many single women nonetheless delay starting a 
family. In the survey in which single men and women aged 25-34 chose three reasons 
why they remained single, the top two reasons why women in this age group stay 
single is, first, they have not met the right marriage partner and second, they would 
like to enjoy the freedom of being single. In 1997,49 per cent of women claimed that 
they stayed single as they had not meet the right person, 38 per cent responded that 
they would not like to lose the freedom they enjoy as a single, and 35 per cent
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responded that they did not need to get married. In 2002, despite the decreases by a 
few percentages in these reasons, they were still the top three reasons why young 
women remain single (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 
2003: 12). The National Institute Population and Social Security Research (2002: 8) 
reported that young single women, particularly those in age group 25-29 have high 
incentives to stay single as they benefit more in staying single. As young single 
women are likely to be in employment, they are financially more secure than women 
before the 1970s. The meaning of marriage for them differs from that of single women 
in the 1950s, who expected financial security through marriage and having children 
(Ihara 2000). The change in value of marriage enables young single women today to 
have the role of both an unmarried daughter and a worker.
Although the value changes after the 1970s allowed single women to act as 
both an unmarried daughter and a worker, it did not enable mothers to act as both 
mother and worker. Childless women in Group IV do not have to choose either the 
worker or mother role but mothers have to do so. Mothers today are likely to 
experience pressure to choose the roles of wife and mother over the role of mother. 
The earlier chapters demonstrated that the status quo would not allow workers to 
spend time for the family. If they do so, they are excluded from financially secure jobs. 
As Japanese families prefer parenting as the type of childcare, it is mothers who are 
likely to spend time with the family. Within the status quo, if married couples follow 
gender norms, they are most likely to be financially successful. However, if not, they 
may have financial difficulties and conflicts within the couple that may put their 
marriage at risk, or cause them to experience stress from not expressing their 
preferences. Mothers in Group I are unlikely to experience these difficulties. In 
contrast, mothers in Group II and III are more likely to experience them. For women
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in Group II, this problem is revealed to others while for women in Group III, others 
may not know that these women have conflicts in self-identity.
This suggests that women are encouraged to delay marriage and remain 
childless not only because they would prefer to have time available for their own use 
but also to avoid the stress associated with choosing either employment or caring for a 
family. In order to explain mothers’ conflicting preferences, the following section 
examines how mothers perceive employment and taking care of their own children.
3 Choosing to be a Worker or Mother
3.1 Conforming to Social Norms of Mothering
In order not to lose their reputation as mother, mothers in Japan are likely to conform 
to prevailing social norms. One of these is to treat the mothering of children as if  it is 
a divine duty for biological mothers. The Ministry of Health and Welfare (1998: 84) 
reports that this perception of mothering has been stressed in publications such as 
‘Bogenbyo’ (illnesses caused by mothers’ lack of childcare) by Hisatoku (1979). 
Drawing on studies in Western OECD countries, Hisatoku argues that an increase in 
the number of cases of childhood asthma from 1955 has been influenced by mothers’ 
lack of attention to children. The Ministry of Health and Welfare (1998: 84) notes that 
the importance of mothering for children under the age of three has been stressed for 
four decades, and that approximately 90 per cent of married women in Japan agreed 
with this view in 1992.
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Table 9-3-1: The Opinion of Married Women in 1992, regarding the Statement "it is
preferable for young children that mothers stay at home to care for children"
Opinion Percentage Numbers of respondents
A: strongly agree with the statement 47.9 4,232
B: agree with the statement 40.2 3,555
C: disagree with the statement 7.6 671
D: strongly disagree with the statement 2.5 217
E: Other 1.9 169
Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR) (1992), Ministry of 
Health and Welfare (1998), p.85.
Note: samples are married women nationwide.
The Ministry stresses, however, that there is little rationale for regarding sole 
care by mothers for children under three years old as the most important factor in a 
child’s development. In various studies conducted in Western OECD countries, the 
importance of fathers’ active involvement in childcare is also stressed (Ministry of 
Health and Welfare 1998: 84-5). It is notable that in 1997, 33. 4 per cent of selected 
intellectuals in Japan disagreed with the view that women should stay at home with 
children under the age of three.
Table 9-3-2: The Opinion of Intellectuals in 1997, regarding the Statement "mothers 
should specialise in child rearing until children become three years old"
Opinion Percentage Numbers of respondents
A: strongly agree with the statement 21.0 129
B: agree with the statement 36.3 224
C: disagree with the statement 15.8 97
D: strongly disagree with the statement 26.5 164
E: Others 0.4 3
Source: Institute of Welfare Science (1997), Ministry of Health and Welfare (1998), p.85. 
Note: samples are intellectuals familiar with this issue.
There is a large disparity between married women in general and
intellectuals regarding preferences of parenting. This suggests that a difference in
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knowledge may affect individual preferences regarding parenting; those more 
familiar with the current trend of parenting in Western societies are less likely to see it 
as the sole responsibility of mothers.
Despite this limited shift in perception, people continue to value highly 
women matching the image of the ‘good’ wife and ‘wise mother’. The excessive stress 
on the importance of mothering is socially created, but it is perceived as a ‘natural’ 
work arrangement at home. This pressurises mothers to specialise in childcare at the 
expense of their paid employment. Moreover, the decline in family-owned businesses 
has weakened the bargaining power of mothers who stay in the household specialising 
care services.
Furthermore, the perception o f ‘good’ mother is more likely to affect mothers 
with higher educational qualifications than those with lower educational 
qualifications. The higher education the parents have, the keener mothers become to 
educate children at the early age at home (Brinton 1993; Ben-Ari 2002).1 For these 
women, exposure to current trends of parenting in Western societies (through their 
exposure to education) seems to have an opposite effect. Brinton shows that parents 
with higher education tend to put more importance on children’s education than those 
with lower education. Ben-Ari argues that Japanese parents are pressurised to follow 
standardised course of child development before children reach the school age of six 
years old.
1 These mothers are called “Kyoiku Mama (Education (keen) Mother).
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3.2 Conflicting Self-identities in Choosing Mothering
Empirical evidence confirms the argument that mothers may choose child rearing as a 
passive option. The results of a 1997 survey show that most full-time 
housewives/mothers experienced lack of confidence and stress in child rearing.
Table 9-3-3: Full-time Housewives/Working Mothers' Concern in 1997 regarding Child 
Rearing Question:
Do you agree with the following statements A-C regarding rearing children?
Unit: (%)
Strongly
agree Agree Disagree
Strongly
disagree No answer
A: I hardly feel confident in child 
rearing
Working mothers 9.7 40.3 38.9 9.7 1.4
Full-time housewives/mothers 15.7 54.3 22.8 6.3 0.8
B: I feel stressed because I cannot 
do what I want to do
Working mothers 15.3 54.2 23.6 5.6 1.4
Full-time housewives/mothers 19.7 54.3 22 3.1 0.8
C: I feel stressed without clear 
reasons
Working mothers 19.4 65.3 12.5 1.4 1.4
Full-time housewives/mothers 31.5 47.2 18.1 2.4 0.8
Source: Economic Planning Agency (1995). Ministry of Health and Welfare (1998:85).
That working mothers feel stressed in relation to child rearing is hardly
surprising. What is striking is the very high proportion of fulltime
housewives/mothers who also report stress, either because they are not doing what
they want, or for reasons they cannot identify. This suggests a significant level of
conflict between their identities as mothers and their other identities.
As Figure 9-3-1 indicates, the overwhelming majority of mothers with
children aged 6 and 7 agree with the social norm that mother should stay at home with
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children under the age of three. But an equally high proportion now wants an 
additional identity to that o f mother.
Figure 9-3-1: The perception of mothers in 1998 regarding child
Rearing Question: Do you agree with the following statements?
A: I find child rearing important but I want to seek an additional identity.
B: I pressurise myself to be a ‘good’ mother.
C: While I was single, I loved children.
D: I do not identify myself as being motherly.
E: I may not love my children sufficiently
F: Child rearing is suitable for me.
G: It is preferable for children that mothers take care of them until they reach the
age of three.
□  Agree 
■  Disagree
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Source: cited from Ehara (2000), p.31.
Note: samples o f  mothers with children aged 6 and 7
Mothers feel helpless when they experience a multiplicity of self-identities. 
They feel satisfied as individuals when they act upon their private preferences, but as 
mothers, they feel guilty about doing so as their emotions link them to the utility of 
children. Two mothers expressed their feelings on paid employment and childcare 
services in Ehara (2000) as follows.
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‘For years, I wanted to have a baby and cried when I saw someone’s baby. I left my favourite 
teaching job to get treatment for acyesis (sterility), and waited six years for a baby. Once I 
had my baby, I realised that I missed my job. I noticed that I am not good at taking care of 
children as I am childish and not mature enough. I am determined to devote myself to my child 
even though I need to sacrifice my life. But, I am too exhausted. I often forget facts such as 
that the sky is blue, the clouds move, and that I have a shadow when I stand in a sunny place. 
I would like to teach students in class by speaking aloud, chat with students after class, and 
experience enjoyment when students understand what I teach and smile. I do not feel like I am 
being myself unless I do something else apart from caring for my child. Am I selfish?’ 
(Housewife, 31 years old, Petite Tanfan Press 1996: 148).
‘I thought I did not like children much, but I love my second child very much. When I think 
about this being my last child, I want to care for him for at least two years. However, if I leave 
my high-paid job for my children, I may not be able to get as good a job as this one again. When 
I think about my age, I feel I should not leave my job. But, I have nightmares every night, in 
which my youngest son runs after me and cries. I am continuing to work in paid employment 
although 1 feel tom apart and am reminded of my son’s look at me, as if he is asking for help, in 
the dream. When I wake up in the morning, my eyes are filled with tears. I feel so unbearably 
sentimental... that I feel like leaving my job...’ (Administrative clerk in a hospital, on parental 
leave, 27 years old, Petite Tanfan Press 1996: 155).
These cases suggest that mothers suffer from anxiety about losing paid 
employment while rearing children. The former case illustrates that full-time caring 
mothers engage in care services for children even when they feel dissatisfied with 
what they do. The latter case shows that although the mother is devoted to her children,
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she may still choose paid employment over childcare labour at home.
Other evidence also suggests that wives are not necessarily satisfied with the 
present gender division of work at home: in 1993, 26.1 per cent of women said that 
they felt helpless; 29.2 per cent said that they felt forced to accept the situation; 22 per 
cent of them said that they felt dissatisfied; only 22.4 per cent of them felt satisfied 
(Figure 9-3-2). On the one hand, women may not be satisfied with their choice as their 
perceptions during their life course, as Ehara’s cases show; on the other hand, they 
may be making their choices because they fear the difficulties they may face if they 
stay single. As LeDoux (1996) argues, fear can be a motivation for action.
Figure 9-3-2: Wives’ satisfaction regarding gender division of work at home, 
in 1993
Percentage
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 L
□  Percentage
3.3 Supporters of the Status Quo
There remains a question: since some women clearly suffer from multiple and 
conflicting identities associated with the current arrangements for childcare provision, 
why do these arrangements persist? This may be explained by the fact that men and 
women change their preference regarding sharing domestic work as they change their 
marital status (Figure 9-3-3).
Although Figure 9-3-3 (a)-(d) has a large proportion of those who answered 
‘Others’, it nonetheless illustrates some patterns that differ by marital status. Those 
categorised as ‘Others’ may not specify how to share domestic work with a partner in 
five other categories, as they were not certain about it. It was particularly noticeable 
that in cases where elder parents or other kin were the ones to share domestic work, 
parents tended to share domestic work not only with their partner but also other kin. 
The National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR) (1993) 
shows that in 1992, approximately 30 per cent of married couples live with an elderly 
parent or parents and that as many as 80 per cent of them live in neighbourhoods 
where they can access their parents’ homes within 30 minutes. The Ministry of Health 
and Welfare (1998: 104) reports that in 1996, over 80 per cent of adult children in the 
age group 20-34 lived with their parents and accepted daily support for domestic work. 
This suggests that it may be difficult for the respondents in Figure 9-3-3 to specify 
how they share or prefer to share domestic work with their married/cohabiting partner 
as their parents often provide domestic services. Taking this into account, the analysis 
that excludes ‘Others’ can illustrate how married couples share or prefer to share 
domestic work between them, to some extent.
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Figure 9-3-3: Preference regarding dom estic work by marital status, in 1993
(a) Single Men and Women
H Women 
□  Men
(b) Married Men and Women
60 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
50
50 —
40
33.3 32.9
50-50 Supportive Slightly No Support Clear Others
Men Supportive from Men Division of 
Men Labour
□  Women
□  Men
Unit: X axis = Division o f  Domestic Work, Y axis =Percentage 
Source: National Institute o f  Research Advancement (1993b), p.75.
Note: Others include answers such that either o f  partners works when he/she is available or that I am 
not certain how we arrange domestic work.
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Figure 9-3-3 c o n t .: Preference regarding Dom estic Work by Marital Status (Cont.)
(c) Divorced Men and Women
60
50-50 Supportive Slightly No Support Clear Others
Men Supportive from Men Division of 
Men Labour
® Women 
□  Men
(d) Cohabiting Men and Women
45.5 50 50
50-50 Supportive Slightly No Support Clear Others 
Men Supportive from Men Division of 
Men Labour
H Women 
□  Men
Unit: X axis = Division o f  Domestic Work, Y axis =Percentage,
Source: National Institute o f  Research Advancement (1993b), p.75.
Note: Others include answers such that either o f partners works when he/she is available or that I am 
not certain how we arrange domestic work.
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Marital status clearly affects whether a person prefers a traditional strict 
gender division of work or an equal division of work at home. Men and women who 
do not intend to be in the traditional marriage arrangement tend to prefer an equal 
share of domestic work. Divorced men and women, and those cohabiting, tend to 
prefer an equal division of care work in the family. In contrast, single women are more 
likely than their married counterparts to prefer an equal division of work, suggesting 
that married women may form more ‘realistic’ preferences as they progress through 
their married life (National Institute of Research Advancement (NIRA) 1993b). This 
evidence indicates that marital status has a more significant effect on women’s 
preferences than men’s, and is consistent with Moore’s explanation of gender 
difference in perceptions.
Because of the lack of bodily experience as fathers, married men tend to 
identify themselves in the roles of worker and father as the breadwinner. However, 
recent empirical evidence shows that fathers feel attached to children and enjoy 
childcare after they experience time off work for this purpose. As already noted in 
Chapter Eight, in 2001, fathers who took parental leave enjoyed their experience and 
developed a sense of responsibility as parents (Nikkei Hourly New 2002c 28 August 
22: 00 PM).
The problem is that although fathers want to take up time off work for 
childcare, they may not be able to do so. In 1999, 67 per cent of men agreed that it is 
good for families if fathers take time off work for childcare (Prime Minister’s Office 
1999). The Ministry of Internal Affairs (2002) reported that there is a gap between the 
perception and the reality regarding gender division of labour between the husband 
and wife. This was the first time that less than 50 per cent (47 per cent) of people 
preferred a clear gender division of work between the husband and wife. However,
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this change in perception has not been accompanied by changes in actual gender 
division of work because the husband and wife in 2002 maintained the same gender 
division of work as in 1992 (Jiji Tsushin Sha 2002 7 September 18:00 PM). In 
response to this report, the central government attempted to encourage local 
governments and employers of private firms to provide fathers with time off work for 
childcare.
In spite of this effort, time off work for fathers has not prevailed even though 
some employees privately prefer to spend time with the family. Fathers want to spend 
time for their family but cannot take time off for the family (Ministry of Health and 
Welfare 1998: 88; Nihon Hoso Kyokai 1998:40-1). At home, some men want to share 
unpaid care services with the other family members, but cannot do so due to 
limitations of time (Ministry of Health and Welfare 1998: 88-9). As noted in Chapter 
Seven, only one out of five fathers could actually reduce their work hours for 
childcare in 2003 (Nikkei Hourly News 2003 1 March 01:00 AM).
This is largely because fathers cannot confront the ‘good’ worker role and 
because the husband and wife do not negotiate on how to share domestic work, 
including childcare. Kosodate Net Beans (2000) reported that in the Fukuoka area in 
2000, 91.2 per cent of fathers responded that they needed more understanding from 
their employers and colleagues to take time off work for childcare. However, as many 
as 94.2 per cent of these fathers made little effort to discuss how to share domestic 
work with their wives. Only 27.4 per cent of them responded that they should discuss 
the gender division of work with their wives (Nishi Nihon Shinbun 13 August 2001). 
Further survey results confirm that men tend to conform to the status quo after 
becoming fathers. Joho Box (2003) reported that 53.5 per cent of husbands feel 
responsible for financing the costs of children or devoting more time to paid work
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when they know their wives are pregnant.
Accordingly, although fathers increasingly value their role in childcare, they 
continue to follow the ‘good’ worker role given to them by the status quo. They 
cannot change this perception unless they experience childcare by themselves. As 
co-habiting couples tend to share equally the work between men and women, a 
marriage arrangement seems to link to a clear gender division of work in the status 
quo. The above finding confirms my assumption that the gender division of work 
based on a marriage arrangement is a part of the status quo, as noted in Chapter One.
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4 Preference Falsification regarding Mothering and the Decline in Fertility
Mothers are likely to benefit from conforming to social norms, particularly through 
reputation. For this, they may perform preference falsification regarding mothering. 
However, this may make them face multiple and conflicting identities; mothers 
specialising in caring for their own children at the expense of employment suffer from 
conflicting identities.
Mothers tend to win a good reputation by preference falsification regarding 
mothering. Within the status quo, people give a good reputation to wives who take up 
all household responsibilities, particularly childcare, in order to make their husbands 
spend as much time as possible on their careers, including socialising with managers 
and co-workers. Working wives (women in Group II in Table 9-2-1) have two 
contradictory roles: selflessly devoted workers for the employer and selflessly 
devoted wives for the family. As it is impossible fully to fulfil both these roles, they 
are pressurised to choose either paid employment and single status, or having children 
and being a ‘good’ mother.
As working mothers lack the reputation of good workers, mothers have 
further difficulties in maintaining identities as both worker and mother. As noted in 
Chapter Eight, it is difficult for wives to take time off work for childcare in order to 
maintain both the career and the family profile. If they take time off work for childcare, 
they lose their reputation as a loyal worker. If they do not take care of their own 
children, they lose their reputation as a good mother. Thus, within the status quo, it is 
rational for women to choose either to stay childless and in paid employment (Group 
IV option) or to specialise in taking care of their own children (Group I and III 
options), because they are then less likely to lose reputational utility.
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This pressure is strengthened if women are concerned with security in their 
financial matters and married life. The more people regard the status quo as 
unchangeable, the less likely they are to challenge it for fear of reducing financial 
security by losing reputational utility; this means that few women will dare to take the 
Group II option, which may threaten married life.
This persists as perceptions regarding marriage are carried over generations. 
Even the young generation perceives marriage arrangements as necessary for having 
children; as recently as 1997, young people still supported the idea that people should 
get married before having children (Inoue and Ehara 1999: 12-3). On the other hand, 
workers strengthened their perceptions regarding ‘good’ workers as lifetime 
employment and a progressive pay by age accompanied with overwork and 
Tanshin-funin expanded to most of the workers in the keiretsu economy in the 1970s. 
This acts together with the perception of marriage to continue pressuring women to 
choose employment or caring the family from the 1970s.
If people can expect a reward for having a good reputation, it is rational for 
workers and mothers to conform to social norms by preference falsification. As long 
as mothers save their marriages, women may practice preference falsification 
regarding specialising in caring for their own children. The number of women in 
Group III in Table 9-2-1 will increase when women seek financial security via 
marriage rather than their own employment.
While mothers increasingly experience discomfort from preference 
falsification, young women are more able to remain childless and in paid employment. 
Since single women have better job opportunities than mothers, women may continue 
choose to remain single and in employment over caring for the family. These childless 
women are concerned about their financial and social status, but are less likely to
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experience discomfort from preference falsification, at work and at home, than men 
and mothers.
Empirical evidence confirms this. The social values and norms of the status 
quo stress that mothers should identify themselves as unpaid carers for the family, and 
a mother’s sacrifice for the family is considered as a token of affection (Ehara 2000: 
35; Ohinata 1988; 58). This makes ‘selfless’ devotion to children something done out 
of self-interest; the more a mother sacrifices for the family, the more affectionate she 
feels herself to be (Ehara 2000: 35; Folbre 2001b: 34). Ehara argues that by viewing 
‘childcare as a mother’s duty’, and by sacrificing their own needs, women develop a 
feeling that they are mature because they give up self-interest for the collective 
(social) interest. Ehara stresses that when women devote themselves to childcare work, 
this can boost their self-esteem.
However, even after this, full-time wives since the 1970s have suffered 
increasing stress, because they devote themselves to unpaid mothering for little future 
reward (Ehara 2000). This suggests that the status quo may no longer be as secure as 
in the past.
The central part is that while the status quo pressurises men and women to 
conform to social norms, fertility rates will continue dropping as increasing number of 
young women of choosing to remain childless. There is little hope of change to the 
status quo, then to be a working mother is the least rational choice for childless 
working women, because by avoiding this option, they can escape both types of 
preference falsification, at work and at home.
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5 Conclusion and Further Implications
Fertility decline is partly due to parents’ inability to afford the costs of children’s 
education; this is in conformity with human capital theory. However, this does not 
fully explain the fertility decline in Japan. This chapter demonstrates that fertility 
decline is partly due to a malfunctioning in the status quo.
As long as the status quo remains securely in place, many women will 
choose the Group IV option. This is the case at present, as evidenced by the low 
fertility rates. In order to encourage women to choose the Group I, II and III options, 
and particularly the Group II and III options, both men and women need to rethink 
their perceptions regarding mothering. When they do not query the status quo, they 
may not even notice the levels of stress that emerge in recent surveys. And as has been 
clear throughout my argument, the status quo is so strong that even women with 
higher educational qualifications will follow it once they have children. This helps 
explain why fertility rates have declined since the 1980s, when it became more 
possible for single women to choose the Group IV option.
Declining fertility rates and the stagnant labour force participation of married 
women have the same roots in the status quo. It will be difficult to solve the problem 
of declining fertility without in the process addressing the low paid dead end career 
path for women in keiretsu, and the limited employment opportunities for married 
women with higher qualifications. Moreover, people need to pay attention to how 
their husbands work in the firm and provide care in the family. As men and women 
form a dovetailed pair in the status quo, it is necessary to review men’s work and 
family life as well as women’s work and family life.
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Conclusion: Explaining the Japanese Experience
This thesis demonstrates that the Japanese puzzles arise not only because it is costly 
for firms to hire women and for couples to have children but also because men and 
women maintain a gender division of work at home and at work in order to conform 
to the status quo and maintain financial and social security. Because of value 
changes, mothers today are less likely to benefit financially from having children 
than mothers in the 1950s. This weakens financial interest as a motive of childcare. 
Mothers continue to take care of their own children because of other reasons. The 
pressure to conform to the status quo induces a sense of responsibility and fear, 
particularly after the 1970s. The status quo encourages women to feel responsible 
for unpaid childcare and they fear losing their reputation if they fail to satisfy these 
criteria. At the same time, it encourages men to feel responsible for earning a living 
for the family and to fear losing their job by failing to conform to co-workers. When 
the feelings induced by these pressures interact with altruism and an intrinsic joy in 
taking care of their own children, mothers specialising in childcare reveal levels of 
dissatisfaction with what they are doing. In anticipation of this, fewer women have 
children than before the 1970s, and fertility rates continue to decline.
This thesis also demonstrates that the status quo depends on a considerable 
amount of what Kuran terms preference falsification. In order to satisfy the status 
quo, men, particularly men in keiretsu, are likely to accept overwork and 
Tanshin-funin even when survey evidence suggests they might prefer spending time 
with the family.
The resulting confirmation of ‘male’ work patterns makes it particularly
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difficult for women to access elite career paths. Employers and colleagues expect 
female employees to start a family, and take periods of maternity and parental leave 
that will disrupt their employment. Following this expectation, they find it 
appropriate to assign women to assistant career paths, and/or to pressurise 
employees to leave their job after starting a family. Employers and colleagues are 
likely to view married women in employment as challenging the status quo. They 
find it appropriate to exclude married women from elite career paths, even when the 
women in question have served for longer than 30 years.
This helps explain why married women are paid so much less than their 
male counterparts even when they have served the same length of time in 
employment. It suggests that married women are discouraged from staying in the 
labour force. Most female elite university graduates do not satisfy the conditions of 
the status quo, as employers believe that maleness and selfless devotion to the 
employer are firmly linked. As a result, most women are excluded from elite career 
paths from the beginning of employment and the average woman is paid less than a 
male counterpart. These gender inequalities at work are likely to persist as long as 
people perceive the status quo as functioning and unchanging.
Furthermore, because women as employees are less likely to gain from 
educational qualifications than men, their purpose in gaining an education differ 
from that of men. As noted in Chapter Six, women educated in elite universities do 
not necessarily find a job in keiretsu. Women then pursue higher education not only 
for employment but also for marriage purposes. However, it is important to note that 
they make choices regarding education within the framework of the status quo, 
which encourages employers to hire male elite university graduates and parents to
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invest differently in a daughter and son’s education. Women’s educational 
qualifications work differently from men’s not simply because women aim lower 
than men but because women can expect smaller returns from employment.
In order to illustrate the details of the status quo affecting people’s choices, 
I have argued here about its role in the decline in fertility rates. The decline in 
fertility rates in Japan between 1975 and 2000 occurred because women resisted 
their subordinate role within the household, but did not more directly challenge the 
status quo which they believed to be unchangeable. The status quo of the family in 
Japan has forced society to hold on to subordinating attitudes towards women, which, 
in turn, has facilitated patterns of male socialisation. Traditional marriage 
arrangements pressure wives into performing the role of the subordinate wife in 
which women do not share tasks and time for unpaid care work with their husband, 
and society approves those who follow a traditional gender division of work in the 
family.
Furthermore, women, as workers, are not adequately paid or supported to 
rear children whilst in full or part-time employment. The subordination and 
inequality is, however, partially masked because mothers are encouraged to have 
interdependent preferences towards those cared for (Folbre and Weisskopf 1998; 
Folbre 2001b). Due to such interdependent personal preferences, mothers choose to 
act as carers in the family rather than seek employment in circumstances where 
quality childcare is not available.
A central part of my analysis is that current developments in Japan should 
be understood in terms of preference moulding by men and women, who form their 
preferences based on a strict gender division of work coupled with the prevalence of
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a system based on seniority wages and lifetime employment. Maleness is still an 
important part of the status quo in Japan and men seek to show the possession of this 
attribute by spending time with male peers and supervisors - even when their private 
preference on time use does not agree with public opinion. The fear of losing 
employment means they are more likely to shape these preferences to fit the status 
quo: this means that people ‘choose’ a status quo opinion even it is at odds with 
some of their other preferences. This general process of preference falsification is 
particularly marked.
Women are also deterred from acting according to preferences that go 
against the status quo; for if they act against the status quo, this may ruin their 
reputation. Male collective action in the workplace yields a larger husband’s income 
for the family, even if  this does not necessarily translate into an increase in financial 
support for women and children at home (Hashimoto 1996). Confronting public 
opinion run the risks of sanctions in both paid employment and marriage 
arrangements. When women want to have children, this sanction is crucial; for 
example, the costs of divorce are high for the wife since she cannot expect her 
husband to pay the full costs of child rearing after divorce (Ministry of Health and 
Welfare 1998: 78-81; Inoue and Ehara 20-21).
If men and women fear losing financial and social security, they are more 
likely to act upon preferences that fit to social norms. There may be a big disparity 
between the revealed preferences and inner preferences regarding the gender 
division of work in Japanese society; this is what Kuran calls preference falsification, 
and it can be seen in perception of overwork, Tanshin-funin and mothering. People 
shape their preferences to the status quo in order to get the best out of situations
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where they perceive the status quo as given and constant over time, and as Kuran 
argues, this creates a vicious circle. If people perceive the status quo as normal, and 
also fear the losses that may come if they challenge it, they may not express 
preferences that conflict with the status quo, even when many share these 
preferences. As a result, the status quo may persist even when many, or even the 
majority, are against it. In my reading, this now applies to the case of Japanese men 
and women.
When women perceive the status quo as given and constant, ‘rational’ 
women will choose to stay single in paid employment, to get married and stay in 
paid employment without children, or to have fewer children so that they can easily 
re-enter paid employment. The result in Japan has been persistent gender inequalities 
at work and a rapid decline in fertility rates during the period 1975-2000. Rapid 
industrial and economic development has positively affected men’s social position 
since the 1970s. In contrast with men in general, societal changes have negatively 
influenced married women, particularly mothers. Single women now may enjoy paid 
employment until they reach the average age of marriage, but after that, they are 
under strong pressure to choose either paid employment or having children. Women 
are caught in a dilemma of having to choose between accepting the role of a ‘female’ 
worker marginalized in a male-dominated environment, or being a selfless, caring 
mother.
Amongst women, it is mothers with higher educational qualifications, 
rather than those with lower educational qualifications, who are most affected by 
outside pressures when they work as employees. This pressure comes from 
employers and male peers at work, parents-in-law, and peer working mothers, all of
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whom influence their preferences regarding paid employment and children. At work, 
women with higher educational qualifications are under particular pressure to 
conform to male socialisation. At home, they are more likely to have to assume the 
major for childcare when they work outside the home, because they are more likely 
to live away from their own parents.
In the Introduction, I suggested that the decline in fertility rates reflects of a 
process of preference moulding in society, whereby men identify themselves 
primarily as members of a social organisation, and women identify themselves as 
care providers for children. What is questionable here is how long society can 
sustain the current status quo. Certainly, after the recession in the 1990s, 
associations of employers in large firms started to recognise the need to change the 
seniority wage and lifetime employment policies both key ingredients in the status 
quo.
Changes in the economy may then induce a small change. From the late 
1990s to early 2000s, many firms reviewed their unconditional provision of lifetime 
employment and a progressive wage by age for most men; in 2002, as many as 55.9 
per cent of firms introduced a new payment not based on a progressive pay by age 
for most men. However, as employers in keiretsu still prefer to hire a 
disproportionate number of male elite university graduates for elite career paths, this 
change alone is unlikely to change the status quo towards favouring women.
In addressing this problem, it is not enough to encourage women to stay at 
home and engage in unpaid child rearing, or to work as many hours as men without 
proper social provision of childcare: policy recommendations made by mainstream 
economists such as Machiko Osawa (1993) and Yashiro (2001). As this thesis has
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emphasised, mainstream neoclassical economic theory places preference formation 
outside its frame of reference. Consequently, its theory pays too little attention to the 
emotions that play such a significant part in forming preferences regarding care 
service labour.
A re-evaluation of care services as a whole is necessary and should be 
enforced so as to ensure that women are fairly rewarded; this process needs to 
include not only issues of time off work for children but also matters involving 
educational institutions and the courts. Society needs to reform the educational 
system (including the provision of scholarships for both sexes so as to reduce the 
effects of parental preferences regarding the education of their sons and daughters); 
the courts need to revise the interpretation of social values and norms (so as to 
reduce the conservative impact of the status quo); women and men need to feel they 
can have children even when they are not legally married. Taking these additional 
aspects into account, this thesis suggests that the provision of paid time off work for 
children for both parents is one of the crucial mechanisms for addressing gender 
inequality at work and declining fertility rates. For this purpose, society needs to 
re-value care work as a whole, revise seniority wages and lifetime employment for 
men, and introduce gender-friendly social support by means of social security and 
taxation. It will also be necessary for courts and the government to intervene more 
actively in employment practices within keiretsu in order to prevent employers and 
colleagues from sanctioning -  formally and informally - employees resist demands 
for overwork and Tanshin-funin.
Importantly, mothers today need to be rewarded as much as mothers before 
the 1970s; if so, it is more likely they will invest time in having children. If the
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government provides a further tax reduction and an increase in pension for working 
mothers when children are counted as dependants of mothers instead of fathers, this 
may increase a potential mother’s financial incentive to have children while 
remaining in employment.
Gender inequality at work and the decline in fertility rates are linked 
phenomena, and should be approached together, not separately. In current 
discussions, there is some nostalgia for the gender division in the pre-war era, as 
people seek to recover the moral code of Bushido from the pre-war era. This 
solution, however, is unlikely to resolve the problems of gender inequality at work 
and declining fertility. A closer look is needed at the motives encouraging parents 
and others to provide quality childcare services, without either romanticising 
mothering or glorifying selfless devotion to the employer. In this way, a better 
alternative to the status quo may be identified.
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Appendix
Chapter Nine
(A)
The data in the reports mainly cover the following items:
1) the total number of employees (men and women)
2) the type of industry
3) the products and services that the firm supplies
4) the average age of men and women
5) the average duration of service of men and women
6) the number who took maternity leave in the year 1994-5
7) the treatment of childcare leave (length and pay),
8) the number of women in managerial positions,
9) the highest position of women in 1994,
10) the names of schools from which female workers graduated,
11) the number of new employees in 1994,
12) the average monthly pay of men and women (for 394 firms only),
13) the starting year of business,
14) the names of directors
15) The names of the schools from which the directors graduated.
16) The total number of married women
(B)
1) Agriculture
Number of firms 
5
2) Construction 34
3) Manufacturing 274
4) Real Estate 9
5) Transportation and Communication 19
6) Utilities 8
2) Retailing and Wholesaling 110
3) Services 36
9) Finance and Insurance 121
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(C)
Five firms are in manufacturing and one in finance and insurance. The 5 firms in 
manufacturing include 3 in electronics, 1 in food and 1 in medicine. The only firm in the 
finance group is a trust bank. In the group with 24-months’ leave, the 9 firms in 
manufacturing form the largest proportions; 5 firms are in finance and insurance, 2 in services, 
and 1 in transportation and communication. Four firms are in electronics, 2 in chemicals, 1 in 
gum products, and 1 in precision machine manufacturing. Four out of 5 in the finance group 
are security firms while 1 is a bank.
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